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Abstract
This thesis explores corporate responsiveness to radical change in the context of
learning and adaptation. The empirical research is based on the experiences of large
Korean companies. It is assumed that the Asian financial crisis has challenged their
continuous survival, and the prime aim is to see whether restructuring has been learning
centred. Thus, I am seeing whether chaebol act as latest theory would predict. The
second aim is to examine the contextual variables, which are firm-specific as well as
institutional environment-specific, that affect corporate learning and adaptation. It
illustrates and criticises the powers of the evolutionary and institutional approach to the
firm. This thesis makes four main contributions to the theorisation of learning and
adaptation. First, it illustrates that learning alone cannot guarantee short-term as well
as long-term adaptation of the firm. I argue that both learning and restructuring are
necessary conditions for short-term as well as long-term adaptation of the firm.
Second, it stresses that learning and adaptation are a product of a variety of variables
within and without a firm. This is to stress the importance of institutional and firm-
specific contexts that lead to the diversity and specificity of corporate adaptation and
learning. Third, I argue that learning involves all forms of knowledge, including tacit
and codified and that the interplay between incremental and radical learning is critical to
understanding processes of learning-based adaptation. Finally, I argue that
geographical proximity alone is not sufficient for understanding the nature of learning
and that 'proximity' in learning should be studied along relational/organisational
dimensions that go beyond geographical dimensions. These theoretical questions are
examined through case studies of two of Korea's largest electronics companies: LG
Electronics Company (LGE) and Samsung Electronics Company (SEC). This
empirical study draws on the qualitative methodology centred on in-depth interviews
and secondary sources.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It is clear that the chaebol need to act, both to survive the present crunch and, in the
longer term, to attract the investment funds they need to grow. They must learn to run
their companies in an entirely new way, abandoning empire building to focus on
creating value for shareholders (Akaba, Budde and Choi, 1998).
This is but one example amongst a number of studies that evaluate the problem with
Korea's giant conglomerates, the chaebol, and that suggest changes for survival since
the financial crisis. In fact, the chaebol have already been exposed to increasing global
competition led by rapid changes in market and technology. In these circumstances,
the financial crisis has posed a great challenge to their survival. In the wake of the
crisis, they have come under a great deal of political pressure from the government and
non-governmental civic organisations, suggesting that the corporate sectors should be at
the heart of structural reforms (see for example Kang, C. 1999; Kim, K. 1999; OECD,
2000; 2001). Despite their leading role in the nation's rapid economic growth and
industrialisation, the chaebol have been blamed for Korea's financial crisis and their
survival is at a crossroads.
The term chaebol refers to the Korea-specific business system, commonly business
conglomerates owned and managed by founders and their families (Kang, M., 1996;
Kang, C., 1999; Kim, E., 1989). The features of the typical chaebol include: 1) they
are conglomerates of many companies; 2) they tend to spread across industries; 3) the
major decisions associated with business strategy and investment tend to be made by the
founders and their families. Although member firms (or affiliated firms) are listed as
independent firms, they are linked by means of interlocking ownership or cross-
shareholding. This ownership structure has made it easy for chaebol owners to control
member firms by their hands despite their limited equity in member firms (Chung et al.,
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1997). It illustrates that most of large private companies in Korea are associated with
one of large conglomerates either directly or indirectly.
In general, scholars draw on two theoretical positions in order to understand the
characteristics and evolution of large firms in Korea. The first is a political economy
perspective, which places its interest on the role of the state in the evolution of chaebol
and emphasises the symbiotic relationship between the state and chaebol (e.g. Kim, E.
M., 1988, 1989). On the other hand, studies in strategic management and
entrepreneurship tend to focus on the role of entrepreneurship and the firm's continuous
efforts to acquire new technologies and knowledge (e.g. Hobday, 1995; Kim, I., 1997).
In modern Korean history, the emergence of the chaebol can be traced back to the early
1960s. The authoritarian regime that emerged through a military coup in 1961 found it
necessary to gain legitimacy and the support of the people. The regime realised the
urgent need for revitalising the nation's lagging economy and achieving rapid
industrialisation. The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan was undertaken in
1962. The plan focused on the transformation of the nation's economy from labour-
intensive light industries into more capital-intensive and technology-advanced
industries, including chemicals, iron & steel, machinery, automobiles, shipbuilding and
electronics. The political leaders believed that the solution to overcome the weakness
of the nation's economic system, characterised by scarce natural resources and weak
industrial foundations, would be to promote import-substitution, export-oriented
industries. However, the government found it difficult to achieve such an ambitious
development project in a short-term. It realised that these were a need to build
cooperative relationships with existing entrepreneurs who ran large firms. Thanks to
special favours and incentives provided by the government, the chaebol were able to
rapidly grow by expanding their size as well as diversifying their business areas.
Above all, the government helped chaebol to acquire foreign loans with low interest rate
and provided them with many other financial incentives to start new businesses,
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especially in capital-intensive industries that the government intended to promote. The
government played a catalytic role for chaebol to access and learn foreign technology,
as they had no technical expertise, know-how and skills necessary to establish and run
such new businesses. The government established public research institutes dedicated
to technological development in key strategic industries such as electronics and
machinery and the dissemination of more advanced technology and new knowledge in
private firms. Take the example of Korean electronics firms. With the help of
government support to promote technological and production capabilities of the
domestic firms and the firms' own continuous efforts to learn and accumulate new
knowledge, Korean electronics firms were able to establish organisational and
technological capabilities to survive in market competition and compete for
international markets. 1 According to Ernst (2000a: 5), Korean firm capabilities
centred on three areas. First was the mastery of production capabilities for mass
production beyond a simple assembly capability. Second, they acquired some related
minor-change capabilities, ranging from "reverse engineering" to "analytical design"
and some "system engineering" capabilities which involve the acquisition of the
capabilities of process-reengineering and product customisation in limited areas. Third,
they established the capacity to set up new production lines quickly and at low cost.
Utilising a carrot-and-stick strategy, the government forced firms to accelerate
technological learning (Kim, L., 1997). If new entrants to technology-intensive
industries displayed good performance, the government gave them additional financial
loans or allowed them to embark on other new businesses. If not, they were not able to
borrow additional loans as well as they did not have an industrial license to start new
businesses. In addition, the government strictly regulated the imports of foreign
products in technology-intensive sectors and controlled foreign direct investment, in
order to promote the incubation of domestic firms. The business environment,
characterised by a protected domestic market and guaranteed domestic demand, allowed
chaebol to focus more on finding financial resources to invest into production facilities
1 For more details on technological learning by Korean firms in general and electronics firms in
particular, see Hobday (1995) and Kim, L. (1997).
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than on improving managerial skills and creating the market (Lee, K., 1999).
Under 'guided capitalism' where the state plays a guiding role in shaping and reshaping
the national economy (Chang, 1994), a handful of chaebol came to dominate Korea's
industrial landscape (Jung, S., 1997). The continuous expansion of scale economies
provided a basis for them to successively diversify into a number of related or unrelated
industries in a short period of time (Amsden, 1989). By 1986, the top ten chaebol
accounted for more than 65 per cent of GNP and, in 1989, total sales of the top four
chaebol account for around half the GNP (Kang, M. 1996).
Despite their remarkable role as drivers of rapid industrialisation in the Korean economy,
chaebol have had a number of negative effects on the economy. As many
commentators have pointed out, it is widely accepted that chaebol's mistaken
management practices played a crucial role in bringing about the 1997 financial crisis
(Chang eta!., 1998; Kang, C. K., 1999; Mathews, 1998). These management practices
arose from owner-centric corporate governance strategies (see, for more details,
Economic Studies Division at the Social Participation Alliance Group, 1999).
Although, at the early stage of chaebol formation, entrepreneurial owners without doubt
contributed to the rapid growth of their companies through inherent management
capability, paternalistic management has been identified as a major cause of bad
management practices. It has been argued that some of chaebol founders tend not only
to show arbitrary leadership but also make reckless investments. They invested too
excessively in already overcrowded industries, resulting in huge debts, in spite of a lack
of core competences and expertise. To borrow bank loans and gain special favours,
they made great efforts to manage political connections with the government officials
and political leaders, under a regime of what might be called 'crony capitalism' (Chang
et al., 1998). Subsequently, reckless investments led to low efficiency, causing low
profitability.
Nevertheless, it is also true that some chaebol, on the other side, have made great efforts
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to be more competitive in international competition through continuous learning in
technology and marketing. These firms have been able to continue to survive and
some of them have become international players. Consequently, while many chaebol
have failed to manage their businesses, others have become stronger and bigger.
Amongst the top 10 chaebol in 1970s, only few have survived to date, including
Samsung, LG (previously Lucky Goldstar), Hyundai and SK (previously Sun Kyung).
These chaebol have something in common. Broadly speaking, it is said that they have
responded more effectively to changes in the market environment. They have made
greater effort to build up both technological and organisational capabilities of their own
than others. Leading member firms of each chaebol are well known both domestically
and internationally.
To sum up, corporate adaptation in the period of the national industrialisation was
centred on keeping pace with the government's industrial policy and monopolising the
domestic industries through economies of scale and diversification. This means of
'adaptation' has become increasingly obsolete since the late 1980s. First,
overcompetition in the same industry between chaebol has resulted in the rapid
saturation of the domestic market. Second, labour costs have rapidly increased since
the great labour disputes occurred in the mid 1980s. Third, the protection of the
domestic market has been increasingly deregulated. Fourth, international market
competition has become unprecedentedly intense and technology has become more
complex and unpredictable.
Above all, the financial crisis has provided large Korean firms with another great
pressure to reform corporate governance and management practices. As OECD (2001)
point out,
As explained in the past three OECD Economic Survey of Korea, fundamental
weaknesses in these [corporate and financial] sectors made Korea vulnerable to
contagion from other Asian countries in 1997 and, moreover, accounted for the
severity of the crisis. In short, Korea's highly-leveraged companies were vulnerable
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to the cyclical downturn and external shocks experienced in 1996 and 1997, which
resulted in severe balance-sheet problems and a series of major bankruptcies (p. 127).
Although there have been a great deal of debate on the cause of the financial crisis, it
has been agreed that the nature of the crisis should be found in chaebol's outdated
management practices.
The problem is capacity. The top chaebol value size over profitability, diversification
over specialization, and huge debt over a solid equity base (Business Week, 14
December 1998: p. 72).
[A shareholder activist said]: "The issue here is the power wielded by founding
families" 	
 "Without tackling governance, you can't expect significant reforms at
the chaebol" (Business Week, 24 April 2000: p. 66).
In this context, the government, as the developmental state, has been a central force in
•
guiding and reshaping the paths of corporate adaptation. The government, on the basis
of the guidance of the IMF, has initiated a corporate restructuring programme and such
the state intervention has been central to the radical moves of chaebol towards
improving management practices and governance structure.
This thesis would not attempt to unpack in detail the nature of the financial crisis or the
government-led corporate reform processes as prime concerns, as it is beyond the focus
of the thesis. However, in this thesis these issues will also be considered in the course
of analysis. This is not only because this has critical implications for grasping the
recent paths of adaptation by large Korean firms but also because the 1997 financial
turmoil signifies that Korean firms can no longer secure their survival with their
existing mode of adaptation. Whether or not they are able to sustain adaptation and
evolution may rely on how they effectively restructure to adapt to the current situational
context.
Based on this historical and situational context, this thesis focuses on understanding the
dynamics of how large Korean firms have responded to radical change. From the
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evolutionary point of view, radical changes in environment imply that firms should seek
radically different ways of doing things in order to sustain continuous adaptation.
However, it may not be easy for firms to change and thereby fit to such a new
environment. Theoretically, adaptation, especially in the face of radical change, means
a change in routines, strategy or structure (Dosi and Malerba, 1996; Levinthal, 1996).
This may involve more complex organisational processes than those involved in
incremental change.
In this thesis, 'adaptation' is defined as organisational responses to environmental
change. This thesis debates on two different theoretical positions in explaining
corporate adaptation: one that focuses on corporate restructuring, another that centres on
corporate learning. Until the 1980s, in geography, a restructuring perspective had
dominated in explaining corporate success and adaptation. It was argued that the
continuous increase of international competition had eroded the competitiveness of
large bureaucratic conglomerates with diversified businesses. A restructuring
perspective deals with all the ways in which a firm adapts under pressure, from
specialisation to downsizing and job cuts. The aim of corporate restructuring is to
secure lasting competitive advantage through organisational changes, designed for cost
cutting, the enhancement of productivity and the improvement of market positions
(Hayter, 1997). In other words, the task of restructuring seeks changes in existing
routine and structure. In this perspective, the outcome does not always lead to a
revolutionary change or successful adaptation. What is emphasised instead is that
corporate restructuring reflects the firm's complex, multifaceted processes of adaptation
to environmental change. But this perspective pays little attention to how firms adapt
to environmental change and why some firms adapt successfully, while some others fail
to adapt. Therefore, this perspective does not give insights into a context-specific
explanation of corporate learning and adaptation.
More recently, especially since the 1990s, academic focus on corporate adaptation and
evolution has shifted towards exploring the nature of learning that leads to the dynamic
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competitiveness. This perspective, drawing upon evolutionary and competence-based
theories of the firm, emphasises the influence of knowledge, learning and competence
on corporate evolution and corporate success (Hodgson, 1998b; Amin and Cohendet,
1999, 2000). Learning is recognised as path-dependent or self-reinforcing in nature.
For this reason, firms are seen to have, to a greater or lesser extent, difficulties in
radically changing their routines and structure. It is argued that incremental learning,
which means continuous improvements within existing routines, is important for
competitiveness, but that it is less appropriate for radical shifts in environment. To
adapt to such a circumstance, firms need to seek more strategic and radical learning,
involving a series of strategic activities that seek innovation in organisation, process and
products leading to new ways of doing things (Kuwada, 1998; Hudson, 2001).
Learning which focuses on adaptation to Tadical change may pose a ge.atev challeage, to
the firm than 'routine learning' (Amin and Cohendet, 1999), for it implies the
unlearning of established routines and practices (Hedberg, 1981; Nystrom and Starbuck,
1984) or, at times, requires learning new knowledge outside of the firm to which it is
likely to be difficult to have access (Amin and Wilkinson, 1999).
In this thesis, I will explore corporate learning and adaptation by combining a learning
perspective and a restructuring perspective. That is because I believe that the
dynamics of corporate adaptation and evolution are an outcome of the mixture of
perpetual processes of restructuring and learning, both continuous and discontinuous.
This thesis, therefore, attempts to recognise that both learning and restructuring are
necessary conditions for short-term as well as long-term adaptation of the firm. This
is to reject uni-dimensional explanations of corporate change. Based on this unity,
some key arguments are proposed.
First, I attempt to recognise that learning and adaptation are a product of processes
reflecting a variety of variables within and without a firm. This means to acknowledge
the importance of institutional and firm-specific contexts that are likely to lead to the
diversity and specificity of corporate adaptation and learning. There are a lot of factors
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that make corporate learning and adaptation context-specific. These may include the
firm's evolutionary trajectory and path-dependence, leadership, business strategy,
characteristics of organisational knowledge and competences and the (spatial) forms of
organisation.
Second, I argue that learning alone cannot guarantee short-term as well as long-term
adaptation of the firm. My argument is that in the long-term, adaptability is sustained,
or improved, through the combination of restructuring and learning in pursuit of
adaptation. In a rapid shift in circumstances, firms tend to implement classical
strategies of restructuring, such as the downsizing of non-profitable and marginal assets,
employment adjustment or change of organisational structure. In some respects, these
modes of adaptation are probably more critical than other dimensions such as
technological learning and inter-firm alliances. In addition, there may be a difficulty
in specifying strict boundaries between restructuring and learning. In some
restructuring activities, successful adaptation is likely to be dependent upon learning
processes followed in the course of restructuring.
Third, I argue that corporate learning requires taking advantage of knowledge in various
forms. Some of these sources may exist beyond a boundary of the firm. As opposed
to the view stressing the powers of tacit knowledge and incremental learning in
sustaining a firm's competitive advantage, I emphasises that learning involves all forms
of knowledge, including tacit and codified. As a result, the distinction made in the
literature between incrementalism and radicalism in learning is difficult to make.
Instead, I recognise that the interplay between incremental and radical learning is
critical to understanding processes of learning-based adaptation.
Fourth, I want to challenge the growing received wisdom in economic geography on the
benefits of localised learning for firm competitiveness and on the power of geographical
proximity in learning. This tendency results from a lack of the proper consideration of
how learning takes place in the firm and where the sources of knowledge and learning
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come from. I will argue that geographical proximity alone is not sufficient for
understanding the nature of learning and that 'proximity' in learning should be studied
along relational/organisational dimensions that go beyond geographical dimensions.
These questions are theorised in more detail in the next two chapters, which form the
conceptual framework for the later two corporate case studies. Chapter 2 attempts to
conceptualise corporate adaptation, by drawing on various theories of the firm. To
understand the dynamics of corporate adaptation in a context of radical change, the
chapter presents a dual perspective on adaptation that incorporates a learning
perspective and a restructuring perspective. By focusing on different sorts of learning
and various types of restructuring strategy, it will argue that corporate adaptation seems,
to a greater or lesser extent, to rely on both the process and outcome of organisational
change, both strategic and non-strategic actions, and both the internal structure of
governance and external environments. Additionally, it is emphasised that corporate
adaptation, as far as corporate learning is concerned, can be dependent on a balanced
combination of incremental and radical learning. This point of view implies the
complex ways in which firms learn to adapt in the face of radical change — in ways that
are different from textbook expectations. This chapter then approaches three different
kinds of knowledge communities in the firm: communities of practice, epistemic
communities and task-force teams. Its aim is to explore how corporate learning takes
place in the firm and the role of these communities in learning and adaptation.
Although each of these communities is distinct in terms of its origin and purpose, I
suggest that these communities can be vital sources of both incremental and radical
learning by drawing on tacit and codified knowledge in the process of their own
problem-solving activities.
In Chapter 3, I review the geographical literature on learning and proximity that stresses
the role of the regions and geographical proximity in sustaining competitive advantage.
I develop an alternative, relational/organisational perspective on the sources of
knowledge and learning in the firm. In doing this, I argue that geographical proximity
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alone is not sufficient for understanding the nature of learning and thereby the centrality
of proximity in learning should be studied along relational/organisational proximity that
go beyond geographical proximity. I then stress that the sources of learning exist in
organisational spaces, with complex geographies that not only mobilise distributed
knowledge and competences but also combine varied forms of knowledge beyond the
simple demarcation of tacit and codified knowledge.
These theoretical questions on learning and restructuring are investigated through case
studies of two of Korea's largest electronics companies: LG Electronics Company
(LGE) and Samsung Electronics Company (SEC). 2 Both companies are recognised as
the flagship company of each chaebol group, the LG group and the Samsung group. In
addition, they are rivals in both domestic and international markets in many segments of
the electronics industry. Although both companies are the product of the same national
institutional context and both are engaged in similar fields of electronics industry, they
display differences in terms of corporate culture, managerial practices, evolutionary
trajectory, business structure, core strengths (or competences), and spatial form of
organisation. Like other big Korean firms, they have been at the forefront of pressure
to restructure. In addition, both companies have increasingly faced intense
competition in international markets and technologies: in the electronics industry, rapid
technological progress led by technological convergence and an increasing market
competition have forced firms to adapt rapidly. This makes them good choices to
study the role of adaptation to radical changes.
In Chapter 4 the methodology of the empirical work is discussed. This chapter
outlines the methodological underpinnings of this thesis and the issues raised by a
fieldwork based on qualitative research methods such as interviewing and an analysis of
secondary sources.
2 Daewoo, the third largest electronics firm, has undergone severe hardships after the crisis, since the
Daewoo group has been dismantled owing to the failure of management. This constrained access to the
firm.
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Chapters 5 and 6 focus on LG and Samsung respectively. Each case study explores the
diverse sources of adaptation, including downsizing, employment adjustment,
production shifts, organisational and process innovations, technological learning.
Chapter 5 on LG illustrates in particular the processes of learning, taking place between
R&D units, and between R&D and manufacturing. This in-depth case study
emphasises the influence of relational/organisational proximity on the changing process
of R&D organisation. The chapter also reveals the dynamic ways of intra-firm social
learning through both formal and informal groups which are seen as critical action
learning groups for both incremental and radical learning. By contrast, chapter 6 on
Samsung, with the particular focus on the role of the CEO's leadership, reveals a series
of attempts to destroy path-dependence and sustain organisational innovation. This
chapter starts by introducing a series of attempts to destroy path-dependence and to
sustain organisational innovation together with the general process of restructuring in
the face of the crisis. In turn, it explains the more detailed ways of restructuring and
learning in radical shifts. It draws attention to geographies of corporate learning and
the role of proximities. In doing so, it presents the clustering and co-location strategies
of organisational units.
Chapter 7 compares the two companies to tease out similarities and differences in
adaptation strategies, but also to identify the dimensions that influence restructuring and
learning and lead to variations in these processes. The comparison between the two
Korean firms is elaborated based on the theoretical framework explored in theory
chapters. Throughout the whole chapter, an emphasis is placed on recognising the
context specificity of corporate learning and adaptation. First, it highlights that
traditional methods of restructuring can be used as a critical device to sustain learning
and adaptation, particularly in the face of radical change. Second, the firm-specific
context leads to different processes and ways of adaptation, particularly in terms of
learning, as well as usages of space. Particular emphasis is on the spatial forms of
organisation that make restructuring and learning strategies different. Finally, it
highlights the role of formal learning as well as social learning in adaptation.
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The concluding chapter challenges the existing theorisation of corporate learning and
adaptation. It emphasises the context-specific nature of learning and adaptation, the
indivisibility of restructuring and learning in sustaining continuous adaptation, the
inseparability of incremental and radical learning, which indicates the incorporation of
diverse forms of knowledge in learning, and the indivisibility of geographical and
relational/organisational proximity for effective learning.
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Chapter 2
Theorising corporate adaptation and learning
2.1. Introduction
In an era of economic globalisation, capitalist firms have been under great pressure to
cope with increasing international competition in markets and technology. In this
context, knowledge, learning and innovation have become fashionable words in the
economic literature. Many argue that the capability to learn competitive knowledge is
critical for the continuous survival and evolution of the firm. A great deal of attention
has been paid to exploring the sources and generating mechanisms of learning and
innovation. Among various theoretical perspectives aiming to explain corporate
evolution and adaptation, a knowledge or competence-based approach has been
recognised as a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of learning (e.g.
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Foss, 1998; Hodgson, 1998).
From this approach conceiving the firm as a processor of knowledge and a learning
entity, the knowledge residing in the firm is composed of organisational competences.
It focuses on the problem of how competences are generated, maintained, replicated,
and modified. This has a direct connection with learning. Learning is associated
with the creation and development of competitive knowledge within the firm and its
wider networks. However, such learning cannot take place in a social vacuum.
Learning involves not only a cognitive process, which manifests in the acquiring,
exchanging and transferring of knowledge in an organisational context (Odgaard and
Hudson, 1998), but also a non-cognitive process, which is characterised by unconscious
learning (Amin and Cohendet, 1999b; Wenger, 1998). However, whatever its nature,
learning is achieved through social interactions between agents and can be of crucial
importance to the continual adaptation and evolution of the fin-n.
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Adaptation involves more than the dimension of learning, but the competence-based
view tends to deal with aspects of adaptation only when discussing the pressures on
organisational routines that are constructed as a result of continuous learning. The
concept of adaptation needs to be conceptualised in a broader sense. In this chapter, I
will define this concept as corporate responses to environmental change, which take
various modes of restructuring and learning. In this sense, this chapter presents a dual
perspective on adaptation, one that stresses both learning and wider restructuring. It
emphasises that both are not completely independent and are complementary in
corporate adaptation.
In the first part, I attempt to conceptualise corporate learning. I begin by defining such
basic constituents as knowledge and competence, which are involved in the process and
mechanism of learning. Then I explore the dynamics of the learning process, focusing
on the context of organisational change and adaptation. The theoretical emphases are
on the definition of 'learning' as incremental improvements drawing on the
development of tacit knowledge as well as radical innovations based upon a series of
strategic actions taken to access new knowledge. However, from the following
sections, I question that a competence-based learning approach does not provide a
sufficient understanding of how learning takes place in the firm and of what kinds of
corporate strategy are sought to sustain adaptation and in what ways. This is an
attempt to show that adaptation and learning are not pre-defined and self-evident.
Based on these questions, the following section attempts to explore the role of
'communities within the firm' in corporate learning and adaptation. Although there
are various kinds of communities in the firm, this section deals with informal forms of
organisation, including communities of practice, epistemic communities and task-force
teams. Communities of practice would be helpful for understanding the characteristics
of intra-firm social learning taking place through daily working processes, while
epistemic communities and task-force teams are involved in intentional and strategic
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learning. Although each of them is distinct in terms of its origin and purpose, I
suggest that these communities can be vital sources of both incremental and radical
learning by drawing on tacit and explicit knowledge in the process of their own
problem-solving activities.
In section 2.4, I suggest that corporate restructuring is a means of sustaining corporate
adaptation, and that its process and outcome rely on firm-specific contexts such as
routines, learning and competences. Furthermore, corporate restructuring occurs
through the adoption of multiple strategies, some of which entails learning associated
with the continuous development and discontinuous creation of knowledge and
competence. The first two parts are concerned with non-learning-based dimensions of
restructuring such as downsizing, employment adjustment and organisational change,
while the latter parts involve learning-based dimensions of restructuring such as
strategic alliances, innovations in process, product and organisation. In the last section,
I attempt to link a learning perspective and a restructuring perspective. Here, I argue
that corporate adaptation can be better understood by combining both theoretical
positions than only taking any one side between the two.
2.2. Defining corporate adaptation
One of the central themes in evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm
relates to how firms adapt to environmental change (Metcalfe and Calderini, 1997).3
3 In fact, organisational theories also have a variety of theoretical branches, called Open Systems (OS)
perspectives, which are closely associated with theorising the relationship between organisation and the
environment. As Nohria and Gulati (1994) discuss:
An important contribution of OS theorists to organizational analysis has been their explicit
focus on organizational adaptation over time. This has been sparked by the recognition that if
organizations are a product of their environments, they must respond to changing environments
over time. A crucial difference among OS theorists lies in their conception of the adaptive
abilities of firms (p. 538).
Although my focus on the issue of adaptation is limited to evolutionary and competence-based theories of
the firm and there is limited space to elaborate in full these organisational theories, it would be useful to
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Adaptation is considered crucial for the survival and evolution of the firm, as business
environments surrounding the firm have become increasingly complex and turbulent.
Definitions of the term adaptation tend to be given with two contrasting perspectives.
One view is interested in 'adaptation' in order to emphasise the path-dependent nature
of organisational response to environmental change, while the second view recognises
'adaptation' as a product of firm's strategic and non-strategic responses to
environmental change.
Some writers, who are interested in the influence of learning on organisational evolution
and change, refer to the way in which firms show path-dependent responses to
environmental change (e.g. Foss, 1998; Levitt and March, 1996). In evolutionary and
competence-based theories of the firm, the firm is seen as a changing, but relatively
durable entity, implying the possibility of the firm to change tends to become
increasingly low over time (Hodgson, 1998b). This means that the state of the firm at
a given point in time is path-dependent, signifying that present and past behaviours
display a similar pattern (Foss, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The evolutionary
path of the firm is embodied in organisational routines, which refer to regular and
predictable behavioural patterns of firms.
For Levitt and March (1996: 517), the concept of 'routine' does not just include the
forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies and technologies around which
look at in brief each of theoretical streams in the context of adaptation as their theorising is to a great or
less extent associated with evolutionary and institutional understanding of corporate learning and
adaptation. First, the crux of structural contingency theory lies in the argument that firm's ability of
adaptation to a specific environment depends on the fit between organisational structure and the
environment (see Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 as the seminal work). Second,
institutional theory is concerned with a broader social, cultural and institutional context that induces
similarity in the behaviours of firms (see Scott, 1983, 1987; Davis and Powell, 1990 as the seminal work).
This theory deals mainly with the influence of the state, professional employees within the organisation
and other organisations in the process of institutional isomorphism (Nohria and Gulati, 1994). Third,
resource dependence theory pays its primary attention to the role of inter-organisational networks as a
strategic response to environmental uncertainty (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967 as the
seminal work). Fourth, population ecology theory takes a distinctive position by arguing that the
specificity of environmental context determines the survival of organisations (see Hannan and Freeman,
1977 as the seminal work). In this theory the ability of organisations to adapt to the environment is
ignored. In addition to these theories, Nohria and Gulati (1994) deal with a network theory and a
transaction cost theory as part of OS theories.
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organisations are constructed and through which they operate. It also involves the
structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, culture, and knowledge that support,
elaborate and contracts the formal routines. Specifically, routine is an executable
capability for repeated performance in a context that an organisation in response to
selective pressures has been familiar with (Cohen et al., 1996). Organisational
routines are transmitted and reproduced incrementally through both the intentional and
unintentional behaviours of an organisation, although this does not mean that business
behaviours always follow regular and predictable patterns. This is to emphasise that
there are stochastic elements both in the determination and in the outcome of decisions
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Organisational routines are created as the result of learning processes involving the
construction of competences (Levinthal, 1996). In a relatively stable environment,
such an attribute of routines therefore provides a source of organisational competences.
It is, however, paradoxical that routine is likely to create an inertia that constrains
organisational change. Inertia is often the product of successful adaptation to the past
environment, as a firm develops ways of operating that appear well suited to its internal
and external environment (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Levinthal, 1991). There is
the possibility that the path-dependent nature of organisational behaviour based on
routines restricts organisational change, even in the face of stimuli external to the
activity and decision rule in question (Helfat, 1998). The reason is that the strategies
deployed in order to adapt to an established environment are not necessarily suited to a
transformed environment. This implies that incremental or evolutionary adaptation
can be the cause of an organisational lock-in that restricts adaptability to a changing
environment. In this view, the term adaptation refers to the response to changes in
environment.
However, this definition of adaptation is unnecessarily narrow. A firm's responses to
environmental change can be diverse. Firms attempt to adapt to environmental
turbulence by drawing on various adaptation strategies, such as changes in organisation,
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leadership, product and process. For Laitinen (2000: 805), the adaptation strategy is
defined as a response strategy to the environment. In a similar vein, Sharfman and
Dean (1997) define 'adaptation' as the series of a firm's strategic choices about how the
organisation should respond to perceived threats or opportunities. Dosi and Malerba
(1996) argue that adaptation occurs when the firm changes its strategy, structure or
some other core attribute to fit some new environmental contingency.
In a nutshell, adaptation represents organisational responses to environmental change.
When we understand the concept of adaptation like this, not all the strategies that firms
deploy may entail learning in a direct way (Levinthal, 1996). Some of the adaptation
strategies may centre on gaining new knowledge and competences and sustaining
organisational and technological innovations, which will necessarily be accompanied by
a learning process. Those may include inter-firm alliances and R&D activities.
Meanwhile, other forms of firm strategy can concentrate on cost reduction through the
dimensions of restructuring such as downsizing, employment adjustment and
organisational change. It can be assumed that these two forms of adaptation strategies
involve distinctive processes that have little to do with one another. However, I argue
that both forms of adaptation strategies need to be understood as complementary or, in
some sense, indivisible processes, as effective adaptation can be realised through
complex organisational processes that bring together restructuring and learning. The
next section takes into account a learning perspective on adaptation.
2.3. A competence-based learning perspective
2.3.1. Learning and competence
The recent development of the competence-based approach to the firm has put the
concept of learning at the forefront of studies on organisational change. Learning is
regarded as the development of skills and knowledge via access to new knowledge or
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the improvement of an established knowledge structure. This definition recognises
that learning relates to the creation and development of knowledge and competence
through mobilising existing internal knowledge, as well as through the acquisition of
knowledge outside of the firm.
Since organisational theorists such as Selznick (1957) and Penrose (1959) introduced
the concept of competence to identify the distinction between firms, it has become a
major concept in the evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm.
Competence means what firms 'can do well' and 'core competence' what they can do
'better than the others' (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The concept of 'distinctive
competence' expresses the distinction between internal resources such as knowledge
and competences and the different potential for continuous evolution that exist between
individual firms. Competences are basically said to include the sets of routines,
differentiated skills and knowledge, the ability to combine these sets of knowledge, and
secondary assets which express the efficiency of problem-solving procedures (Cohendet
et al., 1999). More specifically, the constituent elements of organisational
competences include the ability to access, incorporate and use externally derived
information and knowledge, the capability to learn and generate knowledge and
information internally, the mastery of technologies and production, the applicability and
effectiveness of problem-solving procedures, and the understanding of demand and
user's requirements (Dosi and Malerba, 1996). On the other hand, competences could
also imply firm-specific routines that coordinate and govern corporate internal
relationships (Coriat and Dosi, 1998).
Looking at these characteristics, it can be argued that competences do not lie in
particular products or markets, but in organisational processes and capabilities that
enable firms to co-ordinate activities and make use of their assets (Liedtka, 1999).
Moreover, organisational competences are said to be collective and tacit. They cannot
be reduced to the sum of competences possessed by members of the organisation,
because they tend to be embedded in the nature of collective social relationships within
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the organisation. In addition, competence, particularly core competence, is seen as
non-transferrable and inimitable. This highlights the differences in dynamic
competences among firms (Foss, 1993; Hodgson, 1998). In this view, the firm is seen
as an entity seeking to obtain and sustain a competitive advantage through the
cumulative development of a distinctive set of organisational competences (Liedtka,
1999). In this respect, organisational competences constitute the basis of competitive
advantage and learning is central to creating and promoting competences.
The idea of firm-specific competence has been developed from the competence-based
approach to the firm. In contrast to the contractual approach that conceives the firm as
simply 'a processor of information' for optimising allocation of resources, the
competence-based approach recognises the firm as not only 'a repository of knowledge,
experience, and skill' but also as 'a processor of knowledge' for creating resources
which consist of a firm's competitive competences (Amin and Cohendet, 1999a). In
this sense, knowledge becomes a crucial element of organisational competence.
2.3.2. Knowledge and learning
Competence-based firm theorists stress the distinction between knowledge and
information. According to them, information is a basic constituent necessary for the
production of knowledge. On the other hand, knowledge is produced through a
process of cognition and interpretation. Kogut and Zander (1992) state that
information implies a know-what, while knowledge implies a know-how. In their
OECD report on the knowledge-based economy (1996: 12), Foray and Lundvall also
argue that the concept of knowledge is much broader than information, because of its
tacit dimension. They distinguish between the know-what and know-why as codified
forms of knowledge and the know-how and know-who as tacit forms of knowledge.
The `know-what' refers to knowledge about facts that usually exist in the form of
codified information, while the 'know-why' means the scientific knowledge of the
principles that underlies technological development in most industries. These forms of
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knowledge can be codified and obtained through reading scripts and books, attending
lectures and conferences and accessing databases. By contrast, the 'know-how' refers
to skills or the capability to solve a certain problem. The 'know-who' involves
information about who knows what and who knows how to do what. Thus it is often
said to be a prerequisite for the formation of social networks that are critical not just to
access external sources of knowledge but also to make use of that knowledge efficiently.
These forms of knowledge are tacit, being difficult to transfer from one person to
another.
Since Michael Polanyi (1967) who emphasised some years ago the tacit dimension in
the epistemology of knowledge, scholars have discussed the role of diverse forms of
knowledge in organisational competence. Two forms of knowledge especially are
contrasted: the tacit and the codified. Tacit or non-codified knowledge involves
specific skills and know-how, which are not transferable beyond the context in which
they are produced and embedded. Tacit knowledge can be acquired through
experience, direct observation, imitation and interaction (Hodgson, 1999). These can
be devised through on-the-job-training, apprenticeship and daily work practice, personal
rotation, informal meeting, block conference and so on.
Some types of learning are related to the acquisition of tacit knowledge. For example,
Arrow (1962) refers to learning-by-doing' as a way of acquiring knowledge.
Learning-by-doing takes place through daily work process. Through experience and
trial and error, people can gain tacit knowledge in the form of skill and know-how.
Lundvall (1988) uses learning-by-interacting' to stress the social dimension of learning.
The idea is that learning processes based on reciprocal interactions between agents,
particularly firms, promote the acquisition and exchange of knowledge. However, it
does not mean that these are sufficient for the dissemination and exchange of tacit
knowledge such as know-how and skills. Although tacit knowledge can be assimilated
through these learning practices, it seems to be at best partial. This makes the
codification and transfer of tacit knowledge difficult. The reason is that tacit
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knowledge tends to be embedded in specific personal and organisational skills and the
complexity of human relationships.
Non-explicit or tacit knowledge can be embodied at the individual level as well as the
collective level. Tacit knowledge that individuals gain as a product of learning-by-
doing is difficult to share and formalise at the collective level. However, once
knowledge is acquired at the organisational level, it tends to be memorised in the form
of routines, conceived as the behavioural pattern of an organisation (Hodgson, 1998;
Leroy and Ramanantsoa, 1997). The routinisation of tacit knowledge tends to form
organisational competence. This means that organisational competence is composed
of competitive knowledge. Since tacit knowledge and competences, which are
embedded in a specific organisational context, are not immediately transparent, they are
difficult to accurately duplicate in the different organisational and institutional contexts.
However, there is the danger that competences may be turned into a lock-in over time,
which could impede the chance to learn external knowledge and consequently curtail
adaptability to environmental change.
Table 2.1 Types of knowledge and the sources of learning
Tacit
	
Codified
Internal	 Learning by doing
Learning in doing/working
On-the-job training
External	 Largely localised tacit knowledge
Face-to-face contact and informal
exchanges by acquaintances
In-house R&D
Intrafirm training programmes
Inter-firm alliances and joint ventures
Technological licensing
Conferences, journals, texts and the
like
As opposed to tacit knowledge, codified or formal knowledge involves scientific and
other forms of knowledge, scripted or formalised in the form of patents, books, papers,
tapes, and so on. It is assumed that codified knowledge can easily be transferred.
However, it does not imply necessarily that this process makes codified knowledge no
longer important. As recently argued by Zack (1999) and others, formal knowledge,
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such as procedure manuals, product literature, patents and computer software, does not
only plays a large role in organisations, but is also a crucial factor for the production of
knowledge. Formal knowledge has a ubiquitous nature once access to its sources is
mastered, but the entry barriers to new knowledge can be considerable (Amin and
Wilkinson, 1999). These include the lack of absorptive capacity and the difficulties of
accessing valued codified knowledge such as patents. For the former, Cowan et al.
(1999) point out that the tacit nature of specific codified knowledge tends to be a barrier
to learning and the dissemination of knowledge. If a specific group or organisation
retains competitive tacit knowledge, members of that group or organisation may make a
codebook to share between them. As such a codebook is designed and made for only a
certain group or organisation, outsiders may have difficulty in accessing the knowledge
it contains. This knowledge, although taking an explicitly codified form, may
therefore be tacit for others and remain the property of the group. For others to be able
to access such a form of knowledge, they have to possess the capability to acquire,
decode and absorb that knowledge. In other words they need 'absorptive capacity'.
On the other hand, some kinds of formal knowledge, such as patents, may be critical for
firms to sustain their competitive advantages in the market competition. It emphasises
the importance of the appropriation of knowledge in capitalist competition. Thus,
firms possessing competitive formal knowledge make great efforts to monopolise and
appropriate such knowledge. In this sense, a prime issue for latecomer firms is likely
to include the problem of how to access formal knowledge as well as of how to develop
tacit knowledge. Once firms succeed in accessing formal knowledge, the focus is on
how to incorporate this new knowledge into the organisation and how to sustain an
optimal combination between the new formal knowledge and the tacit knowledge
embedded in the organisation.
In sum, these characteristics of knowledge show that both forms of knowledge do not
exist completely independently. The acquisition of formal knowledge needs tacit
knowledge in the form of skills and know-how, while tacit knowledge needs to be
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codified within the firm. There is no doubt that tacit knowledge can be a basis for the
development of core competence. However, once tacit knowledge becomes core
competence, it conversely becomes a basis for core rigidity, which may result in
inadaptability to change. Thus, continuous corporate adaptation may depend on how
core competences can change to fit a new environment. To do this, firms need to
combine and harmonise embedded tacit knowledge and external codified knowledge.
Based on this discussion, the following section deals with modes of learning in the
context of adaptation.
2.3.3. Modes of learning and the problem of adaptation
Organisational learning is not a simple process in its own right. Learning involves
cognitive processes, manifest in the process of acquiring, exchanging, applying,
transferring and modifying knowledge in an organisational context (Hayes and Allison,
1998; Odgaard and Hudson, 1998). However, processes of learning may differ,
depending on the nature of organisational responses to changes in the internal and
external environments of the firm. They also differ in outcomes.
Argyris and Schon (1978), for example, distinguish 'single-loop learning' from 'double-
loop learning'. Single-loop learning involves incremental change within an existing
framework. This type of learning implies the reinforcement and refinement of existing
routines as well as the improvement of the knowledge base or firm-specific
competences without changing underlying norms and assumptions (Dodgson, 1993).
Learning processes are characterised by a single feed back loop that involves a process
of stimulus-response to the results. The goal of learning is how to best keep
organisational performance within the ranges set by organisational norms and how to
best achieve existing goals and objectives (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The norms and
values of the organisation remain unchanged.
For this reason, learning is said to be necessarily path-dependent and self-reinforcing.
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Continuous learning, which is not aimed at changing routines, is likely to induce the
development of firm-specific competences. Simultaneously, these competences
become a set of routines that constitute the problem-solving process (Dosi and Marengo,
1994; Foss, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Routines, once established in an
organisation, tend to persist with existing learning processes. The self-reinforcing
nature of learning makes it attractive for the firm to sustain its current focus (Levinthal,
1996), which can lead to the 'competence trap' (Levitt and March, 1996). The success
of past strategies tends to result in complacency and sometimes the failure to adapt in
the face of environmental change (Liedtka, 1999).
There is the possibility that an organisation will persist in its existing ways of doing
things, even in situations where existing routines are no longer adaptable to changes in
the environment. Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) note that the corporate evolution is, to
a greater or lesser extent, influenced by organisational inertia, including both structural
and cultural dimensions. Structural inertia means a resistance to change which is
rooted in the size, complexity and inter-dependence of the organisation's structure,
systems, procedures and processes, whereas cultural inertia comes from age and success.
Some claim that the older the age of the firm the more difficult the firm find it to cope
effectively with a rapidly changing environment due to the path-dependent nature of
learning (Levinthal, 1996; Teece et al., 1997). Therefore, single-loop learning or
exploitation is likely to be effective in either a stable environment or in the short run,
but is problematic in the long run. This is the reason why firms need to seek double-
loop learning to sustain continuous adaptation and long-term competitiveness.
Double-loop learning entails transformative change accompanied by changes in the
firm-specific knowledge base, competences and routines. While single-loop learning
is reactive, double-loop learning is strategic. Thus, both dimensions of learning are
qualitatively different. Double-loop learning is required when existing competences or
routines become obsolete due to radical changes in the internal or external environments
of the organisation. This is likely to take place when the organisation seeks radical
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innovations in products, processes and organisation (Hudson, 2001). The sources of
knowledge for radical innovations comes mainly from learning channels such as R&D
activities and external institutions, including competing firms, universities and R&D
institutions (Gertler, 2000; 2001a).
The process of double-loop learning involves an 'unlearning' process, which is defined
as a process through which the organisation discards obsolete and misleading
knowledge and routines (Hedberg, 1981; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). The more
rapid the environmental changes, the more crucial the ability of the firm to unlearn
obsolete routines becomes for its survival. In this sense, double-loop learning is more
complicated and difficult to implement than single-loop learning. As Argyris and
Schon (1978) point out, most organisations do quite well with single-loop learning, but
have great difficulties with double-loop learning. Hedberg (1981) goes so far as to
argue that forgetting established knowledge and routines could be even harder than
acquiring new knowledge. There are some means of unlearning, however. The first
is to discharge employees, especially corporate leaders or managers who are unable to
move away from outdated ways of doing things (Tunstall, 1983; cited in Huber, 1996)
and instead to recruit people who have new insights and perspectives. Secondly, as
unlearning is likely to take place when a firm faces a crisis in internal or external
environments, unlearning can be induced by intentionally infusing employees with a
sense of crisis (see, for example, Kim, 1998).
Regarding the arguments stated above, one might say that existing knowledge bases,
competences and routines could hamper new learning as well as degrade an adaptability
to change. However, this is only partially true, as not all established organisational
knowledge and routines are obsolete for sustaining discontinuous learning and radical
adaptation. The knowledge base that is accumulated within the organisation as a result
of continuous learning is a prerequisite for new learning. The reason is that the
effective learning of new knowledge requires absorptive capacity which depends on a
prior knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A prior knowledge base
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comprises tacit knowledge, such as know-how and skills, including the problem-solving
capabilities. Nooteboom (1999a) argues that a prior knowledge base is helpful when
new learning is sought in a novel way but related to an existing system. This means
that the acquisition of new knowledge and learning cannot be separated from an
organisation's knowledge base and routines. In sum, a crucial challenge for firms to
adapt to radical changes might be not to specialise in any one type of learning, but to
sustain a balanced combination of continuous learning (single-loop) and discontinuous
learning (double-loop).
To conclude, a competence-based learning perspective provides a clear implication for
corporate adaptation. That is, adaptation is dependent on how the firm is able to
sustain continuous and discontinuous learning by combining various forms of
knowledge through effectively monitoring the changing nature of business environment.
Despite its well-defined understanding of corporate dynamics, the competence-based
view is silent on the mechanisms and processes through which firms learn and adapt.
In other words, a matter of how learning occurs in the firm tends to be taken as given in
the competence-based view. In addition, this view is little to say about the detailed
processes of corporate strategies taken to adapt to radical change. In what follows, I
suggest theoretical positions that complement a competence-based learning perspective
in order to make clear an understanding of processes and mechanisms of corporate
adaptation. In the following section 2.4, I attempt to explore how learning takes place
in the firm by drawing on 'learning communities'. In the last section, I attempt to
tackle various dimensions of the corporate restructuring which is undertaken to adapt to
changes.
2.4. Learning and communities in the firm
Following the conceptualisation of learning and adaptation, this section places its focus
on 'learning communities' that are assumed as the sources of learning and knowledge
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creation. Although there are various kinds of communities in the firm, this section
deals with informal forms of organisation, including communities of practice, epistemic
communities and task-force teams. Communities of practice would be helpful for
understanding the characteristics of intra-firm social learning taking place through daily
working processes, while epistemic communities and task-force teams are involved in
intentional and strategic learning. Although each of them is distinct in terms of its
origin and purpose, I suggest that these communities can be vital sources of both
incremental and radical learning in the process of their own problem-solving activities.
In this section, I suggest that corporate learning which is either incremental or radical
takes place through organising various forms of learning communities. This means
that these learning communities could affect outcomes of learning and the potential of
adaptation to environmental change.
2.4.1. Learning through communities of practice
In recent years, some learning theorists have argued that organisational learning does
not necessarily take place through conscious design or formally recognizable cognitive
frames (Amin and Cohendet, 1999b; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Fox, 2000; Garrety et
al., 2001; Lave and Wenger, 1990; Wenger, 1998). This assumption can be found in
the literature that deals particularly with the success of Japanese firms (see, for example,
Aoki and Dore, 1994; Kenney and Florida, 1993). It is argued that competitive
Japanese firms tend to improve knowledge and skills (Kaizen) and even sustain
technological and organisational innovations, through daily common interactions,
communications and informal meetings between peers in the workplace. In a similar
manner, Amin and Cohendet (1999) argue that in addition to formal sources of learning
such as R&D, daily practice among individuals and groups within firms can also be a
vital source of learning, through forms of knowledge — mostly tacit knowledge —
generated in practice, social action and interaction, via communities of practice within
firms.
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In fact, every organisation is made up of many communities of practice in which
learning is a matter of new meaning and emergent structures arising from common
enterprise, experience and sociability — learning in doing (Wenger, 1998; Amin and
Cohendet, 1999b). For Wenger and Snyder (2000), communities of practice are
defined as groups of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion
for a joint enterprise — for example, engineers engaged in deep-water drilling
consultants who specialise in strategic marketing, or frontline managers in charge of
check processing at a large commercial bank. Thus, communities of practice are
homogeneous groups that are composed of people engaged in the same practice, in
regular communication with others. They describe the common features of
communities of practice.
Some communities of practice meet regularly - for lunch on Thursdays, say. Others
are connected primarily by e-mail networks. A community of practice may or may
not have an explicit agenda on a given week, and even if it does, it may not follow the
agenda closely. Inevitably, however, people in communities of practice share their
experiences and knowledge in free-flowing, creative ways that foster new approaches
to problems (pp. 139-140).
It implies that the source of learning in communities of practice is experience,
interaction and shared meaning between members of the community. This view of
communities of practice allows us to understand the nature of learning as a multiple,
ongoing, distributed process (Amin and Cohendet, 1999b), as well as a socially
constructed process (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 1998). In detail, the nature of
learning requires participation in the doing, the sharing of perspectives about the doing
itself, and the mutual development of both individual and collective capabilities in the
process (Lave and Wenger, 1990). Within communities of practice, people share tacit
knowledge through dialogue, exchange ideas about work practice, and experiment with
new methods and ideas (Hendry, 1996). Informed dialogue between members is
central to the on-going co-evolution of meaning and capabilities, because the work itself
is central to the community of practice, and because meaning, purpose, and learning are
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tied to the doing (Liedtka, 1999:7).
Communities of practice differ from formal organisations — or formal communities —
within the firm such as functional groups (see Table 2.2). The latter refers to
organisational units with a specialised domain of work and compartmentalised by the
nature of labour (for example, manufacturing, marketing, R&D and so on). Members
of a functional group are composed of homogeneous agents sharing a disciplinary
specialisation. By contrast, communities of practice are informal. They are not
created, but evolve through a self-organizing process based on mutually committed
interactions. Once again, Wenger and Snyder (2000) explain:
Membership in a community of practice is self-selected. In other words, people in
such communities tend to know when and if they should join. They know if they
have something to give and whether they are likely to take something away. And
members of an existing community, when they invite someone to join, also operate on
a gut sense of the prospective member's appropriateness for the group (pp. 141-142).
Communities of practice exist in the minds of their members in the connection that they
have with each other and with the larger institution in which they reside (Brown and
Duguid, 1991). Thus the creation of a community resides in a set of shared meanings
that are intimately bound up with the practice of the work itself, the purpose and the
people that such work serves and the on-going development of its individual members.
Within the firm, communities of practice thus consist of hybrid groups of overlapping
and interdependent communities (Brown and Duguid, 1998). Knowledge, rules for
action and culture can be spread at an organisation-wide level, through vigorous links
and communication between communities of practice.
Basically, communities of practice are created and managed as a means to enhance the
individual competences of their members (Cohendet, Creplet and Dupouet, 2000).
However, they can also make a contribution to the shaping of new problem-solving
routines in the context of radical learning. This implies that communities of practice
can be the sources of radical innovation in response to dramatic events, as well as of
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incremental learning. Hutchins (1996) gives an example of adaptation to a radical
situation, by showing how a navigation team facing a critical moment in the middle of a
cruise arrives at a new stable procedure. The story is summarised as follows:
Following a chaotic and unsuccessful search for a solution through experiments and
computational and textual alternatives, the team developed an answer through doing.
As local tasks were found for individuals distributed across the ship, the ensuing
sequence of actions and conversations, drawing on experience and experimentation,
led to the construction of a solution based on trial and testing. On this occasion, a
solution was found on time (Amin and Cohendet, 1999b: 18).
Here, the navigation team looks like a community of practice and successful adaptation
is driven by learning in doing, recursive communications and trial and testing between
team members. Hutchins' study suggests that radical innovations can be attained not
just through learning by design, but also through learning in doing. Let me describe in
more detail the process of building communities of practice and the learning process,
through three infrastructures of learning.
When trying to establish new codified knowledge in the form of a new technology or
machine, some of the people involved in this project may feel the need to voluntarily
create a discussion group or a study group. Perhaps, most of the people who intend to
participate the community share common work practice and they are interested in
sharing and learning useful knowledge. In managing the community, participants may
make use of tacit rules and norms that are required to shape a mutual engagement
among them. 'Mutual engagement' is a prior condition that allows the community to
accept a variety of interests and cognition; to do things they seek to do together; to have
mutual values, trust, reciprocity and sharedness; and to manage their community.
From this, the community members come to recognise the basis of what they should and
should not do and why.
The second stage is joint enterprise' which implies that it begins with practice in the
community in reality. Doing together reflects the multiple voices among members and
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the need to negotiate. Things that have been agreed might be continued through
experimental and reflexive processes, in the form of trial and error, continual sense
making, understanding and reconciliation. During that time, some may secede from
the community while, conversely, new members may come. This gives the community
opportunities to renovate, as they may bring new experience and knowledge into the
community. They can be 'knowledge brokers' between different communities. This
is the reason why boundary blurring is important for learning and innovation. In doing
so, mutual accountability will arise and a local code of practice will be created.
In the next stage, both visible and invisible performances, experienced and shaped
through the process of materialisation will need to be codified as well as shared among
members. In this sense, the third stage, which is called 'shared repertoire', is crucial
in sustaining a learning community and leading to innovation. To share performances
and outcomes, members of a community might draw upon stories, artefacts, discourses,
concepts, historical events and discourses. These can be shared or publicised via
cutting edge ICTs, such as databank and the Internet. But it needs more. Some
aspects of their performances and outcomes are necessary to publicise to people beyond
the boundary, such as other communities of practice or the rest of the workers in the
firm. They may discuss what is wrong or right in doing something. By this stage, the
capability of the organisation to solve problems will be increasingly enhanced. This
stage will also help to diffuse knowledge within the firm. Ultimately, the new routine
will be successfully embedded in the organisation. Although the process described
above is interpreted in quite a simplified manner, it helps us to understand the role of
communities of practice in learning.
However, it should be noted that communities of practice do not always play a key role
in inducing radical innovations, nor can they be created, or work well, in all firms.
Basically, a community of practice is a kind of knowledge community where members
learn the knowledge that is embedded in the community. Thus communities of
practice are more likely to contribute to improving existing routines through
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incremental learning and an exploitation of best practice rather than to explore new
routines or radical innovations (Cohendet and Llerena, 2001). Moreover, communities
of practice work well in firms that are characterised by corporate cultures, emphasizing
diversity, autonomy and individual empowerment, but would not fit in some cultures,
and they are not a good means of dealing with more urgent, difficult matters of business
change (Davenport, 2000: 9). To deal with more uncertain or complex issues,
alternative communities are often organised in and beyond the firm. In what follows, I
suggest two kinds of communities; epistemic communities and project (or task-force)
teams.
2.4.2. Learning through epistemic communities
The original concept of ' epistemic communities' was developed in international
relations dealing with the decision-making process of international environmental issues.
In this realm, the concept is defined as 'a network of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' (Haas, 1992: 3). Epistemic
communities are similar to communities of practice, for example in terms of the process
of interaction between members and their attitudes and behaviours. However,
epistemic communities differ from communities of practice in many ways. Epistemic
communities are intentional and strategic, because they are organised to collectively
solve a certain problem, or to sustain knowledge creation in a specific area. In this
sense, Storck and Hill (2000) call these communities 'strategic communities', to
emphasise the strategic nature of this type of knowledge community.
Another important dimension that distinguishes those from communities of practice is
that epistemic communities have a commonly understood procedural authority, which is
needed for effectively achieving the objective. Epistemic communities can be
established when members of a community have procedural authority which every
member commonly understands and accepts (Cowan, David and Foray, 1999). The
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procedural authority conveys the idea of progress towards a cognitive goal set by the
community and becomes a guideline to manage this community, thereby playing a key
role in holding the community members together (Cohendet, Creplet and Dupouet,
2000). The existence of procedural authority and the strategic nature of the
organisation imply that, in epistemic communities, autonomy and identity tend to be
weaker than in communities of practice.
The goal of epistemic communities does not lie in the achievement of individual
interests or the improvement of individual competence. Rather, epistemic
communities are centred on the achievement of a strategic goal and the codification of
the knowledge they intend to create. Members of an epistemic community are bound
together by their commitment to enhance a particular set of knowledge (Cohendet,
Creplet and Dupouet, 2000). The community members are composed of professionals
with recognised expertise and competence, who are fit for a strategic goal, beyond
geographical and functional boundaries. In this sense, this type of learning community
provides the potential for not only making great use of dispersed human resources and
knowledge within the organisation but also for utilizing the benefits of communities of
practice in terms of learning and knowledge creation. Epistemic communities enable
firms to deal with continuous changes in the business environment. More crucial is the
fact that epistemic communities seem to be better at handling unstructured problems
than communities of practice.
2.4.3. Learning through task-force (or project) teams
A task-force (or project) team is one of the communities in the firm, which is committed
to the strategic production of knowledge and the way of solving a specific problem at a
given point in time. This community is an ad hoc temporary organisation that is
designed to accomplish a specified task. As task-force teams are goal-oriented in
nature, they are managed under clear-cut time limitation. Task-force teams are
heterogeneous groups of employees with professional knowledge in a given task,
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selected from different teams or departments. Members of the task-force team attempt
to mobilise individual knowledge and competences in order to achieve the goal of a
given task within a certain time frame.
A task-force team is strategically created to make use of the benefits of diversity in
evolutionary terms. An evolutionary perspective sees that the assets of organisational
competence and learning capability tend to result from cognitive diversity among
organisational members (Cohendet and Llerena, 1997; Metcalfe, 1998a; Saviotti, 1996).
This implies that task-force teams are a kind of organisational tool that tries to create
hybrids of the different communities (Cohendet and Llerena, 2001). Coming from
different units of organisation, members of the task force team are characterised by
distinct cognitive frames as they are specialised in distinct fields of work with different
interests. Sometimes, this cognitive distance can bring about difficulties in deriving a
consensus and identity between the members of the team. Nevertheless, once mutual
trust has been built a common identity and consensus established, the task-force team
could be a driving force of innovation. The nature of social relationships between
team members reflects the characteristics of communities of practice, and results in the
collateral effect of the creation of knowledge by creating quasi-communities of practice.
However, there are fundamental differences between task-force teams and communities
of practice. As communities of practice do not have a strategic objective and
obligation, their capabilities to mobilise the resources most appropriate for seeking
radical learning may be restricted. On the other hand, a task-force team binds
members of the team together through a given goal and accountability. In addition, its
members are a group of people who have the best knowledge in relation to the project.
Thus, this form of organisation is suitable for making good use of the individual
knowledge and competences decentralised across organisational boundaries.
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Table 2.2 A tvno1ovof communities within the firm
Functional
groups
Project teams Epistemic
communities
Communities of
practice
Informal
networks
Goal To deliver a
product or
service
To accomplish
a specified task
To deal with
unstructured
problem or
produce
knowledge
To develop
members
capabilities;
To build and
exchange
knowledge
To collect and
pass on
business
information
Membership Everyone
who reports to
the group's
manager
Assigned by
senior
management
Defined by
organisational
function, but
chosen by
individuals
whether to be
active or not
Members who
select themselves
Friends and
business
acquaintances
Agents Homogeneous Heterogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Rules Manifest
formal rules
Manifest
regulation and
obligation for
action
No regulation, no
obligation, but
manifest
procedural
authority
No regulation,
no obligation
No regulation,
no obligation
Driving force
that holds it
together?
Job
requirements
and common
goals
The project's
milestones and
goals
Procedural
authority or its
own governance
processes
Passion,
commitment, and
identification
with the groups
expertise
Mutual needs
Duration Until the next
reorganisation
Until the
project has
been
completed
Normally until the
common goal has
been finished but
as long as the
community want
to continue their
activities
,
As long as there
is interest in
maintaining the
group
As long as
people have a
reason to
connect
Knowledge
production
and the mode
of learning
Unintended
Learning by
doing
Unintended
Learning by
interacting
between
members
Intended
Learning by
searching,
Learning by
interacting
Unintended
Learning in
doing/working
Intended or
unintended
Dependence on
social ties and
intention to
learn and share
knowledge
Sources: based on Wenger and Snyder (2000); Cohendet, Creplet and Dupouet (2000); Storck
and Hill (2000)
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In many ways, the nature of a project or task transcends boundaries of demarcated
formal work groups. In this case, traditional work groups seem to be unsuited for
mobilising the knowledge and competences decentralised across the boundaries of
formal organisational units. It has been argued that the bureaucratic nature of large
modern business organisations is inflexible and inadaptable in an age of rapidly
changing market and technology (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In this context,
organising task-force teams is seen as an effective means to sustaining strategic learning,
which needs to efficiently mobilise decentralised competences and quickly reach a
strategic goal.
2.5. A restructuring perspective
Since the 1950s, the radical increase in international competition in markets and
technology has led to the decline of many large Western firms' monopolistic
competitive positions. Many of them have responded by restructuring. According to
Rock and Rock (1990), during the 1980s, in particular, nearly half of all large US firms
undertook restructuring. In that period, the focus of corporate restructuring was on the
reorganisation of the business portfolio through downsizing or Mergers & Acquisitions
(M&A). It is true that capitalist firms have restructured in response to the changing
market and technology. However, the recent tendency in corporate restructuring
differs from that of the past. Corporate restructuring has become more complex and
multifaceted. This is because not only has inter-firm competition become increasingly
intensified, but also the pace of change in market and technology has significantly
accelerated.
In this context, defining 'corporate restructuring' is not easy. Usui and Colignon
(1996) argue that whatever a firm does under pressure can be referred to as corporate
restructuring. They summarise the dimensions of corporate restructuring as follows:
the elimination of product lines, the combination of internal units, new stock offerings,
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early retirements, the sale of nonessential units, plant closure, the externalisation of
employment by taking regular employees out and relying more on contract or temporary
workers, the replacement of top executives and board members, the reallocation of
employees, and a change of decision-making location (centralisation or
decentralisation) (p. 517). According to Hayter (1997), corporate restructuring
involves corporate activities aimed at lowering costs, enhancing productivity and
improving market position. It implies the search for flexibility in technology,
production, organisation, markets, location and labour. Each of these becomes the
theme of corporate restructuring, and in many ways, they become interwoven in the
process of restructuring. In management terms, Bowman and Singh (1990) define
corporate restructuring more precisely as a change in assets, financial portfolio or
management. Asset restructuring consists of adjusting a business portfolio through
downsizing, mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. Financial restructuring involves
changes in the capital structure of the firm. This means the infusion of high levels of
debt to increase the leverage of the firm to reduce the likelihood of a takeover.
Management restructuring involves significant changes in organisational structure to
increase the efficiency of management.
It is assumed that the notion of restructuring involves a revolutionary change, a
qualitative transformation from one state to another (see for example Lovering, 1989).
However, it does not necessarily involve such a complete transition (Hoggart and
Paniagua, 2001), nor do all processes of corporate restructuring lead to revolutionary
change. Rather, it is better to view corporate restructuring as an on-going process of
qualitative change. Corporate restructuring can also be accomplished through
incremental processes of organisational change. In addition, corporate restructuring is
context-dependent, as its process depends on the nature of the industry in which firms
are engaged, and their environment. Let me take an example. For firms operating in
a mature industry and stable market, the key to adaptation seems to be factors like cost,
efficiency, and incremental innovation. On the other hand, firms competing in an
emerging industry and an unpredictable market need to make great efforts to develop
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new products and ways of doing things in order to adapt the market to a given
environmental situation.
Therefore, corporate restructuring is, in many ways, the outcome of specific corporate
strategies developed to adapt to a changing environment. However, it is difficult to see
corporate restructuring as the result of an optimal reaction to or interpretation of a
changing external environment (McGrath-Champ, 1999). As described above,
corporate restructuring strategies are complex and multifaceted, reflecting the process of
adaptation to environmental change. This implies that a restructuring approach can
provide useful insights into what is needed for corporate adaptation. This is a critical
aspect that the learning perspective tends to overlook by focusing largely on the
development of organisational knowledge and competence. In addition, some of
corporate restructuring strategies involve learning either directly or indirectly. The
following sections explain some examples of corporate restructuring in more detail and
show how they facilitate adaptation. The first two represent non-learning-based
dimensions of restructuring, while the latter parts involve learning-based dimensions of
restructuring.
2.5.1. Downsizing
Downsizing is referred to as a means to reduce the size and scope of firm's activities.
This has long been recognised as the most conventional way of restructuring taken by
firms facing a substantial decline in operating performance. The 1980s are
characterised by the tendency for large U.S. companies to move towards a 'lean'
architecture of organisation and industrial specialisation (Harrison, 1994; Hatfield,
Liebeskind and Opler, 1996). Business conglomerates became difficult to deal with
business diversification and economies of scale because of decline and fluctuation in
consumer demands and increasing competition in technology and markets. 'Lean
production' and a retreat to the 'core competences' became prevalent among bog firms
and, consequently, these led to strategic downsizing (Harrison, 1994). The aim of
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downsizing is to abandon business lines, which are seen as peripheral to core business
or businesses, or the long-term strategy of the firm. The recent tendencies in the
restructuring of productive organisation, such as the movement from vertical integration
towards vertical disintegration and the significant increase of outsourcing, exemplify
one outcome of strategic downsizing by big firms (Sayer and Walker, 1992).
Downsizing in productive organisation can also be done by the selective closure and
rationalisation of production facilities.
Employment adjustment, such as lay-offs, is another means of downsizing. Its aim is
to reduce labour costs. However, firms find it difficult to sustain their competitiveness
solely by lowering labour costs. Therefore, they try to increase productivity by
intensifying work practices. The prevailing conceptions of 'knowledge workers'
(Delbridge et al., 1998; Fruin, 1997; Kenney and Florida, 1993; Lowe et al., 1997) and
'the learning firm' (Hudson, 1999; Asheim, 2000) emphasise the importance of the
exploitation and exploration of organisational knowledge for the increase of competence
and productivity.
2.5.2. Change in organisational structure
Recently, the focus of organisational restructuring has been on creating organisational
forms which are designed to be f1e)61D1e enough to adapt to a rapitSV changing
environment, but also on more effectively mobilising the organisational knowledge and
competence distributed in the firm.
For large firms encounting environmental uncertainty and pressure, one of the critical
challenges is how they can reconfigure their organisation in order to fit this changed
environment. Contemporary large firms have, to a lesser or greater degree, a
diversified business structure. They illustrate how multi-divisional forms of
organisation can effectively manage varied business lines, although the internal
composition of the forms may substantially vary from firm to firm according to
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organisation-specific conditions. Organisational structure is one of the critical factors
that determine corporate adaptability to environmental change, as it is likely to
determine decision-making channels and the flow of information and knowledge within
the firm. This is evident in Sharfman and Dean Jr. (1997), who argue that the most
crucial factor in all organisational adaptation is the decision-making process.
Firms need an organisational structure that is adequate for effectively coping with
unpredictability and instability in business environment. This is because, under
turbulent economic conditions, firms have to be flexible enough to be capable of
responding quickly to new pressures and demands (Kelemen, 1999). As one evidence
that shows this tendency, the largest leading firms have tended to decentralise strategic
decision-making by dividing it into sub-organisational units. The structure of
organisation is to a degree associated with the capability to mobilise resources and
competences within and without the firm (Marengo, 1995, cited in Amin and Cohendet,
1999). This aspect is important with regard to competitiveness and learning. In the
long term, continuous adaptation can be sustained through a balanced coordination of
continuous and discontinuous learning, which requires the timely and effective
mobilisation of resources and competences. Firms that are capable of reorienting
themselves to new adaptive landscapes have organisational forms which favour
decentralisation and local autonomy, representing an internal diversity that is conducive
to generating multiple bases learning processes (Levinthal, 1996; Teece et al., 1997).
Such forms of organisation enable firms to combine exploitation with exploration.
Thus they may increase the possibility of learning and innovation based on cognitive
diversity as well as the likelihood of adaptation, thanks to openness to outside worlds
and the flexibility to adapt to changes.
2.5.3. Strategic alliances
Increasing international competition makes it difficult for individual firms to survive by
themselves. In part, this is because market and technology have become more
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complex and dynamic, and cannot be covered adequately with the internal capabilities
of an individual firm. Firms seem to find it difficult to possess all the resources and
knowledge needed to compete in a given market. Because of this, inter-firm alliances
have been increasingly advocated as a way to sustain an individual firm's continuous
survival and growth.
The nature of inter-firm alliances is becoming increasingly complex and multifaceted.
The reasons for this include a difference in the motives and expectations of the firms
which intend to forge alliances, and the variety of areas and forms of alliances. As
shown in Table 2.3, strategic alliances are forged for a variety of purposes as well as in
various areas, ranging from R&D to production and marketing. First, with reference to
marketing, the aim of an alliance between MNCs is usually to either penetrate local
markets or to intensify their market positioning. Some alliances in marketing are
associated with national or supranational regulatory policies. The tendency of large
firms to steer their business portfolio towards core competences leads to the increase in
long-term contracts between market leaders in the form of mutual OEM in consumer
goods. The corollary of this is that allied firms are not only able to maintain, or even
expand, their market share, but also avoid the problems of overcapacity caused by
market saturation or excessive facility investments.
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Table 2.3 Purposes of inter-firm alliances by large firms
Classification	 Purposes
Marketing
Production
Technology
(R&D)
Penetrating market and intensifying market positioning
Overcoming trade barrier
Expanding market share via diversifying product portfolio via mutual
OEM
Realising economies of scale and scope
Coping with overcapacity caused by market saturation or excessive
facility investments
Monopolising global market by global market leaders
Utilising comparative advantage between market leader and
technology leader
Reciprocal mutual sourcing on a stable basis (product vs. product;
product vs. parts; parts vs. parts)
Learning and gaining complementary technological competences from
counterpart
Monopolising an emerging market via technological advancement
Sharing costs, uncertainties, risks of R&D
Leading global competition for preoccupying I industry standards (e.g.
digital television, home network)
Saving costs via cross licensing
Utilising complementary assets between manufacturer and techno-
based firms
Coping with a rapidly increasing technological convergence via
sharing complementary technological competences between allied
firms
Sources: based on Dicken (1998), Gnyawali (1999), Hudson (2001), Powell (1998), Tidd et al.
(1997)
Second, inter-firm alliances are largely forged for joint production. The aim of this is
either to realise economies of scale and scope or to overcome the problems of
overcapacity. In seeking cooperative relationships in production, joint ventures are a
conventional form of alliance. On the other hand, firms tend to establish long-term
supply relationships on a stable basis. In this process, interactive learning appears to
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take place between customer firms and suppliers (Lundvall, 1988). In addition to
alliances between manufacturers, there is a growing tendency that R&D-intensive firms
make connection with manufacturers. The aim is to utilise the complementarity of
core competences between firms that are specialised in different areas.
Third, technological collaborations are the most common in inter-firm alliances,
particularly between technologically intensive firms (Hudson, 2001). Most of these
technological collaborations tend to take place in the area of product development.
Although there are a number of reasons for these collaborations, the common intentions
of the firms include the sharing of costs and risks, the reduction of the time and
uncertainties in the development of new product, technological learning and the
monopolisation of markets. In this respect, learning is not the only reason for
technological collaborations. However, strategic alliances can offer great opportunities
to learn new skills and knowledge (Inkpen, 1996). The potential for learning and the
success of technological collaborations are likely to rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on
the complementarity and balance of technological competences between alliance
partners, the degree of relational proximity between alliance firms and a firm's
absorptive capacity based on a prior knowledge base (Child, 2001; Kraatz, 1998;
Nooteboom, 2000; Tidd et al., 1997).
2.5.4. Innovations in process and product
Sustaining innovation in products and processes is important if firms are to adapt to
intensifying competition. Firms deliberately seek to differentiate themselves from
rivals through a variety of product and process innovations (Saviotti, 1997). In a given
market, process innovation plays a role in increasing the flexibility of production as
well as in reducing production costs. According to the theory of product life cycle,
process innovations tend to take place mainly in a mature stage of product as an
important factor for sustaining adaptation (Hudson, 2001). Examples of industries at
the mature stage of a product life cycle include consumer electronics, chemicals and
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steel, and firms in these industries compete for established product technologies.
Therefore, the centrality of competition lies in the efficiency of production and the
reduction in costs rather than in new product knowledge. In addition to this, process
innovation tends to be more important for technology-follower firms attempting to
sustain competitiveness (Kline, 1991). However, process innovation can also be
critical for corporate competition in the high-tech industry.
Process innovation involves either the reorganisation of labour processes or the
introduction of new production methods. An improvement in the production process is
often the outcome of learning-by-doing and trial and error taking place in the
manufacturing process. These processes of learning by manufacturing workers
produce tacit knowledge in the form of know-how and skills, and the organisation's tacit
knowledge is likely to lead to incremental innovations. However, this does not seem
to be enough for firms to sustain continuous adaptation. Sometimes, firms need
radical innovations in production processes such as the introduction of new production
technologies or machines. The codified knowledge embodied in these should be
adapted to specific organisational contexts. The process of innovation needs the
combination of codified knowledge imported from the outside and tacit knowledge
embedded in the organisation. Therefore, successful adaptation to the new ways of
production may rely on the ability to settle new routines in the workplace by effectively
bringing together both forms of knowledge.
In addition to process innovation, leading players strive for product innovation. This is
to secure their competitive position by creating new markets beyond existing markets
(Hudson, 2001). It is also a means to survive and adapt to intensified market
competition and the change in consumer demand. Innovations in products are by and
large incremental rather than radical, because most product innovations tend to take
place within the scope of existing products. Rosenberg (1996) confirms this tendency
by showing that more than 80% of industrial R&D expenditures are devoted to
improving existing products. This means that the focus of R&D activities in industrial
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firms is on 'Development' rather than 'Research' (Forbes and Wield, 2000). Industrial
leaders in market and technology do not only strive to intensify their competitive
position through incremental innovations, but also make great efforts to remain in the
industrial leadership and to adapt to new competitive environments by sustaining radical
innovations.
2.5.5. Organisational innovations
Together with a change in organisational structure, organisational innovation is a crucial
dimension of corporate restructuring. As Kenney and Florida (1993) argue, the
organisational model has been shifting from a traditional Fordist organisational model to
an innovation-mediated one (see Table 2.4). 4 The emerging forms of organisation
encourage organisational innovation and learning. They suggest five basic dimensions
of the innovation-mediated model: a transition from physical skill and manual labour to
intellectual capabilities or mental labour; the increasing importance of social or
collective intelligence as opposed to individual knowledge and skill; an acceleration of
the pace of technological innovation; the increasing importance of continuous process
improvement on the factory floor and constant revolutions in production; the blurring of
the lines between the R&D laboratory and the factory (p. 14). This does not mean that
workers are simply a given factor in production. Rather, they are considered to be an
integral part of a learning economy, which focuses upon functional flexibility rather
than numerical flexibility (Ettlinger, 2000).
Thus, innovation-mediated production integrates the knowledge and intelligence of all
workers, from R&D scientists and engineers who create new technologies and product
ideas to shop-floor workers who turn those innovations into marketable products
(Kenney and Florida, 1993: 15). Therefore, the conceptual starting point of
innovation-mediated production comes down to the question of how firms sustain
An alternative organisational model by Kenney and Florida is also, as with other writers stressing new
competitive organisational forms, inspired by the characteristics of organisational forms and behaviours
which highly innovative Japanese manufacturing firms have adopted.
47
learning and adaptation by harnessing and organising the intelligence, skill and
knowledge of organisational members. Such capabilities to learn and adapt can be
realised by establishing an organisational form which is pro-active, flexible and open-
minded.
It has been argued that traditional forms of organisation have become obsolescent, as
they have revealed their limitation in coping with a rapidly changing environment.
Firms have thus faced the challenge to move towards more decentralised and networked
organisational forms away from hierarchical and concentrated ones (Cooke and Morgan,
1998; Hedlund, 1994; Levinthal, 1996). Evolutionary and competence-based theories
of the firm are helpful in explaining the changing features of organisational forms that
contemporary large firms face. A theoretical framework of these views emphasises the
capabilities of firms to mobilise the knowledge distributed inside and outside the firm,
as well as to sustain collective learning as the most crucial strategic asset. In view of
this, it is critical to reset the boundaries of the demarcated divisions of labour between
organisational units, in order to foster interactive learning between distributed units or
subgroups. To do this, Cooke and Morgan (1998) stress the need to consider the role
of peripheral organisations such as branches and subsidiaries, the responsibility of work
teams, local autonomy, the link between R&D and production, and the importance of
suppliers.
Under the Fordist mass production regime, typical organisation forms consist of highly
segmented divisions of labour, characterised by task specialisation, functional
fragmentation, and hierarchical management control. The realisation of mass
production based on the maximisation of cost effectiveness is the basic concern. This
means that the underlying principle lies in maximising the efficiency of formalised
routines. Vertical control based on hierarchy is a principled way of managing the
organisation. Therefore, non-managerial units such as R&D and production have little
authority to make a decision. The model also emphasises the vertical flow of
information that is well reflected in the linear process of innovation. Thus it has no
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space for accepting cognitive diversity and multiple voices. Daily work practices are
carried out on the basis of officially defined relationships. All of those aspects result
in the limitation to the possibilities for members of the firm to interact and communicate.
In addition, this model is based on simple adaptive responses to environmental change.
As a result, firms have great difficulties in sustaining adaptation and learning in the
context of a rapidly changing environment and market competition.
In contrast, an innovation-mediated organisational model is designed to increase the
degree of innovation and collective learning to sustain and secure high quality and
productivity. This model differs significantly from the Fordist model of organisation
in the organising and managing of the divisions of labour among teams, departments,
functions or individual workers. It stresses that learning and knowledge creation are
the responsibility of everyone in the organisation, not just a selected few such as R&D
engineers and managerial groups (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The shared divisions
of labour are characterised by functional fluidity and boundary blurring, with the
intention to increase the capabilities to solve problems, learn, innovate and adapt. This
overlap and the crossing of functional boundaries foster collective learning based on
learning-by-interacting (Morgan, 1996). Work practices are designed to encourage
workers to learn and innovate through learning-by-interacting, learning-by-doing and
learning-in-doing, drawing upon interactive participation and communication.
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Focus	 Control and efficiency
Efficiency of mass production with
low cost
Vertical and hierarchical control
Non-managerial groups having little
authority to make a decision
Highly specialised division of labour
Specialised functional boundaries
Separation of conception and
execution
Work practices based on officially
defined relationships
Decision
making
structure
Division of
labour and
work form
Functional separation of R&D and
production
Based on the linear innovation model
Proximities not considered
Fixing independent routines between
divisions
WEAK forms of organisation in the
context of radically changing
hyper-competitive environment
Stressing vertical flow of information
Leading adaptive response and
substantive rationality
Low capability to solve problems
Low possibility of interaction and
communication
Low degree of organisational
proximity
Ignorance of cognitive diversity
Link between
R&D and
production
Implications
for learning
and
adaptation
Table 2.4 A comparison between organisational models
Traditional form	 Innovation-oriented form
Learning and coordination
Collective learning for high quality and
productivity
Convergence and co-ordination of local
voices
Local autonomy and responsibility
Shared division of labour
Functional fluidity and boundary blurring
Integration of conception and execution
Work practices based on both formally and
informally constructed relationships
Collective task through team work
promoting job rotation and the career
cycle of workers
Organic link between R&D and production
Based on the interactive innovation model
Highlighting spatial and organisational
proximities
Job rotation and the exchange of workers
STRONG forms of organisation in the
context of radically changing hyper-
competitive environment
Stressing contextualised skill and
knowledge, collective learning and
multi-lateral knowledge transfer and
diffusion
Leading innovative behaviour and
procedural and recursive rationality
Fostering chances to interact and
communicate between workers across
functions in both formal and informal
ways, based on organisational proximity
Activating communities of practice
Acknowledgement of cognitive diversity
Source: Author's construction based on Kenney and Florida (1993) and Lam (1994; 1996)
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In addition, this model emphasises boundary blurring between conception and execution.
This is inspired by the recognition that organisational forms designed to adapt to hyper-
competitive environments must be capable of integrating the knowledge and
intelligence of all workers. Excessive functional specialisation leads to a separation
between technical and organisational knowledge and thus brings about a variety of
problems in the coordination between functions and in knowledge management.
Therefore, it is argued that the functional link between R&D and downstream functions
is important to effectively combine the abstract scientific and technical knowledge of
R&D workers, which is embodied in innovations and saleable commodities, and the
knowledge of shop-floor workers, which provides a crucial source of product and
process improvements (Kenney and Florida, 1993). This argument is clearly reflected
in Lam (1996) who studied Japanese firms:
Engineers involved in the project are expected to interact on a continuous basis, share
information and responsibility. The overlapping approach makes a narrow division
of labour ineffective. The fluidity and ambiguity of job boundaries mean that R & D
engineers are sometimes expected to play a technical support role in production or to
be a market researcher if necessary. Project members are expected to reach out
across boundaries, to engage in intensive information transfer and to acquire a breadth
of knowledge and skills. This is especially evident when engineers are engaged in
new product development (p. 192).
As a means to realise such functional integration, geographers emphasise the need for
co-location between R&D and manufacturing (see Cooke and Morgan, 1998, Morgan,
2001, Hayter, 1996). For them, the geographical clustering of R&D and
manufacturing can contribute to improving the potential for learning and innovation
because it allows employees across different job boundaries to interact on a face-to-face
basis.
Training methods, such as job rotation and the exchange of workers between functional
divisions, are also critical dimensions in sustaining organisational innovation. By
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taking part in these, it is believed that workers can gain contextual skills and knowledge
about organisational routines and management processes. Contextual skills and
knowledge are referred to as general capacities for co-ordination and information
processing (Aoki, 1988, quoted in Lam, 1996), and these enable engineers to cope with
emergent tasks and unusual problems (Campbell and Warner, 1992). 5 Such skills and
knowledge are considered to be composed of competence bases that are critical for
adapting to a rapidly changing technological and product market environments.
In addition, job rotation and the career cycle of R&D engineers can be a helpful means
of incorporating formal and tacit knowledge. It is widely accepted that job rotation
plays a role in broadening the skills and knowledge base of engineers as well as
facilitating information and knowledge flow across different functions. In part, this
practice between different teams, subgroups or departments is likely to improve
relational/organisational proximity between heterogeneous groups within the firm, as
there is the possibility that it will create personal networks which will in turn facilitate
learning.
2.6. Linking a learning perspective and a restructuring perspective
A competence-based learning perspective offers a useful framework for an
understanding of not only why firms differ in adaptation and evolution but also of how
the firm learn and adapt to both incremental and radical change. Learning is based on
processes of knowledge not only both within and beyond the firm boundary but also
existing in both tacit and explicit forms. Thus learning constitutes the basis of firm
competences. Meanwhile, competences or routines based on such processes of
learning appear to make it difficult for a firm to sustain strategic learning to adapt to
radical change. However, this competence-based view, despite its rich implications for
5 However, it is also hard to completely defy the contention that what is involved in emerging new forms
of organisation is not multi-skilling but multi-tasking, part of a search for new ways of intensifying the
labour process (Hudson, 1997).
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the dynamics of the firm, does not explain the sources of learning and the social
processes of learning taking place both in and out of the firm. Considering processes
of mobilising various forms of knowledge and processes of learning, a sociological
understanding of learning communities is of critical importance.
In addition, it is problematic that a competence-based learning perspective is little to say
about the specific processes of firm strategies taken in response to radical change. A
learning perspective tends to draw too much attention to incremental learning. In
contrast, a restructuring perspective offers a useful framework for making sense of the
processes and mechanisms of adaptation to radical change in the real world. Corporate
restructuring involves various dimensions of organisational change and adaptation.
Although these restructuring measures aim at the transformation of organisational
structure and strategy, processes of restructuring also involve learning processes. In
this sense, restructuring strategies help to understand various sorts of learning strategy.
Nevertheless, it is not that this is without flaws. This view also does not show firm-
specific processes of adaptation. In other words, this view does not explain why in an
identical situation some firms take a certain strategy, while why others do not so; why
firms take different strategies; and why such strategies result in different outcomes
between firms. In addition, this view does not interest how social processes of
learning and organisational competences contribute to the implementation and outcomes
of firm strategy. In this sense, a learning perspective provides a context-specific
explanation of corporate adaptation. Therefore, corporate adaptation could be better
understood by combining both theoretical positions.
2.7. Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to conceptualise corporate adaptation by drawing on
theoretical perspectives on learning, restructuring and 'learning communities' in the
53
firm. I have tried to show throughout the chapter that corporate adaptation cannot be
reduced to limited aspects of learning or organisational change. Instead, I have
emphasised that adaptation involves multiple processes of organisational responses to
environmental change. Whether a finn is capable of adapting to changes seems largely
dependent on both the process and outcome of organisational change, both strategic and
non-strategic actions, and both internal structure of governance and external
environments.
I have argued that incremental learning, drawing on tacit knowledge, cannot adapt to
environmental discontinuity. This is likely to make established routines obsolete, as
routines that are seen as core competences imply path-dependent learning, when
different modes of learning are required in order to fit a new environment. In this case,
core competences turn into core rigidity and thereby result in a state of lock-in. A
radical change in environment requires firms to learn to adapt. As argued by Amin
and Cohendet (1999), learning to adapt presents a greater challenge to firms than does
competence-based incremental learning as it involves a management's ability to
perceive and anticipate changes in the surrounding environmental conditions as well as
requiring an unlearning process. It also means not only combining tacit knowledge
and codified knowledge, but also mobilising internal knowledge and external
knowledge. It does not mean, however, that radical learning does not need the
knowledge accumulated within the firm or to specialise in the acquisition of formal
knowledge. Various forms of organisational knowledge serve as absorptive capacity,
which is crucial to learning new knowledge. In addition, learning, especially radical
learning requires that tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are brought together. As
a result, a crucial challenge for firms to adapt to radical changes is to not specialise in
any one type of learning, but to sustain a balanced combination of incremental (single-
loop) and radical (double-loop) learning.
I have also argued that in the real world, corporate adaptation is sustained through both
learning and restructuring. Understanding the processes of corporate restructuring
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offers useful insights into what is required to sustain continuous adaptation. At first,
some of the restructuring processes, such as downsizing, employment adjustment, and
the replacement of top managers, are conducive to forgetting (unlearning) existing
routines and sustaining discontinuous learning. Technological and organisational
innovations on a continual basis are recognised as extremely crucial for firms to adapt
to increases in inter-firm competition and the complexity of technologies. At the same
time, firms need to make use of strategic alliances in order to access and gain the
sources of knowledge external to the firm as well as to jointly cope with changes in
market and technology. All these processes involve learning processes.
Finally, I have suggested that communities in the firm can be vital sources of learning
and play a critical role in sustaining both incremental and radical learning in the process
of their own problem-solving activities. In spite of their different goals and organising
processes, they mobilise distributed knowledge and competences as well as blend the
varied forms of knowledge in their own way. Although three kinds of communities in
the firm are said to be conducive to both incremental and routine-breaking learning,
each has a different potential for learning. Communities of practice seem to contribute
to intensifying incremental learning, while epistemic communities seem to play an
important role in achieving strategic learning on a longer-term basis. Meanwhile, task-
force teams can be a critical player in the strategic production of knowledge and in
problem-solving on a shorter-term basis. However, the important point is that
incremental and radical learning by firms can be achieved through organising various
forms of learning communities. This means that in response to radical environmental
change, firms attempt to sustain both incremental and radical learning by taking
advantage of these communities.
In the following chapter, the issue of learning relating to space and place is explored,
questioning the existing understanding in economic geography on learning and
proximity.
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Chapter 3
Theorising geographies of learning
3.1. Introduction
In recent years, economic geographers have paid much attention to the region as a key
source of learning for creating organisational knowledge and competences. Their
argument stems from the assumption that tacit knowledge is spatially sticky and that
geographical proximity is, accordingly, central to access and acquire such tacit
knowledge. It follows that learning should centre on geographical proximity.
However, the geographical literature on learning tends to over-stress the advantage of
localised learning in firm competitiveness and the power of geographical proximity in
learning. It lacks the consideration of how learning takes place in the firm and where
the sources of knowledge and learning come from. There is a danger that this
tendency may misconstrue the nature of learning which takes place in the firm and
overstate the power of geographical proximity and the region as a source of learning.
As explained in the previous chapter, the recognition of learning as a social, interactive
process implies that learning needs not rely necessarily on geographical proximity, but
on the characteristics of relational and organisational proximity that bind agents
involved in learning processes together. But learning also influences an ability to
mobilise decentralised knowledge and resources. The purpose of this chapter is to
challenge the received wisdom in economic geography and propose a different point of
view on the source of learning. It suggests that a relational/organisational perspective
offers a critical insight into exploring the sources of learning and how learning occurs
and is realised in the firm.
The first section critically reviews the geographical literature on learning and proximity.
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Then, I attempt to conceptualise a relational/organisational perspective on the sources of
knowledge and learning in the firm, by drawing on theories of the firm and
organisational learning. To do this, the concept of proximity is elaborated in order to
grasp the nature of learning and its processes. The main point I make is that
geographical proximity alone is not sufficient for understanding the nature of learning
and thereby the centrality of proximity in learning should be studied along
relational/organisational dimensions that go beyond geographical proximity. This
recognition leads us to take a closer look at the sources and processes of learning.
In the last part of the chapter, I attempt to rebuild the relationship between learning and
proximity, by drawing on such concepts as `ba', communities of practice, epistemic
communities and task-force teams. In doing this, I try to show how such communities
in the firm seek to sustain learning by creating relational/organisational proximity and
taking advantage of geographical proximity. The final section suggests that the
increasing tendency of corporate restructuring characterised by the globalisation of
R&D and strategic alliances implies that corporate learning takes place within and
beyond the boundaries of the firm.
3.2. A critical perspective on geographies of learning and proximity
Regions are becoming focal points for knowledge creation and learning in the new
global, knowledge-intensive, capitalism. In effect, they are becoming learning
regions. These learning regions function as collectors and repositories of knowledge
and ideas, and provide the underlying environment or infrastructure which facilitates
the flow of knowledge, ideas and learning (Florida, 1998: 19).
Inspired by the emergence of the learning or knowledge economy paradigm (Burton-
Jones, 1999; Foray and Lundvall, 1996; Lundvall, 1996), the region has, in recent years,
re-appeared in the interest of economic geographers (see, for example, Cooke and
Morgan, 1998; Ettlinger, 2000; Maskell, 1999; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a, 1999b;
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Storper, 1997). The literature on learning in economic geography stresses that the
region is a repository of knowledge assets, mostly tacit, which are critical to
maintaining a firm's competitiveness. In other words, the key to corporate success lies
in how to best access, disseminate and internalise such tacit knowledge within the
organisation. The argument is that since tacit knowledge is spatially sticky, it follows
that it can be best accessed, learned and finally mastered on the basis of face-to-face
interactions on a local or regional scale. In the end, it sees geographical proximity as a
crucial dimension in effectively learning such tacit knowledge (Maskell and Malmberg,
1999a; 1999b; Morgan, 2001).
Geographers often take remarkable examples of advanced industrial districts, such as
Silicon Valley, Baden-Wiirttemberg and the Italian industrial districts, in order to justify
the role of geographical proximity in learning tacit knowledge. The competitiveness
of such regions is driven by localised learning and innovative capabilities based on
'relational assets' and `untraded interdependencies' (Amin and Thrift, 1997; Cooke and
Morgan, 1998; Storper, 1997). This highlights that relational assets, which involve
local common cultural and behavioural norms incrementally created by trust and
reciprocity between local institutional agents, play a fundamental role in governing the
social economies of the region.
It is argued that the source of competitiveness in such regions lies in the place-specific
institutional mechanisms of learning, characterised by the ability to sustain flexible
adaptation to environmental changes or even reflexive reorganisation. These may be
the characteristics of places showing 'best practices' in a global economy. They are
often called 'learning regions' (Florida, 1995, 1998; Morgan, 1997), reflecting the
distinction between such regions and Fordist mass production regions. 6 Firms in
learning regions that are replete with the assets which support innovation and learning —
information, knowledge, technology, ideas, training, and skills — gain dynamic
6 According to Florida (1998), while Fordist mass production regions represent those based on
comparative advantage that is generated by factors such as natural resources and cheap labour cost,
'learning region' is possible in case that a region's competitive advantage is driven by knowledge creation
and continuous improvement.
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efficiency through the access they enjoy through networks of interdependence with
other firms, formal institutions of learning, and common conventions and
understandings that surround firms (Amin and Cohendet, 1999a: 89).
Geographical proximity is regarded as critical for accessing localised relational assets as
well as fostering untraded interdependencies. Harrington et al. (1999) argue that
geographical proximity between firms, especially when engaged in industrial sectors
relying on specialised information or skill or rapidly changing innovations, facilitates
the frequent interaction, both formal and informal, that engenders the social virtues of
trust, co-operation, and exchange of information (tacit and explicit) necessary for
success. Of course, the possibility has been acknowledged that this logic can only
apply when the region shares the strength of its `untraded and traded interdependencies'
between local economic institutions and has a richness of valuable (tacit) knowledge
(Hudson, 1999; Malecki, 2000; Storper, 1997).
However, the reasoning behind these arguments can be questioned. Contemporary
firms operate under pressure to cope with rapid changes in markets and technology.
These competitive environments require firms to learn and adapt better than competitors
(Kanter, 1989; Thrift, 1996). They force them to use any kind of knowledge, to make
any kind of alliances and to go to any region, as far as they can. Nevertheless, the
recent geographical literature on learning and innovation tends to overstate the power of
geographical proximity and the region as a source of learning (see, for example, Asheim,
1999; Braczyk, Heidenreich and Cooke, 1998; Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999; Malmberg
and Maskell, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a; Simmie, 1997). 7 Moreover, it
lacks hard empirical evidence as to how firms learn. As pointed out by Glasmeier and
Fuellhart (1996):
Research and writing on firm learning primarily emphasize either the internal or
7 However, most studies of 'learning organisations' and 'organisational learning' also have the same
problem as the literature on regional learning, by primarily focusing on the organisational context of
learning, with little attention to the societal and spatial context.
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external environment of a firm. Far less attention is paid to the intersection between
the two that is, the processes by which changes in the external environment are
recognized, identified, and internalised by the firm in a way that maintains or even
increases competitive position. Although geographers, planners, and regional
economists have explored this intersection, there has been a tendency to reduce the
problem to either (a) descriptions of archetypal situations in which it is presumed that
firms learn through proximity, and therefore firms found in proximity to one another
have a higher propensity to learn; or (b) a highly abstract theoretical discourse that
renders conceptual operationalization impractical.
In the same context, Oinas (1999) also claims that the geographical literature on
learning lacks research on actual learning processes to prove whether learning is
localised or takes place in a corporate hierarchy or anywhere else. This illustrates that
there is a need for more scrutiny on the perspective that stresses the advantage of
localised learning. Let us assume that it is the case that firms operating in a certain
place are more competitive. If so, is this the result of learning local tacit knowledge?
Is such local tacit knowledge composed of strategic assets which enable local firms to
obtain competitive advantage? Can tacit knowledge secure the competitiveness of
firms in an era of technological complexity and environmental uncertainty?
However, there is a growing literature arguing that, in this era, local tacit knowledge and
incremental learning are no longer sufficient for securing a firm's competitive survival.
According to Amin and Cohendet (1999a), business networks that are largely dependent
on local tacit knowledge and incremental learning may prove to be inadaptable in the
face of radical shift in markets and technologies. They assert that, especially for
globalised large firms, the key problem is not so much how to acquire localised tacit
knowledge or specialise in one form of knowledge, but rather how to mobilise and
integrate distributed forms of knowledge whether tacit or codified. The question
raised by Amin and Cohendet is convincingly supported by some case studies.
Sternberg and Arndt (2000) investigated the influences of the region on firms'
performance and capacity of innovation. According to the study, large firms in
industrial clusters have little to do with the region in the way of learning and innovation
behaviour, and even small firms in high-tech industrial clusters dominated by a handful
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of large firms are little influenced by regional factors.
Oinas (1999) also insists that firms tend to show a strong connection with knowledge
sources outside the local in order to sustain learning and innovation. As firms tend to
strategically make a huge effort to avoid leaking out critical knowledge and
competences, localised sources of knowledge are likely to be non-strategic assets that
could be partly helpful in incremental innovations. Similarly, Amin (2001a) stresses
that geographical proximity does not imply association and interaction, as access to the
sources of knowledge depends on the capability of the firm to mobilise a variety of
contact networks in order to establish economic links with other firms, markets, and
institutions located elsewhere nationally and internationally. Reliance on face-to-face
contact and local knowledge for market opportunities may progressively decrease, once
firms sustain the routinisation of local proximity into relational and institutional
proximity, through corporate and associational belonging and cultural enrolment, and
through visibility, trust and emotional closeness enabled by virtual and transport
connectivity.
A survey by Jones (2000) on the effect of local networking on the innovative
performances of firms in London questions the tendency of research which argues the
advantage and potential of localised interactive learning between local firms. The
survey convincingly suggests that regions, in particular large cities, should be seen less
as networking mediators for the localised learning of tacit knowledge than as nodes to
access business services such as administrative and legal services and financial
institutions; formal institutions or facilities for industrial activities such as R&D centres
and business training institutes; a multiple-layered labour market pool from technicians
to R&D engineers.
Coincidently, Glasmeier and Fuellhart (1996) also argue that, while agglomeration
economies certainly promote incremental or routine learning, their impact on strategic
or non-routine learning is less clear, because it might be hypothesised that truly strategic
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learning results more from a hierarchical diffusion of knowledge that transcends the
local. Cohendet et al. (1999) go so far as to suggest a convergence between localised
and globalised networks of learning, by showing that in contrast to claims asserting the
superiority of local tacit knowledge, large multi-locational firms are capable of perfectly
combining codified and tacit knowledge by developing IT-based communication
systems that enable them to integrate localised competences into a frame of interactive
learning.
These theoretical and empirical studies all dissent from the current trend in geographical
literature by questioning the power of geographical proximity and the region as a source
of learning. These are signals for notifying that it is time to reconsider the role of
proximity and place in corporate learning to avoid a possible error through geographical
hyperbolism which such logical reductionism may result in. However, this is not to
say that learning has nothing to do with space and place. As proved in a variety of
studies, certain places, replete with the sources of knowledge, provide clustered firms
with heightened opportunities to learn. Geographical proximity can also be, to a
greater or lesser extent, helpful in accessing the regional sources of learning.
In a nutshell, the important point is that geographical proximity itself does not guarantee
that learning processes are initiated and made. Learning is not given and does not lead
to a uniform outcome. Rather, learning is initiated and realised through complex and
multi-faceted organisational processes across space, beyond a restricted place.
Corporate learning is the product of complex human relationships and social
interactions surrounding firms. The effectiveness of learning is likely to depend on the
quality of social interactions, the nature of learning itself and the nature of ties among
agents, regardless of whether it is collective or individual. Therefore, it is right to see
that geographical proximity is only one aspect of factors that influence wider socio-
cultural and institutional processes, which surround organisational learning.
Understanding the process and mechanism of learning needs to start from unravelling
the corporate contexts in which learning takes place. The following section attempts
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to conceptualise the concept of proximity, with focusing on relational and organisational
dimensions.
3.3. Learning and proximity: a relational/organisational perspective
3.3.1. Understanding the concept of proximity relationally
By definition, the term 'proximity' is referred to as the state of being close or near when
describing a relation between agents. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see this term
as indicating simply the spatial. The concept of proximity encompasses multi-
dimensional aspects that mediate and influence learning between agents. Agents and
groups may be close not only territorially, but also relationally, organisationally,
institutionally and so on. Proximity should thus signify much less the spatial
interactions per se than the mix of situated culture and institutions that characterises the
context and facilitates communication, cumulative informative exchange and learning
(de la Mothe and Paquet, 1998). In this context, proximity is seen as defining the web
of complex human relationships and social interactions. If we recognise that learning
reflects the dynamic process of social interaction, the focus should lie on examining
such a process. In other words, it should highlight the role of relational dimensions in
learning.
As mentioned above, corporate learning involves complex social interactions between
individuals, and across functional boundaries or a firm's boundary. Relational
proximity refers to the nature of the relationship between individuals, members of a
group, or groups. This can be sustained through common language and culture,
mutual trust, mutually respected norms of behaviour. Thus, the extent to which agents
are proximate relationally seems to relate to the creation of social capital. The concept
of relational proximity involves not only informal relationships between individuals,
such as informal networks, but also formal relationships between agents who belong to
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a purposeful organisation. Meanwhile, the concept of 'organisational proximity' is
referred to as a coordination mechanism that binds together individuals engaged in a
purposive activity (Blanc and Sierra, 1999). Thus, firms try to establish common
codes of coordination and communication to facilitate social interactions, while
avoiding the possibility of mismatch or conflicts in communications between members.
Conventionally, organisational proximity applies to intra-firm relationships. But
organisational proximity is required to coordinate inter-firm relationships, such as user-
producer relations (Blanc and Sierra, 1999). In what follows, I attempt to elaborate
relational/organisational proximity through the concepts of cultural proximity and
cognitive proximity.
3.3.2. Cultural and cognitive proximity
Organisational proximity can be facilitated when organisational members share
common cultural attributes. Therefore, cultural proximity is regarded as crucial to
sustaining organisational proximity. The term 'culture' refers to the conventional ways
of doing things among people or within an organisation, and is shaped by the way
people share common norms, values, language and understanding over time. Culture
is created at multiple levels, from the small group to organisation or society, and beyond,
and levels usually overlap. Cultural proximity provides members of organisation with
a common perspective. Thus cultural proximity plays a role in increasing common
understanding among members. This is not only important for facilitating collective
learning with methods such as informal dialogue and interactive communication, but is
also conducive to improving the capacity to solve certain problems faced by
organisations.
Of course, the benefits of cultural proximity might be promoted by maintaining
geographical proximity between agents. Meanwhile, long-term co-location between
agents is likely to increase the potential for sharing cultural proximity between them.
Both dimensions of proximity would thus be complementary. Let us suppose a case
64
where two agents are geographically separated from one another, but share the same
culture at the organisational or national level (e.g. Chinese overseas business networks).
Thanks to a sense of common understanding and inclusion between agents, they can
continue to manage their relationship and sustain problem-solving, learning and
adaptation more effectively, partly with the help of virtual proximity via cutting-edge
telecommunication methods such as e-mail and teleconferencing. 8 However, this does
not seem sufficient. The degree of interactions and common-understanding appear to
be, to a greater or lesser extent, limited by geographical proximity. As recently argued
by Asheim (2000), social capital that is incrementally produced from mutual trust and
the sharedness of norm, common belief and culture, and required to maintain long-term
reciprocal and synergetic relationships, may, to a large extent, be built through close
relations based on direct interactions and communications.
The cultural approach to proximity helps us to understand how organisations or
communities within the firm gain relational/organisational proximity, while the
cognitive approach to proximity also offers an insight into ways of achieving a balance
between sustaining organisational ties for a unity and allowing novelty or radical
innovation. The concept of cognitive proximity in the study of learning and
innovation has been influenced by a Neo-Schumpeterian perspective. This perspective
stresses that variety (or diversity) can play a crucial role in creating the learning and
innovation needed for sustaining the dynamic evolution of the firm (Metcalfe, 1998;
Saviotti, 1996). It emphasises the role of cognitive and behavioural diversity in
improving the learning capability. The term 'cognition' refers to the mental action or
process of acquiring knowledge through thought, experience, and the senses (Hayes and
Allison, 1998). Nooteboom (1999a, 1999b, 2000) introduces cognitive proximity as a
means of explaining the dimension of learning and innovation in the relationships
between inter-firm alliance partners.
The concept of cognitive proximity is the opposite to that of cognitive distance. This
8 Virtual proximity refers to situations which employ technology to either simulate or approximate spatial
and cultural proximity.
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conception helps us to understand the ways in which the cognitive distinction between
agents affects performance in learning and innovation. It emphasises that the more
cognitive distance between agents, the more possibility there is of creating novelty or
creative destruction. That is because cognitive distance is more likely to provide the
opportunity for agents to access fundamentally new ideas and insights from other
sources. At the same time, the less cognitive distance there is, the more the possibility
to generate new insights and knowledge is constrained.
There is a similar point of view on the benefit of cognitive distance, which states that
agents have distinct cognitive structures while sharing cultural proximity, the potential
for organisations to improve learning and problem-solving capabilities by mobilising
cognitive diversity may be increased. If agents are culturally close to one another,
there is the possibility that they will share a similar structure of cognition and
perception. Cognition tends to be contingent upon interpretative contexts between
people, but it may be more or less similar according to cultural proximity, which
involves shared language, culture and experience (Nooteboom, 1999a). Conversely,
cognitive proximity is not necessarily similar between people who share cultural
proximity. Nevertheless, differences in the rationality of cognition and behaviour
among people or sub-groups can, to a degree, be co-ordinated and governed by cultural
proximity.
In sum, cultural and cognitive proximity between members allows in-depth, two-way
communication and encourages the exchange and sharing of information and
knowledge by drawing on trust, common understanding and sense-making. Therefore,
it facilitates continuous learning and incremental innovations within a given framework.
Meanwhile, there is the danger that a common cultural and cognitive identity may
prevent a firm or a group from adapting to radical changes in the environment, by
preventing it from taking up creative ideas and considering different points of view. In
this context, the crucial point for continuous adaptation is a firm's capability to manage
organisational proximity and mobilise cognitively distant agents in order to create
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novelty. In the following sections, I explore how learning and knowledge creation take
place in the firm by analysing proximities along a relational/organisational dimension.
3.3.3. `Ba' as relationally defined spaces of knowledge creation and learning
The previous discussion shows that different forms of proximity are, to a greater or
lesser degree, interwoven in the framework of relational/organisational proximity. The
combined recognition of cultural and cognitive proximity in learning enables us to
recognise the importance of relational/organisational proximity, when conceiving
learning as a social and interactive process. This dimension of proximity seems to be
promoted, or influenced, in part by the dimension of geographical proximity.
Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) model of knowledge conversion gives a fascinating
illustration of how these forms of proximity are interwoven. Their model is concerned
with theorising intra-firm learning processes, centred on the process of knowledge
creation. They see that tacit knowledge in and out of the firm can be a basic element
in promoting corporate competence and competitiveness. The key point of the model
is how such competitive knowledge is socialised (tacit to tacit), externalised (tacit to
codified), combined (codified to codified) and internalised (codified to tacit) within an
organisational boundary, and how this cycle of knowledge conversion is repeated
through a feedback process. It is argued that tacit knowledge can only be acquired
through interactions between individuals. Thus the process of learning consists of a
series of learning processes through direct observation, imitation, practice and hands-on
correction on the basis of face-to-face contact. This process highly relies on how
people or organisations form relational ties and maintain reciprocal relationships.
Therefore, building a milieu of trust and mutual engagement among agents is a
precondition. In this context, geographical proximity is viewed as a partial support for
reproducing and reinforcing such a milieu.
Going one step further, Nonaka and his Japanese colleagues have attempted to elaborate
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on the learning process of organisational knowledge, drawing upon the concept of 'ha'
(Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Nonaka and Toyama and Konno, 2001). I suggest that this
concept is very helpful in defining the relationship between proximity and learning.
The Japanese word `ba' roughly means 'place' in English, but necessarily goes beyond
what place implies. The concept of 'ha' is defined as a shared space where learning
takes place. It can be a physical space (e.g. an office or dispersed business space), a
virtual space (e.g. e-mail and teleconference), a mental space (e.g. shared experiences
and ideas), or any combination of them. This definition of 'ha' shows that a key to
forming `ba' is 'interaction', which is considered to be influential in the process and
outcome of learning. As Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2001) put it:
Ba is the context shared by those who interact with each other and, via such
interactions, those who participate in ha and the context itself evolve through self-
transcendence to create knowledge (p.22).
They subsequently try to explain the processes of knowledge creation and learning,
drawing on four types of 'ha' or knowledge spaces (ibid.: 24-26). The first,
'originating ha', is the place where individuals share feelings, emotions, experiences,
and mental models, and is a knowledge space where the 'socialisation process (tacit to
tacit knowledge)' takes place. Thus, the key to knowledge creation is physical, face-
to-face interaction. The second, 'dialogue ha', is the place where individuals' mental
models and skills are converted into common terms and concepts. 'Dialogue ha'
corresponds to the 'externalisation process', which occurs in the codification of
knowledge. Therefore, the sharing and articulation of knowledge through dialogue
between participants, and the further articulation through reflection are critical. This
implies that 'dialogue ha' seems likely to be effectively sustained when the organisation
deliberately creates 'knowledge communities', such as project teams, strategic
communities, or cross-functional teams.
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Figure 3.1 Four kinds of knowledge spaces and knowledge creating process
Source: adapted from Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2001).
The third, 'systemising ba' , is a virtual place rather than real time and space. It offers
a context for the 'combination process', by which new systemic, explicit knowledge is
created through the combination of various elements of explicit knowledge. This type
of ba is largely supported by the utilisation of ICTs (Information & Communication
Technologies), such as on-line networks, databanks, documentation and groupware.
The last, 'exercising ba', is a place where 'internalisation' takes place. Continuous
learning and self-refinement through on-the-job training or peripheral and active
participation facilitate the conversion of codified knowledge into tacit knowledge.
The concept of ba signifies that spaces of learning exist in any form of place where
social interactions for learning take place. It goes beyond a physical space. It
directly connotes the power of relational/organisational proximity. To a degree,
relational/organisational proximity can be sustained at a distance with the help of ICTs
methods such as e-mail, telephone and teleconferencing. However, it is not to say that
geographical proximity is not important in learning. Rather, I would stress that
geographical proximity can be a useful means of gaining "rich" relational/organisational
proximity. The effective combination of different forms of proximity may enable the
people involved to better understand, make sense of and learn from one another in
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mutual and recursive ways. Nevertheless, it should be noted that geographical
proximity without relational/organisational proximity is like an empty bowl. The
interpretation of the relationship between proximity and learning, discussed throughout
this section, emphasises the social and interactive nature of the learning, which takes
place in the firm.
The last section deals with a matter of proximity in learning through communities in the
firm. Particular emphasis is given to how communities in the firm create and develop
relational/organisational proximity through space and place in organising their own
activities.
3.4. Communities in the firm, learning and proximity
3.4.1. Communities of practice, epistemic communities and proximity
The recursive process of learning in communities of practice can be enriched by the
concept of proximity. Communities of practice appear to be a homogeneous group that
is composed of people who share common practices with similar cultural and cognitive
proximities. Etienne Wenger (1998) refers to the role of geographical proximity on
learning in doing:
People who have related backgrounds are capable of creating a community of practice
with less mutual engagement. If they are geographically proximate to one another,
potential of learning may be further increased (p. 130).
There is no doubt that geographical proximity is, to some extent, conducive to the
creation of mutual engagement between members of the community, especially at the
early stage of its formation. However, it needs to avoid seeing geographical proximity
as either a sufficient condition or a requisite for steering communities of practice. The
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process of building soft infrastructures in communities of practice, indicating mutual
engagement, joint enterprise and shared repertoire clearly shows how communities of
practice obtain organisational proximity. The increase of mutual engagement through
doing things together and mutual relationships may further lead participants to promote
relational/organisational proximity. The process of learning that occurs through
ongoing practice and draws on social energy and power generated through interaction in
joint enterprises between participants leads to the formation of a local code of practice
and a regime of mutual accountability. Once relational/organisational proximity is
sustained and a shared repertoire is created, learning and knowledge sharing between
members of the community can be increasingly facilitated through either face-to-face
contacts or distant contacts via virtual proximity, drawing on communication
technologies such as teleconferencing and e-mail.
As communities of practice are homogeneous groups that are composed of people
engaged in the same practice and in regular communication with each other, it could be
argued that this kind of knowledge community draws on the advantage of cultural and
cognitive proximity. On the other hand, epistemic communities are heterogeneous
groups composed of individuals who are characterised by different cognitions and
cultural backgrounds. Thus, it is crucial to bring together the benefits of cognitive
distance (diversity) and cultural proximity (identity). To do this, epistemic
communities are required to establish a procedural authority, which is regarded as a
coordination mechanism that reconciles cognitive diversity and cultural identity. This
is a prerequisite for organisational proximity. The cognitive-cultural distinction makes
it more difficult for members of an epistemic community to sustain organisational
proximity than for members of a community of practice. This means that epistemic
communities might require face-to-face interactions on a regular basis in order to
reconcile cognitive differences and thereby connect new insights to radical innovations.
Based on the example of Xerox, which established a strategic community — called the
Xerox Transition Alliance — organised for the corporate-wide improvement of IT
infrastructure, Storck and Hill (2000) argue:
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Alliance members believed that almost two-thirds of the group's value was derived
from face-to-face networking at the regular meetings. One Alliance member who had
an especially expensive and arduous journey attended every other meeting and
participated by audioconference when he could not attend in person. The importance
of maintaining personal relationships in this way also distinguishes the Alliance from
other high-performing teams, for which research indicates that physical proximity is
not critical. Although face-to-face meetings are not prerequisite means of interaction
for a community of practice, most communities do work this way (p. 68).
We need to read their statement carefully, because it is dangerous to view it as
advocating the advantage of geographical proximity without considering
relational/organisational proximity. The statement illustrates the process of creating
relational/organisational proximity through the mobilisation of distant actors who are
interested in a particular problem-solving task beyond delimited places and boundaries.
The nature of learning, knowledge creation and problem-solving task is dependent on
the degree and intensity of inter-personal and inter-organisational contacts. This is
enabled by the distanciated networks of communication and travel as well as the
unbroken interplay between face-to-face and telemediated contact (Amin, 2001b). In
other words, it emphasises the role of geographies of circulation and mobility —
including, for example, conferences and meetings via both short and long haul journeys
in learning through knowledge communities. In short, it could be argued that
reciprocal and interactive learning and radical innovations in epistemic communities
can be achieved by effectively combining these kinds of multiple proximities centred on
the relations between actors.
3.4.2. Task-force teams, learning and proximity
As with the other communities described above, the activities of task-force (or project)
teams can also be promoted by drawing on a property of proximity. In this section, I
argue that task-force teams seek to draw more on combining geographical proximity
and organisational proximity than any other communities in the firm. Large
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multidivisional firms attempt to make use of the advantage of proximity to organise and
operate task-force teams which represent boundary-spanning co-working activities.
These activities often require to mobilise distributed knowledge and resources over their
global networks of operations. Such a strategy often takes the shape of establishing an
exclusive site designed for only ad hoc task-force activities. Its aim is to not only
enhance the efficiency of a task-force activity, but also to avoid the possibility of formal
work organisations intervening in this activity. The task-force team is usually allowed
freedom and autonomy in its activity.
A task-force team is composed of members who have different expertise and belong to
different teams. These team members consist of specialists working different locations
within the global networks of operations within the firm (Hargadon, 1998). While
such a nature of teamwork may offer a chance to utilise the advantage of cognitive
distance or variety, its relational/organisational proximity is questionable. To
overcome this problem and steer task-force activities, some firms create a purpose-
specific physical space. This is what is known as the co-location strategy. This kind
of strategy tends to be frequently sought in order to effectively undertake projects or
tasks, which require to mobilise a variety of expertise and knowledge. A new product
development project is the best example to illustrate the accomplishment of a task
through co-location. The co-location strategy deliberately seeks to reduce the period
of the development cycle of the product through techniques of simultaneous engineering.
But it also allows to decrease conflicts and mismatch and to mobilise distributed or
separated competences of tacit knowledge in a coherent way. DiBella, Nevis and
Gould (1996) illustrate a co-location strategy used by FIAT, an Italian car manufacturer,
in the process of developing a new product:
New product development teams work together in 'co-location' in common, open work
areas to facilitate communication and co-ordination. Staff from other FIAT Auto
divisions, such as design, manufacturing and marketing, who are also assigned to the
piattaformas — staff groups responsible for the new models of a certain size or cost —
work in co-location. Where engineers and other functional staff once worked
sequentially on related tasks, now they work concurrently in parallel rather than in
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series. In this form of simultaneous engineering, new models are completed without
the time delay that occurred when components were designed sequentially or when
newly designed components had to pass from function to function (p. 365).
The FIAT case shows a co-location model where the project team members work
together in part of existing work areas, while the BMW case illustrates a more radical
co-location strategy which establishes a new R&D centre that brings together
decentralised R&D laboratories in a certain space.
BMW has embarked upon a radical experiment in which some 6,000 engineers and
support staff are co-located at its Research and Engineering Centre to the north of
Munich... The Centre is much more than a conventional R&D facility, because it
represents an unprecedented co-mingling of skills, including research, design,
development, manufacturing, personnel, procurement, and patents. Such extreme co-
location is designed to achieve one fundamental goal, namely to reduce the
development cycle of new models by up to two years through the use of advanced
simultaneous engineering techniques, in which manufacturing methods are developed
in parallel with prototypes (Cooke and Morgan, 1998: 45-46).
On this site, members of a task force team may carry out all the tasks associated with
the project. Until finalising the project, members of the team may always attend the
laboratory prepared for the project. Members of the team usually work together at the
same place. Relational organisational proximity may be facilitated through intensive
processes of joint practices, open ways of communication and mutual efforts to
understand each other. These are the processes of developing common language,
mutual understanding and sense-making, and thereby can be a base that enables
members to exchange and share their tacit knowledge in a more effective way.
Effectiveness in communication is a property of relational/organisational proximity.
This is not the end of the aspects of learning by interaction and communication within
the team. There are many other chances to share common interests and knowledge
between members of various task force teams. Members of a task-force team often
invite outsiders who have expertise and skills in a certain area of work and share, if
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necessary, and discuss the problems that they face. In addition, task-force team
members may learn outside knowledge via maintaining proximity at a distance such as
business travels, the participations of conferences and telemediated contacts (see for
example Hargadon, 1998). Throughout access to distanciated sources of knowledge,
team members can learn tacit and codified knowledge that helps to solve a given
problem. But knowledge acquired through these methods can also be shared within
the team and, potentially, disseminated between teams carrying out diverse projects.
Learning through these processes of interactions may play an important role in instilling
new insights, ideas and knowledge in task-force teams. Novelty or radical innovation
can be derived from bringing together multiple set of knowledge in and outside of a
team boundary.
The nature of relationships between members depending on mutual commitment and
trust would be actually crucial to making such interaction and communication effective.
The role of communication and interaction lies in disseminating and sharing knowledge,
largely tacit, through combining different forms of knowledge and thereby resolving
potential mismatch and conflict. Hands-on communication and interaction may thus
become effective only in case that people related become willing to collaborate, interact,
and engaging with one another (Barker and Camarta, 1998). These may rely on the
extent to which agents are proximate organisationally.
3.5. Distanciated learning
As explored above, corporate learning cannot be reduced to a matter of geographical
proximity and localised learning. For large firms, learning need not be bound to a
specific territorial boundary. Rather, corporate learning should place its emphasis on
firm's capabilities to take advantage of knowledge decentralised inside and outside the
firm. As Dicken et al. (1994: 30) argued, the dilemma facing firms, especially large
firms, in today's turbulent competitive environment is that, to succeed on a global scale,
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they must possess capabilities to be globally efficient, to be multinationally flexible, and
to capture the benefits of worldwide learning all at the same time. This means that
corporate learning takes place inside the firm through the network of intra-firm
relationships as well as outside the firm through the complex network of inter-firm
relationships (Dicken et al., 1994). So to speak, firms learn within and across the
boundaries of the firm. Perhaps, the globalisation of R&D activities and strategic
alliances are most significant dimensions of corporate learning pursued within and
across the boundaries of the firm. These learning methods have become increasingly
critical to access external sources of knowledge. The rapid increase in the
globalisation of economic activities and in global competition in markets and
technology has forced firms to strengthen these strategies.
Following the globalisation of product markets, financial transactions and direct
investment, large firms' R&D activities should be globalised, not only in their
traditional role of supporting local production, but also in order to create interfaces with
specialised skills and innovative opportunities at a world level (Tidd et al., 1997: 138).
The rationale that MNCs expand the geographical scope of R&D activities beyond their
home countries varies. From the market perspective, foreign corporate R&D activities
are pursued to adapt products and processes to local markets where adaptations to local
tastes and traditions are important. Normally, market-specific R&D activities can be
active in multinational firms in industries such as electrical appliances and automobiles.
However, the driving force of foreign R&D activities should be found in a broader way.
The increasing tendency of foreign R&D activities is associated with firms' efforts to
access and learn host countries or regions specific knowledge. Empirical studies prove
this that, for multinationals, the locations of foreign R&D have tended to be
concentrated in certain countries which are replete with the sources of knowledge
critical to promoting firm's technological capabilities (Kumar, 2001; Pavitt and Patel,
1999). For Zanfei (2000), the local embeddedness of R&D activities is critical to
enhancing the capability to learn local-specific knowledge and can be strengthened by
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recruiting local personnel and building cooperative networks with local institutions such
as firms and research institutes.
While the globalisation of R&D represents corporate learning based on intra-firm
networks of relationships, inter-firm alliances are seen as critical sources of learning
between firms. As mentioned in Chapter 2, alliance firms share information, such as
market intelligence, and both tacit and explicit knowledge, such as skills, know-how
and technologies, in a complementary way. Inter-firm learning processes involve a
combination of tacit knowledge and codified knowledge as well as a combination of
local knowledge and distanciated knowledge. For example, technology sharing
involves sharing of codified knowledge between firms, including patents, product
technology and process technology (Inkpen, 1996). However, it needs more. To
share technology requires interactive learning processes between firms through
personnel exchange, face-to-face and telemediated meetings between alliance firms.
In addition, joint product development projects are also characterised by interactive
learning processes. In doing this, alliance firms create joint project (task-force) teams.
In a certain circumstance, alliance firms operate project teams on the basis of co-
location. In general, members of the team, however, interact on a global basis (e.g.
Bengtsson and Soderholm, 2002). They communicate through telemediated contact
methods such as emails, fax and teleconferencing. However, in some circumstances,
physical interactions such as face-to-face meetings and conferences between
distanciated project team members could also play an important role in creating and
maintaining relational/organisational proximity. In short, these cases imply that
learning does not necessarily need geographical proximity and need not necessarily be
dependent upon localised learning. The increasing tendency of corporate restructuring
such as the globalisation of R&D and strategic alliances illustrate that corporate
learning takes place through networks of relationships across organisational spaces on a
global basis.
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3.6. Conclusions
In this chapter, I have reviewed the recent geographical literature on learning and
suggested a relational/organisational perspective on learning and proximity by
introducing the insights offered by knowledge or learning communities within the firm.
I have argued that the current fashion stressing the power of the regions and
geographical proximity as the sources of learning has been silent on how learning takes
place and is organised in the firm and where the sources of learning come from.
Learning reflects complex social relations in and outside of the firm. This is, namely,
to represent that the process and outcome of learning is defined by a property of
relational/organisational proximity. Nevertheless, these are often left in a black box in
the geographical literature. It is claimed that it is time to delve into these questions
and attempt to unpack the black box.
As a means of doing this, I have proposed that an understanding of the sources of
learning and its process needs to be begun by scrutinising corporate contexts. Firms
attempt to find sources of knowledge and learn them by mobilising and blending
knowledge and competences distributed in and outside the boundary of the firm. This
point represents that the sources of learning exist in organisational spaces. To
exemplify this, I have tackled the relationships between learning and proximity,
drawing on the concept of `ba' defined as a shared space, communities of practice,
epistemic communities and task-force teams.
As stated in the previous chapter, knowledge or learning communities within the firm
can be vital sources of learning and make a contribution to sustaining innovations by
mobilising distributed knowledge and competences and blending varied forms of
knowledge. It has been shown that their organising processes are deeply associated
with the building process of relational/organisational proximity. Of course, this
process could be more effective when they have geographical proximity, not least at the
early stage of formation. Equally, it could be argued that geographical proximity
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seems to be a necessary condition in order to increase the circulation of tacit knowledge,
mainly between the same locality-based actors. It should be noted that geographical
proximity is, conversely, likely to impede access to extra-local sources of knowledge
and thereby decrease the possibility to produce novelties, which may result from
cognitive diversity. This means that firms need to attempt to not only mobilise internal
sources of knowledge which are distributed across complex organisational boundaries
within the firm but also link with extra-firm sources of knowledge. As argued by
scholars such as Allen (2000; 2001), Amin (2000; 2001b) and Oinas (1999; 2000), this
is directly to show that a matter of which a firm constructs 'thick' relationships and
relational/organisational proximity which span organisational and industry boundaries
can be more crucial to acquiring knowledge and sustaining learning rather than that of
which a firm maintains geographical closeness to others.
To understand communities in the firm that draw on relational sources of knowledge in
its own learning processes can be of crucial importance. The density and strength of
relational organisational proximity developed through practices of a certain community
seem to influence its performance and learning process. In sum, the main point I have
wished to make is that corporate learning is occurred and realised through the
operations of the networks of relations, which refer to 'learning communities' organised
in organisational spaces. Definitely, these may no longer be the assets of localised
learning, because such learning is only possible by drawing on decentralised knowledge
residing in corporate hierarchy and organisational spaces.
Finally, I claim that corporate learning does not necessarily need geographical
proximity and need not necessarily be dependent upon localised learning. Large firms
attempt to mobilise competences distributed within and beyond organisational spaces
and learn tacit and codified knowledge through movements and relational networks.
The increasing tendency of the globalisation of R&D and strategic alliances is clear
evidence showing that corporate learning takes place through networks of relationships
across organisational spaces on a global basis.
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Chapter 4
Research Methodology
4.1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the methodology and the methods of analysis employed to carry
out the case studies on the adaptation challenge facing Korean firms and to address the
aims underlying empirical research. In section 4.2, I attempt to place the firm, the key
unit of analysis of the thesis, on an evolutionary and institutional perspective in order to
justify the methodological and analytical framework for my empirical research which
will be tackled in the next section. In section 4.4, the rationale for the selection of the
case study firms is suggested. Section 4.5 describes the process of approaching the
case study firms and the methods of analysis used to carry out my empirical research.
In the final section, difficulties and limitations raised in the course of fieldwork are
described.
4.2. Studying the firm
The central unit of analysis of this thesis is the firm. But, the firm, as one of the key
economic institutions of the capitalist economy, has been a contested analytical category
in economics and economic geography (Maskell, 2001; Taylor and Asheim, 2001;
Yeung, 1999). The understanding of the firm has long been dominated by the
neoclassical theories of the firm. Neoclassical approaches assume the firm as a
rational, maximising utility with given and stable behavioural preferences within near
perfect information (Foss, 1998; Hodgson, 1996, 1998). Regarding the firm as a
processor of given information means that the firm may not need to learn. This
implies that firms not only organise their behaviour towards an optimal reaction to
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environmental signals but are also equally capable of optimising their behaviour.
However, these neoclassical approaches make it difficult for us to understand questions
such as the following: how firms behave differently and why they are different from
each other in terms of learning and adaptation. Although there are great differences in
the way in which firms exist, behave and evolve in the real world, these questions
remain a 'black box' in neoclassical approaches (Nelson, 1991).
By contrast, the approach I take in this research lies in the evolutionary and
competence-based approach to the firm, which emphasises firm-specific and context-
specific dimensions of corporate adaptation and learning. The central assumption of
this perspective is that the firm is not a static, but dynamic institution (Nelson, 1991;
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Foss, 1993, 1998). This is to recognise that capitalist firms
exist in diverse forms in terms of their existence and evolutionary processes in the real
world, largely because all firms possess distinctive competences of its own (see for
example Grabher and Stark, 1997). The firm-specific and tacit nature of competences
is assumed to bring about the wide variations in corporate behaviour and performance
(Nelson, 1991).
From the competence-based approach, the firm is seen as a learning entity (Foss, 1998).
The firm is a collective organisation with a certain degree of competence-development
capacity of their own. Firms are not seen as homogeneous units of rational utility
maximization, as in neoclassical theory. Rather, they are differentiated units seen as
capable of learning through the "double feedback loop" of assessing both their own
experiences and that of their peers (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). As the firm is seen as a
dynamic rather than a static entity, evolving elements including adaptation, learning and
innovation, become central units of analysis. Along with this, the behaviour of the
firm is seen to be path-dependent. This implies that past behaviours reflect the
characteristics of current behaviours as claimed by Veblen (1899) over a century ago:
Institutions are products of the past processes, are adapted to past circumstances, and
therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present (p. 191).
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The path-dependent nature of institutions has been one of the central questions in
making sense of institutional change in institutionalism. Considering the relationships
between learning and the nature of environmental change, the role of routines in
learning presents the double sides of the coin. On the one hand, routines built up along
a specific learning domain may provide the basis of competences for both competitive
advantages in a stable environment. On the other hand, routines may result in lock-in
that could constrain new learning in the face of radical change in the environment.
Lastly, as many argue (e.g. Dicken, 2000; Hollingsworth, 2000; Whitley 1992; 1999;
Yeung, 1998; 2001), it is assumed that the operational characteristics of business
organisations are influenced by the institutional systems or institutional arrangements in
which they are embedded. 9 This implies that the paths and features of adaptation and
learning by firms can be influenced by those institutional systems. As such, it can be
assumed that firms produce the different processes and outcomes of learning and
adaptation not only as a result of firm-specific contexts such as corporate culture and
routines, but also as a result of macro-institutional contexts, including political
economic conditions and national systems of institutions. In contrast to individualistic
views as in neoclassical economics, the relationship between the firm and its
surrounding institutional environment provides a basis for understanding the complexity
and variety of adaptation and learning by firms. Adaptation and learning by firms
cannot be simply reduced to the problem of efficiency of corporate strategy and
organisational processes.
These assumptions have critical implications for the research methodology. Firstly,
they demand that the focus is placed on examining contexts within the firm and the
institutional contexts surrounding the firm. Secondly, they demand that the
methodological and analytical framework should put history-specific and context-
9 An institutional perspective explains not only influences of national-specific contexts and institutional
structures on corporate evolution but also, as argued by Yeung (1999), home country-specific features in
the behaviours of transnational enterprises.
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specific aspects in central position. Thirdly, they demand that the methodology must
be sensitive to various kinds of learning undertaken to adapt to various kinds of
challenges, including technologies in product and process, marketing, organisation,
macro-market trends and political economic contexts in and out of the firm level.
These underpinnings have led me to employ qualitative methodologies for the empirical
analysis. As opposed to the quantitative approach which seeks to generalise and
simplify the complexities of organisational contexts by drawing on standardised
measures, the qualitative methods of analysis centre on an understanding of knowledge
'situated' in individuals and groups (Silverman, 2000; Dwyer and Limb, 2001).10
Qualitative methodologies in corporate research can be a useful source of grounded,
rich descriptions and explanations of organisational processes occurring through a
certain corporate context (Schoenberger, 1991).
4.3. Methodological issues
Following the above approach, my empirical work has two aims. The first is to
understand how Korea's largest firms have responded to radical changes in their
environment. It is assumed that the Asian financial crisis must have challenged their
continuous survival, and I wish to see whether restructuring has been learning centred.
Thus, I am seeing whether Chaebol act as latest theory would predict. The second aim
is to examine the contextual variables, which are firm-specific as well as institutional
environment-specific, that affect corporate learning and adaptation. I wish to illustrate
(and criticise) the powers of the evolutionary and institutional approach to the firm.
Most of the literature on chaebol has criticised chaebol's bad management practices and
I ° Some scholars point out limitations of qualitative research such as a lack of reliability and rigor of its
research (see for example Markusen, 2000; Martin, 2001). However, both methodologies have both
strengths and weaknesses in analysing social phenomena and events. As Martin (2001: 197) argues, the
common tendency for the two to be portrayed as incommensurate alternatives is highly misleading and
thereby two approaches work best in combination, each informing, reflecting back on and complementing
the other.
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has suggested the need of radical reforms for survival.
In this thesis, emphasis is placed on understanding the contextual features of corporate
responses to radical change and the complex processes of learning by Korea's large
manufacturing firms. Therefore, I have chosen to consider the relevance of various
kinds of learning strategies as theorised earlier and the contextual variables that
influence the processes of learning. In doing this, I have selected to investigate as
many the organisational units and individuals as possible. They include the
management planning teams, the R&D teams and the production teams.
First, the management planning team has been considered the primary sources of
information with regard to corporate restructuring and organisational changes. This
unit is dedicated to designing and evaluating the corporate strategy. Managers in the
management planning team possess knowledge of the issue in which I am interested.
But they also have authority and power to allow me to access managers in other
organisational units. Often, access to senior staff in the management planning team is
likely, prior to others when conducting corporate fieldwork. From this organisational
unit, I expected to get general information about the case study firm, including
corporate history, human resource management, organisational competences and culture,
organisational structure, corporate strategy and the restructuring process.
Second, the R&D unit can be regarded as the key sources of technological learning and
innovations in large manufacturing companies. In particular, for multinational
manufacturing companies competing for global markets, R&D capability is a crucial
factor that affects survival. Continuous product innovation is the key to leading
technological competition and sustaining continuous adaptation. Investigating R&D
units may offer an opportunity to explore technological learning and innovation
activities, technological competences and the mobilisation of technological knowledge
which are critical to identify various dimensions of corporate learning, involving both
soft and hard learning, and the possible paths of corporate evolution.
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Third, the production unit is an important source of learning and organisational change.
The manufacturing activity cannot be simply reduced to the production of products
through input of production factors such as capital and labour. Rapid changes in
customer demands and the increase of inter-firm competition have forced firms to
innovate not only in products but also in manufacturing process. They have to produce
multiple products on the basis of the principle of mass production in order to meet
fragmented customer demands. Along with this, they have to attempt to sustain
process innovation cut production costs down in order to improve productivity. The
approach to the production team provides a lot of implications for understanding
corporate learning and adaptation. In addition to this, Korean firms have faced an
additional challenge to restructure since the crisis. Major programmes of corporate
restructuring urged by the government have been focused on downsizing accompanied
with mass job losses. As these restructuring processes mean a direct impact upon
production activities, the investigation has also included the process of downsizing and
employment adjustment and its implications for learning and adaptation.
Finally, empirical work has been focused on the role of communities in the firm in
learning. Communities of practice are defined as homogeneous groups of employees
engaged in the same practice in regular communication with others through mutual
commitment. Epistemic communities are heterogeneous groups in which recruitment
occurs through peers, to work explicitly on a common knowledge problem. They have
a clear intention, often strategic. Meanwhile, task-force teams are more strategic and
organised to solve a certain problem facing the firm. The features of communities of
practice can be revealed by examining organisational routines and daily work processes,
especially in both R&D and manufacturing units. Meanwhile, epistemic communities
and task-force teams are strategic communities. Most of all, these communities appear
to be significant in R&D activities. Therefore, an investigation of communities has
been made mainly in the R&D units.
85
4.4. The Selection of the case study firms
To undertake the empirical work, most crucial was the selection of case study
companies. There is no doubt that, ideally, the more the number of case study
companies, the more the result of the study is likely to become reliable and valid.
However, it is extremely difficult for academic researchers to access large firms in
general and Korean chaebol companies in particular. They tend to be reluctant to give
researchers corporate information.
In fact, most empirical studies of chaebol companies have been done by either
renowned academic scholars who already have contacts with top managers or
researchers who have once worked in the companies. I enjoyed neither privilege.
This made it difficult for me to access a range of companies. Therefore, I chose to
study two electronics companies: LG Electronics Co. (henceforth LGE) and Samsung
Electronics Co. (henceforth SEC).
The Korean electronics industry has been dominated by four chaebol companies:
Samsung, LG, Hyundai and Daewoo. In addition to the two case study companies,
Hyundai Electronics Company specialises in semiconductors and Daewoo Electronics
Company specialises in consumer electronics. When I was considering the selection
of the case study firms in early 1999, industry expert outlook on these two companies
was not bright. Hyundai still continues on a massive restructuring path and is striving
to sell off major business divisions. Daewoo too has been struggling to survive since
the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. In early 1999, it nearly closed down its
plants. I realised that I would not have access to these companies for fieldwork. In
addition, I thought it was too risky in terms of the promise of results.
However, the main reasons for choosing LG and Samsung are two-fold. First, both are
flagship companies in Korea as well as in each conglomerate. Although both
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companies operate in rather differentiated business portfolio, they have also been
competing for both domestic and global markets in a wide range of product and
technology within the electronics industry. They share, to a degree, similarities in
terms of business structure, governance structure and corporate culture. These
similarities are influenced by the fact that they have evolved under the same
institutional environment, often identified as a national specific context (see for more
details Biggart, 1997; Hamilton and Feenstra, 1997; Whitley 1992; 1998; 1999). But,
it is also clear that each of these also represents distinctive features of its own in terms
of organisational capabilities, management practices and corporate culture. I assumed
that these features would help to make clear similarities and differences in learning and
adaptation.
Second, the electronic industry in which both companies are specialised typifies
dynamic changes propelling radical learning. This industry is characterised by varying
degrees of knowledge intensity ranging from standardised knowledge to highly
knowledge-intensive sectors, the rapid technological changes driven by technological
advancements and convergence, highly volatile market competition resulted from
globalisation and market saturation. Ernst (2000b) describes the present situation of
inter-firm competition in the electronics industry:
Market positions are highly volatile, new entry is possible, and not even market leaders
can count on a guaranteed survival (p. 1).
This implies that electronics firms faced by a pressure to rapidly respond and adapt to
the pace of radical change should illustrate the dynamics of corporate restructuring and
learning practices in many ways. Therefore, these choices may make them good
examples to compare learning and restructuring practices between firms.
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4.5. Methods of analysis
4.5.1. Approaching the case study firms
The fieldwork was carried out from June 1999 to October 1999. As mentioned above,
I had no direct contacts with employees in either company before undertaking the
fieldwork. As the first stage in contacting the companies, I sent the public relations
team at each company's headquarters a letter requesting their cooperation for the
fieldwork and the details of the fieldwork methods and schedule. The fieldwork
methods designed included participant observations in one of each firm's R&D
laboratories and factories for at least two weeks as well as interviews with employees
ranging from top managers to factory workers. That is because I deemed that
participant observation would help identify the micro-sources of learning and
innovation and understand the role of communities in corporate learning by
investigating learning practices occurring through day-to-day practices.
Unfortunately, however, the response was disappointing. Instead of introducing
relevant personnel to me, I was asked to contact senior managers in charge of teams and
plants which I wanted to contact. In addition, they did not accept my request to meet
top managers. This kind of response was what I more or less anticipated, reflecting
my previous experiences on corporate interviews (Lee, J. H., 1998). Then, I tried to
call some managers working in the R&D laboratories and plants of each company and
requested them to allow me to do the fieldwork. Their responses also were not
positive. Most responded by saying that not only were they too busy to allow me to
carry out the fieldwork in their companies but also that my fieldwork methods were
unacceptably comprehensive. Only few gave permission to interview with their staff,
at best with one or two employees working in a certain sub-organisation unit.
At this depressing point, thanks to a relative's effort, I was able to meet a senior
engineer working at the central R&D laboratory in one of the companies. I
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interviewed him and asked him to introduce me to the chief manager at a product-
specific laboratory I wanted to approach. The laboratory allowed me entry and I was
at the final stage of coordination with the staff members on my fieldwork schedule.
But, after a week, they phoned me to give notice that they were no longer able to accept
my request, because the senior engineer who guided me to the laboratory had moved to
another company — a high-tech new start-up company —just few days ago!
In the course of these attempts to approach the companies, I was forced to contemplate
the impossibility of fieldwork in big companies using qualitative research methods.
But, I did not give up. I found out some important 'tricks' needed to contact the firms
with the purpose of fieldwork. First, I should not reveal that the fieldwork would be
conducted in both LGE and SEC. Instead, I had to say I am planning to study 'only
your company'. Both companies were competing with each other for the recruitment
of talented engineers and both companies were very concerned about the leakage of
confidential corporate information. This was happening in early 2000 and,
consequently, badly affected my fieldwork. The second trick was that I should directly
contact chief managers in charge of the factory or laboratory operation and to get
permission to do the fieldwork from them. Without obtaining their consent, it
appeared clear that my fieldwork would fall very short of my expectations.
Prior to the third round of attempt at the fieldwork, I realised that I had to alter ray
methodology, abandoning ethnographic methods such as participant observation and
instead to focus more on interviews with managers working in a wide range of fields.
I met my postgraduate advisor and a professor of economics, both at Kyungpook
National University and explained my situation. They started to find persons with
personal networks with senior managers in both companies. Thanks to their help, I
was able to meet an engineering professor acting as the chief technology advisor of
LGE. He not only had a great deal of knowledge of LGE but also knew senior staff
members in both case study companies. He rightly called LG senior staff and at last I
was able to start the interviews. But, they still did not allow ethnographic work but
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kindly guided me to interview with managers with the best knowledge in their own
work area. However, in the course of interviewing, I did have opportunities to talk
informally with workers during the lunch break time as well as to observe the work
processes in the R&D laboratory and the manufacturing lines. The professor also
played a bridging role with some managers in SEC. Interviews with SEC managers
were conducted individually out of work times at places such as a restaurant. However,
I also participated in a workshop on technological innovation held in SEC headquarters
hosted by the corporate innovation study group composed of SME managers and
academic researchers. As a result of this workshop, I had the opportunity to talk to
some senior managers in Suwon headquarters and workers in the factory.
4.5.2. Interviewing
The main methods that I have used were semi-structured in-depth interviews. To avoid
misinterpreting the data collected from the interviews, I conducted corporate
interviewing through triangulation processes. Prior to conducting the interviews, I
reviewed a number of secondary data, ranging from corporate history and restructuring
processes to the Korean economy and management theories. I deemed that this
process enables to make sense of the precise meaning and context of narratives
produced through the reflections and memories of interviewees. As Schoenberger
(1991) notes:
The respondent will be reassured to know that the investigator understands the issues
under discussion and is likely to both more open and more detailed, and more likely to
allow the researcher to control the general direction of the interview (p. 186).
In fact, in the course of interviewing, respondents in managerial positions often tended
to use the specialised terms. For example, some of the respondents working in the
areas of management planning and R&D management frequently used specialised terms
and concepts — for example EV (economic value), spec. (product specification) — in
their narratives. Were I to ask them about the meaning of the term, this could waste
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time or miss the main point of the question.
Most interviews were semi-structured and conducted under a set of themes as illustrated
in Table 4.1. There are some main areas of investigation common to all groups.
Questions concerning organisational changes since the crisis have aimed to identify
what firms have done to adapt to the crisis. In line with this, by questioning key
challenges facing the firm and the sub-organisations, I wanted to grasp what firms have
been faced and what they have to do to sustain adaptation. The second set of issues
concerned organisational contexts such as culture, routines and competences that could
affect the paths and outcomes of learning and adaptation. I deemed that these aspects
are important to make better sense of the following questions concerning the
characteristics of learning strategies firms take.
The third set of common questions focused on the types and characteristics of corporate
learning. These questions highlighted what kind of learning for what kind of
adaptation, the sources and processes of learning and the positive and negative factors
affecting the processes and outcomes of learning. Together, the questions concerning
learning concerned ways of social learning through communities such as communities
of practice, epistemic communities and task-force teams. Finally, these themes of
questions paid particular attention to the geographical implications for learning and
adaptation. In other words, the questions concerned how firms use space and place in
order to learn and adapt, how different forms of proximity contribute to learning.
These questions helped to understand the relationships between corporate learning and
geography.
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Table 4.1 Main themes of investigation during the interviews
Management
	
R&D unit
Major changes since the crisis
Both at the firm level and the sub-organisation
level
Key challenges to continuous survival
Both at the firm level and the business division
level
Corporate strategy
The nature of competition in the given industry
The focus of firm strategy
Recent changes in firm strategy
Organisational culture and competences
Firm-specific culture and competences
Strengths and weaknesses
Positive and negative attributes in new learning
Types and characteristics of learning seeking
at present
Types of learning
Source and processes of learning
Methods for resolving the path-dependency
Evaluation and possible outcome of the learning
Recruitment and training of employees
Methods of recruitment and the programmes of
workers training
The role of recruitment and training in the
acquisition of knowledge and the learning
Major changes in R&D since the crisis
Organisational changes
Technological changes
Geographies of R&D organisational change
Key challenges to technological competition
Both at the firm level and the business division level
The nature of current technological competition
The direction of technology strategy
Technological competences
Firm-specific competences: strengths and
weaknesses
Positive and negative aspects in new learning
Routines in R&D activities
Daily work practices
The way of problem-solving and learning
The relation and coordination between R&D units
and between R&D and other functions related
Technological learning and innovation
Types of technological learning
Sources and processes of learning
Factors facilitating/or hindering learning
The role of communities in learning
Communities of practice activities
The operation of task-force team
Epistemic communities
Geographical implications for learning
The nature of proximity in learning
The role of the local in corporate learning
The uses of space place in corporate learning
Continued
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Production unit	 Industry specialists
Major changes in productive
organisation since the crisis
Employment change
Employment adjustment process and its effect
on learning and adaptation
Changes in production process
Process innovation
Geographies of such changes
Key challenges faced by productive
organisation
Both at the firm level and the business
division level
The central issues in manufacturing
The direction of production strategy
Competences of productive organisation
Firm-specific competences: strengths and
weaknesses
Positive and negative aspects in sustaining
learning and adaptation
Routines in production activities
Daily work practices
The way of problem-solving and learning
The relation and coordination between
production unit and other functions related,
especially R&D
Learning and innovation in production
activities
Focus and types of learning
Sources and processes of learning
Factors facilitating or hindering learning
The role of communities in learning
Communities of practice activities
The operation of task-force team
Epistemic communities
Geographical implications for learning
The nature of proximity in learning
The role of the local in corporate learning
The uses of space/place in corporate learning
Challenges faced by chaebol in general and
Korea's largest electronics companies and in
particular
Management practices
Governance structure
Organisational and technological competences
Quality of labour market
Characteristics of corporate culture and
competences
Corporate culture of Korean firms in general
and of both firms in particular
Firm-specific competences: strengths and
weaknesses
Positive and negative aspects in sustaining
learning and adaptation
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As mentioned in section 4.3, the specialised areas of interviewees vary, ranging from
management and the R&D units to the production and the production technology units
(see Table 4.2). Most of the interviewees were in a managerial position — well
informed, experienced veterans working in each company for more than 10 years.
Together, most of the interviewees were those who work in the business division which
operates in a specialised domain of business. Although I did not choose intentionally a
specific location and business unit for empirical work, the location and the business unit
carried out the interviews tend to be concentrated in a certain place and business unit.
Table 4.2 Interviews by groups of interviewees
Corporate managers Industry experts
Units LGE SEC Total Groups Total
R&D 10 (3) 5 (1) 15 (4) Local institutions 2
Management planning 4 (1) 2 (1) 6 (2) Management experts 2
Production 4 (0) 2 (0) 6 (0) Technology experts 2
Total 18 (4) 9 (2) 27 (6) Total 6
* Of which the number of interviewees whom the author carried out repetitive interviews based
on open discussion.
In LGE, I carried out interviews with employees working mainly in the Digital Display
Business Division based in Kumi. In spite of still being to a degree influenced and
controlled by the headquarters, each business division has an independent organisational
structure and management system. The remaining interviewees include managers at
the Digital Appliance Division based in Changwon and engineers at the central R&D
laboratories based in Seoul. In SEC, the interviews were undertaken mainly in Suwon
and partially in Kumi. The reason for this is that most of SEC's organisational units
are geographically clustered around Suwon. In Kumi, there is only a
telecommunication equipment manufacturing plant without an R&D function (for
details on organisational map of both companies, see Figure 5.3 for LGE and Figure 6.4
for SEC). In the course of a fieldwork, I tried to contact managers at the management
planning team earlier than managers at other departments. The reason for this is that I
assumed that they possess overall knowledge related to their company. In turn, I met
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staff members of the R&D team and lastly employees of manufacturing lines.
Finally, I tried to carry out repeat interviews with managers who not only possessed
profound knowledge on their company but were also amicable towards me. I met
them in family restaurants. The meeting place was of paramount importance not only
to discuss various kinds of corporate issues in a relaxed environment and crosscheck the
previous questions but also obtain some corporate documents. Such open discussion
meetings lasted from two to almost five hours.
In addition to interviews with corporate managers, I carried out interviews with some
industry experts specialised in the electronics industry and electronics technology such
as university professors and consultants at a local chamber of commerce. The
interviews with them helped me to understand technological changes in the electronics
industry, trends of the electronics industry and corporate culture.
4.5.3. Secondary sources
In undertaking empirical research, secondary data have been extensively used.
Secondary data have been collected through two sources. The first includes corporate
documents such as annual reports, company brochures, project plans and project
performance reports. Most of these documents were generously provided by some
interviewees working in LGE. However, SEC interviewees were very reluctant to give
me internal documents, even though access to the interviewees was done on a personal
basis. They said that the circulation of corporate documents is strictly monitored. I
managed to get some documents during the participation of a workshop held in SEC
headquarters. They provided important historical and background information and
materials on corporate strategy and corporate vision.
The second source was a number of news articles on both companies. The Korean
Electronics Times (Jeon-Ja Shin-Moon) was used as the most useful source as it
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provides readers with daily information on events, phenomena and changes taking place
in electronics companies, especially in LGE and SEC as they are industry leaders. The
other archival sources include economic newspapers (the same form as the Financial
Times in the UK) and economic magazines published both in Korea and overseas.
These sources were used to study the leadership and the rationality of top managers and
corporate strategy. Secondary data were crosschecked with interview results
transcribed in a field note.
4.6. Difficulties and limitations
I encountered many difficulties during the empirical work. Especially, the empirical
research could not tackle in detail some of what I wanted to look for such as the role of
communities in learning and adaptation. I could not conduct more extensive
interviews and in-depth methodologies such as focus groups and participant observation.
For example, in the course of interviewing, I recognised that the improvement of
subcontracting relationships and the intensifying technological learning processes for
product innovation can be important for corporate adaptation. However, I could not go
further because of the fundamental limits to accessing people and the organisations
involved. In addition, the inability to conduct participant observation severely
restricted my research on the dynamic role of communities in learning and adaptation,
especially in SEC. Then, the relative modesty of evidence on SEC made it difficult to
carry out a comparative analysis between both case study companies.
In conclusion, when I went back to Korea in order to conduct the fieldwork, I called my
friends, relatives and professors who once taught me and told them I was going to study
LGE and SEC with qualitative methodologies and I asked them if they knew any one
working in both companies. Their responses were varied but largely pessimistic: "Are
you crazy?" "Before too late, change your mind. I can introduce you to local small
company workers!" Even industry experts asked me to change the cases. They said:
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"what about studying new start-ups? Korea is in a fever of venture companies".
"Big firms are still too closed and cocky." But an economic geographer encouraged
me try: "Do it! Because chaebol, big firms, are of paramount importance to
understand the Korean economy and economic spaces. It will be difficult but you
should do it!" These responses reveal the methodological limitations I faced.
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Chapter 5
Learning and adaptation in the LG Electronics
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a case study of the LG Electronics Company, the flagship
company of the LG group. In recent years, particularly since the economic crisis, the
company has made various efforts to restructure in order to sustain long-term success.
This chapter starts by examining traditional restructuring attempts, based on downsizing,
the rationalisation of employment, the reorganisation of production, and the reform of
organisational structure. I will show that these ways of restructuring have been critical
not only to respond to the economic crisis and a political pressure from the government,
but also for long-term success. It will be revealed that restructuring centred on
downsizing, employment adjustment and the change of organisational structure has
offered the company the basis for unlearning obsolete practices and routines and
sustaining new learning.
I will also show that spatial reorganisation of production and R&D units has been
closely associated with spatialities of learning. Spatial shifts of production units have
been dependent upon a cost factor as well as the degree of knowledge and competences
overseas plants possess and the interactive learning between the domestic parent plant
and the overseas local plants. But spatial reorganisation of domestic R&D units has
also shown critical implications for understanding the corporate use of space/place and
the influence of both geographical and relational/organisational proximity on intra-firm
learning.
In what follows, I explore various dimensions of learning and innovation that the
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company has pursued to improve its competitiveness. In section 3, I will show that the
company has shown diverse learning practices to sustain innovations in production
processes. In sections 6 to 8, I pay attention to LGE's technological learning across
both national and extra-national boundaries. In section 6, I illustrate the processes of
organisational and technological learning taking place between R&D units, and between
R&D and manufacturing. In sections 7 and 8, I discuss the recent tendency of the
globalisation of R&D activities and inter-firm alliances, considered as a critical means
to adapt to increasing competition in technology and markets as well as a means of
distanciated learning beyond boundaries of limited space/place. The final section
deals with intra-firm social learning occurring through both formal organisations and
informal groups with reference to communities in the firm.
5.2. Downsizing and reorganising the internal labour market
LGE took the decisive step of restructuring by selling or otherwise disposing of
operations and the like which seemed to have little future... This has allowed us to
devote our resources to our core business areas (CEO of LGE, New Year's message,
1999).
One of the pressing questions that the Korean chaebol have faced in the wake of the
Asian crisis is how to reduce excessive debt to equity ratio, eliminate cross-debt
guarantees among affiliates, and improve corporate governance structure. It has been
argued that unfavourable management practices result from excessive competition
among chaebol and an obsession with corporate growth rather than profitability (Chang
and Park, 2000; The Economist, 14 Nov. 1998). Of these problems, reducing excessive
debts has become one of the most critical questions to chaebol firms struggling to
survive, as the Korean government has strongly urged them to lower their debt to equity
ratio to less than 200 per cent by the end of 1999.
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The LG group is no exception. LGE, the flagship company of the group, also
attempted restructuring strategies to resolve the problem. Downsizing was the first
choice of the company to cope with radical changes. Downsizing became central to
the chaebol's corporate restructuring, because the IMF and the Korean government
requested that they follow a guide to restructuring and keep global management
standards, which American firms have established, in both implicit and explicit ways.
Downsizing at the expense of labour has not just been conceived as the most
conspicuous way in which American firms have taken to restructuring (Usui and
Colignon, 1996), but is also, in many ways, treated as equal to corporate restructuring
(Froud et al., 2000).
As soon as the government announced the restructuring plan for the chaebol, LGE set
out a series of plans to restructure its business portfolio. In undertaking business
downsizing, LGE had two basic rules. The first was to abandon marginal businesses
that had lost profitability or likely to lose growth potential in the future. The second
was to outsource or spin off non-core operations and businesses. The majority of
downsizing processes took place between 1998 and 1999, although the downsizing
programme is still active.
LGE withdrew completely from the printer business in 1998 and the hand-held personal
computer business in 1999. Both were evaluated as businesses that showed low
returns and expected to be of high-risk in the future. In addition, some businesses,
including low profit telecommunication sectors, commercial motors and motor pumps,
were sold off in 1998. However, means such as withdrawal and sell-off are one aspect.
The most active way in which Korean firms have taken to downsizing after the crisis is
the spin-off strategy, to outsource non-core or less competitive activities. It seems
clear that the company also sought to remove the surplus workforce through
restructuring the business structure.11
I I Historically, the company had a bad experience in labour-management relations during the late 1980s.
In 1987, a great wave of social democratisation had been started by the social movement towards political
democratisation (see Park, B. 1999 for more details on this issue). Although LGE workers, like those of
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The company, for instance, has separated non-core business sectors such as general
affairs (1998), casting (1998), distribution (1998) and after-sales service (1999) (see
Table 5.1). Some of this produced completely independent firms in the form of EBO
(Employees Buy-Out), while the rest produced spin-offs in the form of a subsidiary
under LGE ownership. The separated companies still act as service providers or
suppliers for LGE. In the course of this form of business restructuring, the number of
employees was decreased. Although there are no official statistics to show the number
of workers decreased by this process, it is known that more than four thousands
employees of the company were made redundant (Korea Daily Business, 10 December
1998).
Table 5.1 Major cases of business downsizing (1998-2000)
Forms of downsizing	 Sectors
Withdrawal	 Printer (1998)
Hand-held PC (1999)
Sell-off	 Low profitable telecom sectors (1998),
Commercial motor/motor pump (1998)
Spin-off (EBO)	 General affairs (1998)
Casting (1998)
Spin-off (Subsidiary)
	
Distribution (1998)
After-sales service (1999)
Sources: based on Korea Electronics Times; Korea Daily Business
(1 January 1998 — 30 April 2001).
Prior to discussing the process of employment adjustment, the reform to the labour law
in the wake of the crisis needs to be noted. The financial crisis has, to a large extent,
other Korean firms, claimed to institutionalise workplace democratisation within the firm, involving the
legitimisation of union activities, workers' participation in decision-making process, top managers did not
listen carefully to their voices. Consequently, two labour disputes had been occurred in 1987 and 1989
respectively. These not only caused a great loss in the company but also resulted in many negative
effects on managerial performance for a long period of time. However, such experiences gave top
managers a valuable opportunity to rethink the importance of labour-management relations and to change
their perspective on labour. Since that point in time, the company's top managers have made great
efforts to restore and rebuild labour-management relations. The company has consequently been
recognised as a successful model that maintains proactive labour-management relation. Therefore, in the
face of employment adjustment, management leaders wanted to solve redundancies while minimising the
potential of negative effects and conflicts with the union.
influenced the shifts in the labour market in Korea. The IMF pressed the Korean
government to improve labour market flexibility, in exchange for financial support to
the Korean government. Korea's labour law makes rapid restructuring of firms
difficult in that it is illegal in Korea to lay off workers except under unusual
circumstances, such as banIcruptcy. 12 The IMF also ruled that the rigidity of the labour
market might hinder radical corporate reform needed for Korea's economic
rehabilitation. The IMF argued that a rigid labour market restricts the ability of firms
to adapt flexibly to a turbulent socio-economic environment and, as a result, gives rise
to disastrous outcomes, such as corporate bankruptcy and mass unemployment. The
IMF wanted the Korean government to transform its labour law into American-style
labour conventions for a flexible labour market.13
In response, a committee composed of government representatives, corporate leaders
and trade union leaders was convened. It agreed to revise the labour law on the basis
of the following agreement (The Korean Ministry of Labour, 6 February 1998)14:
Provided that there is inevitably the need for lay-offs in the process of corporate
restructuring, despite attempts to avoid lay-offs (such as the reduction of working
hours, ceasing from new recruitment and re-contracts with temporary workers), the
employer is allowed to carry out lay-offs by the procedures and requirements stated
clearly in the law.
With the help of the new labour law, firms began to accelerate employment adjustment.
LGE attempted to induce an early retirement and a spontaneous retirement before
undertaking massive job cuts. This was effective, because a large number of
employees retired, with the offer of an additional monetary incentive. A manager of
the manufacturing team explains in interview the situation at that time:
12 See The Economist (24 January 1998).
13 The prime concerns that The IMF urged the Korean government to reform labour market flexibility
were: 1) to amend legislation to clarify the circumstances and procedures for layoffs, in the context of the
Tripartite Accord (involving the government-capital-labour); 2) to relax restrictive legal provisions
relating to private job placement and manpower leasing services (Korea Economic Weekly, 2 March 1998).
14 That agreement is called as "the great compromise between labour, management and the government".
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It was a painful and disgusting process. The date when the list of lay-offs would be
came close, most comrades felt terrible. I thought even I could be a target.
Whenever I went out of my house in the morning, I used to consider seriously whether
I should submit a letter of resignation today, then I could leave my workplace with
more money. Otherwise, if I am selected to be made redundant, I have to go away
without any incentive (L-6, 31/08/00).
This means that the programme, from the viewpoint of the company, contributed to
inducing spontaneous retirement, while minimising conflict with the labour union.
This kind of employment adjustment policy is not unusual in Korean firms.
As Figure 5.1 shows, the number of domestic employees decreased from 33,800 to
25,900 between 1997 and 1998, almost a quarter of the workforce. During the same
period, R&D and engineering workers decreased by 13% (5,289 to 4,583), while
production workers decreased by 35% compared to the previous year (21,654 to 14,149).
Although the decrease continued in 1999, the rate became significantly slower and most
of it was centred on production workers.
Figure 5.1 Changes in the number of domestic workforce
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. The others are composed of marketing and business support jobs.
In fact, many production workers were laid off, due to production shifts of low value-
1 0 3
added products to overseas branch plants (mostly in Southeast Asia and China). For
example, since the crisis, the Kumi TV plant, which assembles a variety of TV models,
has cut more than half of its production workers by restructuring production lines.
According to managers interviewed, employment adjustment undertaken by the
company focused largely on production workers who received high wages, but had low
skills. I5 As argued by a manager of the management team:
When it comes to the process of employment adjustment, the company tried to lay off
workers who are considered less open-minded, less active and creative, or incompetent.
I recognise that it does not mean all the people laid off by the employment adjustment
are like this. Some comrades may be likely to be laid off for political reasons.
Nevertheless, we would say that such an employment adjustment has made a
contribution to unlearning old routines, and seeking new ways of doing things (L-1,
23 07 00).
This may, meanwhile, be viewed as a kind of 'crisis building process' (Kim, 1998),
because remaining workers had a strong sense of crisis and recognised that there was no
way to survive without change. In general, such a sense of crisis has played a positive
role in shifting organisational culture, normally seen as resistant and insensitive to
change, towards a flexible one.I6
Together with employment adjustment, followed by the increased flexibility of the
national labour market, LGE has attempted to increase temporary labour contracts with
a view to saving labour costs. It is true that this strategy has been possible thanks to
large-scale lay-offs; many of them production workers. This has been adopted at the
company-wide level, but out of three business divisions, it is most notable in the Digital
Appliance Division (DAD) producing home appliances, such as refrigerators and air
conditioners. I7 The reasons that DAD decided to actively use this strategy are two-
15 Interviews with a team leader of Super A team, DDD (L-4, 22/07/00), a manager of the development
support team, DDD (L-10, 19 08 00) and a manager of the DND Super A team, DDD (L-15, 26/07/00).
16 Interviews with a manager of the management team, DAD (L-2, 14/07/00), a team leader of Super A
team, DDD (L-4, 22/07 00), a manager of the manufacturing team (L-6, 31/08/00) and a manager of the
DND Super A team, DDD (L-15, 26/07/00).
" Interviews with managers of the management team, DAD (L-2, 14/07/00; L-3, 20/07/00).
104
fold. On the one hand, consumer electronics goods that the business division produces
are characterised by saturated markets and largely codified product & production
technologies. Therefore, cost-saving is more critical than in any other business
divisions producing high technology electronics goods. On the other hand, products
such as refrigerators and air conditioners show a strong seasonal fluctuation in
consumer demands, thus, the need to flexibly use labour. For instance, in the air
conditioner production line, more than 60% of the workers are temporary workers who
belong to labour service companies and many of them are married women.
5.3. Process innovation
There are two basic principles on which modern capitalist industrial firms organise
production: firms strive to optimise organisation in order to maximise productivity, on
the one hand, and to minimise costs on the other. In this regard, the organisation of
production is critical in determining the efficiency of production. The principle of
mass production has long been central in the large global manufacturing firms since the
Fordist production system emerged in the early 20th century. Although there have
been sharp debates among social scientists on transition in the modes of capitalist
production during the last two decades, it is believed that mass production remains
dominant in the certain large manufacturing firms which seek both economies of scale
and economies of scope (Hudson, 1997). However, it is also true that mass production
itself assuming mass demand is no longer effective in unpredictable market situations.
Global market conditions have recently been more turbulent and complex, and thus
technological changes have been more dynamically accelerated. These sorts of
changes have appeared in the globalising process of corporate activities for many
decades. Aspects of these changes have become critical in globalised electronics firms.
Thus, these conditions have required them to adapt rapidly.
LGE, like other large electronics firms, shows significant changes in organising the
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production process. First of all, the increasing fragmentation of customer demand and
taste has led to a significant increase in the number of product models, even in the same
product area (e.g. TVs). Concerning the product life cycle model (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978), many existing consumer electronics goods are characterised as having
increased market saturation and technological standardisation. It is thus not surprising
that emphases are placed on improving product design, strengthening marketing and
capturing niche markets. To do this, the need for introducing new manufacturing
techniques has been observed, as the classic mass production method is no longer
appropriate to sustain efficiency for multi-products, as well as to respond quickly to
increasing fragmentation of customer demands and tastes. In a similar vein, the
emergence of display device products, such as PDP TVs (Plasma Display Panel TVs),
TFT-LCD TVs (Thin-film Transistor Liquid Crystal Display TVs), Projection TVs and
large-size flat screen TVs, which do not yet have a large volume of production, has
challenged the continual adaptation of traditional ways of mass production. As a
senior manager of the manufacturing team in the Kumi TV plant notes:
Those display devices are competing with one another for the next generation in the
digital display market. They all, however, have both strengths and weaknesses as
new display commodities. Market demands of these display products are also not
matured at present. Nothing shows reliable advantage at the moment. In light of
profitability, it is fair to say that those must not be produced yet. Nevertheless, we are
investing in all of them in order to solidify a pre-occupation of an emerging display
devices market. The result would depend entirely on the choice of customers and
technological progress. In this regard, we have tried to construct new production
system, such as cell production and modular production (L-8, 29/08/00).
One new production method that the company has recently tried to adopt is modular
production. Introducing this production method is critical, as far as manufacturing
competitiveness is concemed.18
It is generally recognised that this production method contributes to improving
18 In fact, all of the largest Korean electronics manufacturers (LG, Samsung and Daewoo) have already
noticed that Japanese electronics makers have gained their competitiveness through long-term efforts to
standardise parts/components. Interestingly, these companies are planning to make a collaborative
consortium for the standardisation of some parts/components.
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productivity and product quality, as this method makes assembly procedures simple by
reducing the number of parts/components needed for production. Thus, this method
leads to reducing the error rate in the manufacturing process as well as assembly time.
It is not easy for firms to sustain this kind of process innovation, because firms need to
complete the standardisation of related parts/components prior to introducing this
method. The parts/components standardisation project was not easy to implement
because it required comprehensive collaboration and coordination between cross-
boundary teams and subcontracting firms supplying parts/components. Of the big
three Korean electronics manufacturers (Samsung, LG, Daewoo), LGE has most
actively pursued standardisation of parts/components since 1998. LGE has most
perceived the need to improve manufacturing productivity as a means of sustaining
competitiveness. More importantly, LGE managers have thought that they possess
enough both tacit and codified knowledge and learning competences to achieve such a
process innovation.I9
The part/components standardisation project has led to positive effects in terms of
learning and innovation. 20 First, standardisation leads to the shortening of lead-times
in product development, which contributes to improving the time-to-market capability.
Second, the project brings about a great deal of knowledge sharing and spill-over
among teams, business divisions or even firms as the result of interactive learning
occurring through the project. As expressed by a manager of the management team:
We expect the project to play a role in constructing learning by breaking the
sectionalism and conservatism characterising LGE's corporate culture, through co-
working between teams (L-1, 23 07/00).
The strategy seems to be working. For instance, LGE reported that since 1998 the
19 Interviews with a manager of the manufacturing team (L-6, 31/08/00), a senior manager of the
manufacturing team (L-8, 29/08/00) and a manager of the DND Super A team, DDD (L-15, 22/08/00).
20 Interviews with a team leader of Super A team, DDD (L-4, 12/08/00) and a manager of the production
engineering team, DDD (L-5, 30/08/00).
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VCR OBU reduced the number of parts and components needed for the production of
VCR, from 995 to less than 22 and, as a result, it has obtained a cost saving effect of
more than US $ 40m a year (Korea Electronics Times, 3 March 1999). Encouraged by
such performance, in early 1999, LGE established a committee for the standardisation
of parts/components by division, in order to implement the task of standardisation from
the initial stage of new product development. These activities have consequently led
to the implementation of modular production methods in most of its domestic
production lines.
The company has also been trying to introduce a cell production method, where one
worker carries out most of assembly processes ranging from assembly to testing and
even packing. It is recognised that this method may contribute to saving costs, by
allowing the production of more than two models on a single assembly line. From the
early 1990s, the company has sought to cope with the growing fragmentation of
customer demand. The cell production method was first introduced in an LGE TV
plant in 1995. Since 1997, it has been set up formally in all TV plants in order to
produce new device-based TV models. The Digital Display Division (DDD) has
adopted this method because the division produces a variety of device products and
many of them can no longer depend on mass production. However, the adaptation of
the cell production method in the TV plant is different from the original concept. In
this plant, three or four workers become a team taking charge of the whole process of
production instead of one worker doing it all. A manager of a manufacturing team
explains:
We tested a cell production method over two years. The aim was to optimise it into
the system of production appropriate for a specific character of this plant, before being
put into practice. As a result, we came to find that the method shows better efficiency
when three or four workers become one team for the whole process of assembly than
one worker doing it all (L-5, 30/08/00).
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The TV OBU 21 reported that the combination of both mass production methods and
flexible production methods in the manufacturing process allows the concomitant
pursuit of economies of scale and scope possible and has led to the cost cutting effects.
A manager of the manufacturing team said that:
Traditionally, we thought that productivity would only be improved by reorganising
labour. However, as we have been successful in setting up cell production, we have
come to change our mind on the concept of productivity (31/08/00).
According to him, by setting up a cell production method, the production line is reduced
from 230m to 60m in length, while manufacturing productivity is improved by up to
20%. The cell production method, in addition, enables control the quantity of output.
The cost of inventory management can be significantly decreased at the same time. In
a nutshell, this means that productivity can, from the technological aspects, be improved
by saving on all production costs, ranging from manufacturing costs to inventory
management costs via the effective operation of the production system.
5.4. Spatial reorganisation of production
Globally networked manufacturing firms attempt to cope with radical change by
reorganising both the products they produce and locations where they operate.
Common types of restructuring strategies in production are two-fold: in-situ
restructuring and relocation. Economic geographers have long focused on spatial
relocation or the closure of plants since these sorts of corporate behaviour can influence
regional economies (e.g. Massey, 1984; Hayter, 1997). However, these may not
necessarily be the first choice, because locational change is often a politically sensitive
issue with a direct impact on the local society and economy. Therefore, the
implementation of corporate strategies such as locational change could be influenced by
multi-faceted, complex factors. Above all, manufacturing firms facing a crisis in profit
21 LGE calls 'sub-units' of each business division an OBU (Operating Business Unit).
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tend to seek in-situ restructuring in response to change. If the situation gets worse,
firms may try to undertake an alternative strategy, such as plant closure or relocation.
However, the ways in which firms restructure productive organisations across national
and global scales cannot be reduced to a simple factor. In reality, this is the outcome
of multiple aspects dependent upon contextual specificity and contingency.
Let us explore the case of LGE. After the Asian crisis, LGE did not take radical
actions, like plant closure. Rather, the focus was on the restructuring of the spatial
divisions of labour between production sites on a global scale. First, all domestic
plants were considered to have played a critical role as core nodes of the company's
global production network. They provided overseas branch plants with sources of
manufacturing knowledge as well as periodically carrying out on-the-job training
programmes for local employees in overseas subsidiaries. A senior manager of the
manufacturing department in the Kumi TV plant states:
Most of LGE's domestic plants are recognised, among business specialists, as reaching
the world's best productivity level. How can that be? We have made great efforts to
be the best over the last 25 years. I think it has been possible through reverse
engineering, such as continuous benchmarking on best practices and ceaseless trial and
error. Now the situation is reversed. We have come to possess many advantages
over manufacturing technologies in which rivals may be difficult to imitate in light of
tacit knowledge such as skills and know-how (L-8, 29/08/00).
Industry specialists I interviewed similarly expected that domestic manufacturing plants
of Korea's top electronics manufacturers like LG and Samsung will continue to be
competitive for at least the next decade, because their domestic plants have come to
possess cutting-edge manufacturing technologies and know-how. 22 This knowledge
may be hard for other companies to imitate, because such a largely tacit form of
knowledge can be accumulated over many years from a mixture of both corporate-
specific and national-specific institutional foundations, as illustrated by the literature on
22 Interviews with a director of the Kumi Chamber of Commerce (05/07/00) and a professor of
Electronics in Kyungpook National University (29/06/00).
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innovation systems (e.g. Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Gertler, 2000; 2001a; 2001b).
Thus, the company outlined a spatial restructuring strategy with two distinctive aspects.
On the one hand, labour-intensive and low value-added production has been shifted to
overseas plants, notably in China and Southeast Asian countries, operating to largely
use cheap labour power and to penetrate local markets. Meanwhile, domestic factories
concentrate on the products which are high value-added and high technology-based.
This strategic move is clearly reflected in the following observation by the president of
the DDD:
LG's domestic plants will play a central role in producing high-end products while
factories in China and Southeast Asia will be set up as the strategic supply centre for
the overseas market (The Korea Times, 31 January 2000).
Along with this, the company intends to set up lines for new products in overseas plants
after mastering know-how to cope with unusual problems, which could potentially
occur, by operating lines for new products in domestic plants. 23 This strategy is seen
to take advantage of knowledge and competences accumulated in domestic factories.
Domestic plants, as mentioned, usually outperform manufacturing practices elsewhere
and retain well-educated human resources, as the source of skills and know-how.
Second, only a few engineers and skilled workers have enough expertise for trouble-
shooting or problem-solving in overseas factories. This said, frequent, face-to-face
interactions between multiple units, including the R&D team, the production
engineering team and the manufacturing team, are required at the initial stage of setting
up new production lines.24
If this is so, how do overseas plants solve on-going problems? When overseas plants
face some technological problem which is difficult to solve, they usually ask the
23 Interviews with a manager of the management team, DAD (L-3, 20/07/00) and a senior engineer of the
DND engineering department (L-16, 11/08/00).
24 Interviews with an engineer of the DND engineering team (L-18, 01/09/00) and a team leader of Super
A team, DDD (L-4, 12/08/00), and the author's direct observation.
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engineering team in the domestic plant by email or telephone for a solution. A team in
charge of advice on technological problems in overseas plants first try to find an answer
from members who have associated knowledge and know-how. If they fail to solve
the problem, they may try to review document files drawn up in domestic plants over a
period of time. The procedure for problem-solving is discovering recursively
underlying problems through combining tacit knowledge embodied in Korea-based
engineers and codified knowledge in the form of documents related to trial, error and
experiences. A manager of the engineering team in charge of technological issues in
the overseas plants says:
Every morning, my work usually begins by reading emails sent by overseas plants.
If they reported to us that they are faced with technological problems not identifiable
by themselves, what I do first is to find workers who may have the best knowledge
related to the problem. Jointly, they can find the right way to solve the problem.
It may be possible because, I believe, domestic plants have experienced a number of
trials and errors as well as accumulated know-how and skills enough to solve
problems even at a distance, because we have developed and tested in advance the
same technology on production and product (L-16; 11/08/00).
It implies that this is a set of knowledge that combines the distanciated tacit knowledge,
which is difficult to transfer into overseas plants, and the codified knowledge, which is
not easy to access by others in terms of manufacturing technology. This organisational
frame has made it possible for the company to shift its product lines to overseas, even if
overseas plants show relative lack of expertise, skills and know-how. In addition, the
shift of production lines involves interactive learning between domestic plants and
overseas plants because overseas plants should acquire skills and know-how necessary
to operate new manufacturing lines. Such learning is realised mainly through frequent
business travels, telemediated or face-to-face meetings between domestic workers and
overseas workers and on-the-job training of overseas workers in domestic plants.25
The Digital Display Division (DDD), for instance, completely shifted production lines
25 Interviews with a manager of the development support team, DDD (L-10, 03/09/00) and a senior
engineer of DND engineering department, DDD (L-16, 11/08/00).
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for medium and small-sized TVs (less than 17 inches) and TVCR models to Indonesian
branch plants in 1999. These models are considered to be relatively low value-added.
Instead of shifting such sorts of production lines, domestic plants focus on high value-
added cutting-edge products. In this context, the Kumi TV plant has been focusing on
producing high-technological and high value-added product models such as large-size
flat TVs, TFT-LCD TVs and PDP TVs, all of which adopt new concept devices
replacing the CRT (Cathode Ray Tube).
The Digital Appliance Business Division in Changwon (DAD) has more actively sought
to shift production overseas. There are two reasons for this. First, the products the
division produces are known to be more sensitive to local market conditions than any
other consumer electronics goods. Second, home appliances are by and large those
products regarded as technologically more standardised in both product and
manufacturing technologies. That means emphasis is placed both on how to improve
manufacturing productivity and how to save more costs. According to interviews with
managers of the division's strategic management team, lower manufacturing
productivity in overseas plants in the short-term can be compensated by the effect of
saving costs — mostly coming from labour cost saving. 26 They believe that in the
longer terms, obstacles such as lack of manufacturing skills and know-how, which may
lower manufacturing performance, will decrease in overseas plants. Particularly,
overseas plants operating in Southeast Asian countries and China show a rising learning
curve on manufacturing technology and knowledge. Considering this fact, the DAD
decided that domestic production bases should focus more on brand-new, large-size and
domestic market-specific products in order to utilise the advantages of high productivity.
For example, the division shifted all the existing washing machine models produced in
the Changwon plant to a Thai plant in 1999. Instead, the Changwon plant produces
brand-new washing machine models with a digital network function. The latest
tendency of production restructuring in LGE can be summarised as: domestic plants
concentrate on producing high-tech products, while products which reach at the mature
26 Interviews with managers of the management team, DAD (L-2, 14/07/00; L-3, 20/07/00).
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stage in product life cycle are shifted to overseas production bases taking advantage of
cheap labour costs.
5.5. Reform of organisational structure
This year I will allow each business division to have more independence at all levels of
management, in order to establish an independent management system by the business
division (CEO of LGE).27
This section draws attention to the changing features of organisational structure in LGE,
in terms of the mobilisation of competences and a decision-making structure that would
influence adaptability. As of the end of 2000, LGE is a diversified firm with four
distinctive business lines. The company merged LG Information & Communication
Company (LGIC), one of the electronics affiliates, in the second half of 2000. 28 Since
the financial crisis, one of prime criticisms of the chaebol is that the power of strategic
decision-making is excessively concentrated on the founder family and that this makes
management practices less transparent. In this respect, LG also represents the typical
characteristics of chaebol. At present, LG is still sticking to family-centred
management, but there have been some tendencies in the direction of change; some
attempts to give affiliates extended autonomy in all levels of management.
Until 1998, LGE possessed distinctive business lines and adopted an explicitly
multidivisional form of organisation, whereas a substantial centre of power and strategic
core functions remained under the control of the CEO and headquarters of the company.
It was not a typical Chandlerian M-form at all (Chandler, 1962), even if it took an M-
form. Under such a structure of organisation, roles played by each leader of a business
division were highly constrained. As claimed by manager of the management team:
27 LG Electronics Company corporate release (1 January 2000).
28 Thus, LGE came to add another business division, named Information & Communication Business
Division (former organisations of LGIC except for marketing and management support departments).
Accordingly, there are four business divisions with production functions within LGE.
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In the past, there was very limited power in each business division. Actually, leaders
of each production cluster composing a business division were respectively dedicated
to aspects related to production (L-1, 23/07/00).
This kind of organisational structure and management system can pose serious
difficulties of adaptation. First, it impedes effective local adaptation to changing
markets. Second, it makes it difficult for the firm to build business-specific operating
mechanisms in their own right. Third, since such a form of organisation, from a
Williamsonian perspective, is closer to a U-form rather than an M-form, it necessarily
entails a heavy burden for corporate CEOs (Williamson, 1975). It may cause
difficulties in managing effectively all the business divisions that have distinct
organisational competences and markets.
These problems have already been raised in the company, and top management leaders
have increasingly recognised the need for reforming the structure of organisation
relevant to pursuing economies of speed. However, they say that the group's leaders —
implying the chairman, his family and relatives — are reluctant to let professional
managers control the firms. One interesting example that illustrates such a suspicion.
As described above, LGE, in the last half of 2000, absorbed LGIC, an affiliate of the LG
group, producing mobile telecommunication equipment and providing wireless-
telephone service. LG executives insist that:
The merger will be a win-win proposition for both companies. There will be plenty
of cross-pollination of ideas in research and development as well as cost savings from
joint marketing and distribution, especially in cracking foreign markets. And, it is
predicted that the marriage will make the merged entity a major force in the global hi-
tech industry, with sales of 30 trillion Korean won by 2003 (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 3 August 2000).
In contrast, an electronics analyst argues that:
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It is going against the global trend to specialise business along product lines [to
maximise shareholder value] (Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 August 2000).
On the contrary, many specialists ipso facto suspect that the chairman's families would
merge both companies with the objective to make control of their management easy.29
Even if the above story goes beyond the discussion of organisational structure, I think
that it would be helpful to understand the process of reforming organisational structure
in a wider context.
In December 1998, LGE announced a reform of organisational structure with the focus
on the empowerment and independence of management and decision-making operating
in each business division. It seems that this attempt reflects the need for change in the
contexts of both overall business environment change and the political-economic
conditions surrounding the firm. As said by the company:3°
LGE has decided to reform organisational structure [in a substantial sense] in order to
rapidly respond to a radically changing management environment.
The main points are summarised as follows:
—reducing coordination functions that staff organisations in headquarters and overseas
subsidiaries are in charge of.
— reinforcing the empowerment and authority of each business division at all
management levels to improve speed of operating management.
—placing a focus on improving competences centred around production.
The company talked about 'companies within a company', allowing each business
division to manage most management functions, including strategic planning and
29 A manager complained that:
I have heard convincingly that, after the determination of the merger, the former CEO of
LGIC left the company, a professional executive who has nothing to do with the group's
chairman and his family. He was devastated, because the chairman and his families made
the decision through Koo and Huh families meetings without consulting him. And, he left a
company to which he had devoted his enthusiasm as a founding member (L-10, 03/09/00).
3 ° LG Electronics Company corporate release (Dec. 10, 1998).
116
overseas subsidiaries. The company would provide the leader of each business
division with autonomy and responsibility in management. In turn, the leader of a
business division should manage each division. Together, individual business
divisions are allowed to have the authority to manage human resources in their own way.
This includes job promotion, recruitment and lay-off.
However, it does not mean that business divisions will become completely independent.
If business performance worsens or if profitability goes down radically, central
headquarters will intervene. The decentralisation of decision-making proves to be
critical if we recall that historically the company has geographically decentralised the
structure of organisation. Geographical distance might lessen both rapidity and
accuracy of decision-making, owing to the absence of frequent face-to-face
communications between various levels of staff in the firm. According to interviews,
leaders of each business division have come to make more time to discuss with various
managers and share ideas and opinions with one another.3I
Each business division has its own authority to control all functions, except the R&D
function, which will remains under the control of the CTO (Chief Technology
Officer). 32 This means that most functions, except for R&D, are consolidated in the
heart of production organisation. But, it is interesting that while the function of
strategic decision-making is radically decentralised, the R&D function comes to be
more under control of the corporate headquarters. The company views that it is better
to incorporate R&D functions under the control of the CTO, as the location of R&D is
geographically decentralised. 33 Its aim is not only to coordinate effectively
decentralised R&D functions but also to create synergies between R&D units. The
reason is that as the increase of technological convergence needs more interactions
between R&D functions, it is increasingly important for R&D teams for maintaining
31 Interviews with a manager of DND Super A team, DDD (L-15, 26/07/00) and a manager of the
Development support team, DDD (L-10, 19/08/00).
32 A top decision maker responsible for corporate R&D systems and technology.
33 Interviews with a general manager of New display product lab, DDD (L-9, 06/08/00) and a manager of
the Development support team, DDD (L-10, 19/08/00).
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relational/organisational proximity.
In short, it can be seen that these tendencies towards the decentralisation of organisation
have been sought as a way to respond to the economic crisis and a radically changing
competition environment. It is expected that the changing structure of organisation,
referred to as 'companies within a company', may contribute to fostering more
corporate restructuring as opposed to when the company had a centralised structure of
organisation, because leaders of individual business divisions are likely to try to do their
best in order to improve managerial performance, notably in the short-term. What is
clear is that the company, at a present, has a partially decentralised form of organisation.
It seems to me however that the company will continue to evolve towards a more
decentralised form of organisation.
5.6. Restructuring domestic R&D activities
5.6.1. Regulating technological competences: domestic R&D system and the problem
of proximity
I believe that digital technology will have a significant influence on all areas of the
electronics industry. However, personally I welcome such a radical transformation of
technology in that I am sure that the best chance to gain market leadership is now.
When we started this business, we did not have technologies and thus had to spend so
much time and efforts learning to imitate technologies. However, technology has
been radically moving towards digital technology away from the analogue. We have
made great efforts to cope with such technological shifts. What is important here is to
systemise developed or developing technological resources and to construct effective
in-house infrastructure (CEO of LGE).34
For a competence-based perspective, R&D is of crucial importance for industrial firms,
as it is considered to play a key role in both gaining and maintaining corporate-specific
34 Korea Electronics Times (7 January 1999).
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technological capabilities for innovation. In addition, R&D capabilities can be a
foundation for building absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which is a
prerequisite for obtaining important knowledge from outside the firm. These
technological capabilities can be made more robust through both continuous
strengthening of in-house R&D capabilities and vigorous technological networking with
the outside. As far as the technological aspects are concerned, adaptation is to a large
degree dependent upon how firms effectively mobilise their technological competences.
To begin with, the characteristics of R&D organisations in LGE need to be understood.
While the company started with its own R&D activities from the beginning, it is
difficult to say the company pursued formally organised R&D activities from that
period. The focus of technological learning was exclusively based on 'learning by
imitating' external knowledge, notably from Japanese technologies, and 'learning by
doing' through repetitive trial and error (Ernst, 2000a; Kim, 1997). Formal research
activities were begun in 1976, when the central R&D centre was established in Seoul
(see Table 5.3). As of 2000, the company operates a global R&D network covering
most domains of the electronics industry related to what it does (see Figure 5.2, Figure
5.3; Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 The role and objective of corporate R&D units
R&D unit
	
Role and Objective
Group-wide R&D
Centre (LGEIT)
—Basic and applied research on electronics
Long-term research project
—Cross-boundary research
—Research on future-technology
—Focusing on future-oriented products and technologies
—Developing the emerging new technologies
—Leading technology standards
— Developing part of new products and components
—Developing a new product model
—Improving an existing product model
Source: LG Electronics Company.
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Figure 5.2 Spatial distribution of sub-organisational units in LGE
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Figure 5.3 Structure of R&D in LGE
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The company has a geographically decentralised form of R&D organisation. This is
contrary to Samsung Electronics, the rival firm. 35 Such a spatial form is the result of
fact that domestic production bases are geographically decentralised and distant from
Seoul. Thus, the company has developed a segmented system of R&D, which consists
of central R&D laboratories in a corporate-wide research complex based in Seoul and
product-specific local R&D laboratories based in each domestic core production base.
The reason why the company has built this kind of spatial form of organisation may to
some degree be understood by taking into account the spatiality of competences and
knowledge. The operation of central R&D laboratories in Seoul is seen to give the
company some distinctive geographical sources of advantage. Firstly, Seoul is known
to have favourable access to sources of scientific and technological information and
knowledge within the national boundary. The capital region retains the majority of
public & private research institutions and leading universities. There is no doubt that
the capital region is the most competitive place in Korea in the context of institutional
thickness. Secondly, Seoul offers greater possibilities to recruit more qualified
scientists, engineers and graduates. If we consider the importance of human resources
in both sustaining and mobilising technological competences and knowledge, it is a
crucial factor for firms, particularly Korean firms. 36 Thirdly, the operation of central
R&D laboratories in Seoul allows LGE to keep close connections with the LG
Electronics Institute of Technology (LGEIT), a central R&D unit for Electronics CU
companies37 , as they are all clustered together in a certain site in south Seoul, called the
LG group central research park, established to foster synergy effects in research &
development. LGEIT performs not only basic and applied research projects
distinguished from central and local R&D laboratories, but also short-term joint projects
with firm-level laboratories. LGEIT thus has a complementary relationship with firm-
level R&D laboratories. As the group-wide R&D hub, LGEIT plays a central role in
35 For more details on Samsung Electronics Company, see Chapter 6.
36 For more details, see the following section.
37 CU (Culture Unit) is a term referring to a group of firms interrelated among affiliate firms within the
LG group. The Electronics CU includes companies such as LGE, LG Innotech, LG-Hitachi, LG-Philips
LCD and LG Electronics Parts.
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coordinating research projects between similar R&D laboratories as well as in
mobilising in-house technological competences.
Meanwhile, the company operates product-specific laboratories by business division.
The purpose is to utilise the potential advantage that may be derived from the
combination of R&D and manufacturing. According to interviews with managers of
product-specific laboratories in Kumi, the co-location of R&D and manufacturing tends
to be important at the stage of commercialising new products. 38 A new product
development cannot be finalised until completing a series of tests on feasibility and
manufacturability of the product. Such a process needs to use equipment and facilities
in the manufacturing plant as well as to interact with engineers in the plant. In
addition, the process of setting up a new production line requires frequent and intensive
interaction and communication between different parties, including the R&D team, the
engineering team and the manufacturing technology team.
This situational context is important to understand the latest changes in the composition
of R&D units, notably since the crisis. The company has formally established four
R&D laboratories since 1998, three of which were opened in 1998. In fact, all of the
new laboratories were part of the existing R&D organisations. However, each of them
became an independent R&D unit. That is because the company decided to focus
organisational competences on the development of products based on the emerging
digital technology, which is said to be core strategic business, such as display devices,
digital TVs and multimedia products. The company wants each of the new
laboratories to focus all of its competences only on its own technological area. Three
of them were established in the LG group central research park in Seoul as part of
central R&D laboratories. Only one of them is founded as a local product-specific
laboratory within the Digital Media Business Division (DMD) plant in Pyungtaek.39
38 Interviews with director of Digital Network Division, DDD (L-12, 25/08/00), a senior engineer of New
display device product lab, DDD (L-13, 01/08/00) and a manager of the Development support team, DDD
(L-10, 19/08/00).
39 Pyungtaek plant is the closest among all domestic plants, taking about an hour by train from Seoul.
In fact, the local product-specific lab in Pyungtaek had already existed from 1984 with the name the
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Table 5.3 Domestic R&D laboratories (LGE)
Name Location Research areas Estab.
LGEIT a Seoul Basic research in electricity and
electronics (element materials,
information technology, ASIC, and so on)
1975
Digital Media Lab" Seoul Optical storage technology, digital AN
technology and product development
1998
Digital TV Lab° Seoul Digital TV and ASIC technologies, and
product
1998
Development
Digital Display Lab ° Seoul Display devices and application
technologies (PDP, FED)
1998
Digital Appliance
Lab
Seoul Development of core components and
technology for home electronics products
1987
Digital Design Lab Seoul R&D of Product design 1983
Quality Centre Seoul Research and analysis on product quality
and reliability
1982
LSR Lab Seoul Research on product concepts through
customer analysis
1989
Production
Engineering Lab
Pyungtaek R&D of production technologies (factory
automation, system engineering and etc.)
1987
Digital Media Pyungtaek Development of new multimedia products 2000
Technology Lab b
Digital Display Kumi Development of new display products 1984
Products Lab b (HDTV, Flat TV and etc.)
Digital Display
Devices Lab b
Kumi Development of next generation display
devices (PDP, Flat display, etc.)
1988
Digital Appliance
Changwon Lab b
Changwon Development of new products (air
conditioner, Refrigerator and washing
machine)
1984
Digital Recording Chungju Development of AV tape and optical disks 1975
Media Lab b
Source: LG Electronics Company (as of January 2000).
° Clustered together with LG Electronics institute of technology in the LG group central research park in
the south of Seoul.
b On-site laboratories established within focal factories.
Video research lab. The company dissolved the organisation to establish a new R&D lab to perform
local-specific R&D on multimedia products in 2000.
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However, we need to take into account the features of change in the spatial form of
R&D organisation. Two of the newly established central R&D laboratories have a
direct link to local laboratories of the DDD in Kumi in terms of the nature of research
which they carry out. In the process of founding new laboratories, many of the
engineers at local product-specific laboratories — about a third of all engineers — moved
to new laboratories in Seoul." Instead, the company reduced the function and
organisation of the local laboratories. To surmount a lack of staff at the local
laboratories, some engineers in the engineering team were shifted to the product
laboratory, and in turn the engineering team decided to outsource routine work in order
to cover a shortage of staff. Managers interviewed predict that this kind of R&D
system will continue to remain, whilst the role of local R&D units will be decreased
incrementally with the scale of minimum efficiency. 4 ' This prospect, however, can
only be available when the company continues to keep in-house manufacturing
activities without outsourcing manufacturing functions. 42 The following section
tackles these issues in more detail, on the basis of in-depth interviews and several
workplace observations.
5.6.2. The division of labour, learning and proximity
This section illustrates the processes of organisational and technological learning
occurring around R&D units and centres upon the relationship between the division of
labour in R&D and proximity. 43
 A particular concern relates to the influence of
40 Interview with a manager of the Development support team, DDD (L-10, 19/08/00).
41 Interviews with a general manager of New display product lab, DDD (L-9, 06/08/00), a chief engineer
of the DND engineering department, DDD (L-11, 26/07/00) and director of Digital Network Division,
DDD (L-12, 25/08/00).
42 For example, most recently the Sony Electronics company decided to outsource production activities
and instead concentrate on only conception functions, such as basic and applied research and marketing,
which are regarded as core competences.
43 This section is based on interviews with managers of R&D and manufacturing teams: manager, the
production engineering team, DDD (L-5, 30/08/00), general manager, New display product lab, DDD (L-
9, 06/08/00), manager, the development support team, DDD (L-10, 03/09/00), chief engineer, DND
engineering department, DDD (L-11, 26/07/00), director, Digital Network Division, DDD (L-12,
25/08/00), senior engineer, New display product lab, DDD (L-13, 01/08/00), senior engineer, Digital TV
lab (L-14, 11/08/00), senior engineer, DND engineering department, DDD (L-16, 11/08/00) and engineer,
Digital TV lab (L-17, 10/09/00).
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proximity and place on interaction and learning between R&D units and between R&D
and manufacturing, in order to understand recent organisational changes. The
following description is based on the fieldwork survey in the Kumi TV plant of the
DDD.
The DDD has three domestic plants, all of which have been based in Kumi in the
Southeast of Korea since the late 1970s. The division is closely associated with two
product-specific local laboratories in Kumi plants and two product-specific central
laboratories in Seoul. The TV plant has a product-specific laboratory with more than
130 engineers and the engineering team (140 engineers), the manufacturing technology
team (70 engineers) and the manufacturing team. The engineering team is closely
related to the R&D laboratory in the nature of its work. It usually performs
engineering tasks, needed for linking new products to mass production, as well as for
handling technological problems with and improving the existing products. The
product-specific laboratory and the engineering team intersect at the boundary of their
work in many ways, and sometimes they interchange members of the staff. Thus, I
shall here treat it as part of the R&D unit.
The central Digital TV Laboratory (hereafter, the central laboratory) actually performs
research projects in a broad range of basic and core technologies associated with digital
TV. Meanwhile, the role of the TV laboratory in the manufacturing site (hereafter, the
local laboratory) is as follows: the development of display device parts; the
development of products at the commercialisation stage; and the improvement and
modification of the existing products based on analogue display technology.
Let me explain an example associated with the development of digital TVs. To
commercialise a brand-new product, more than a quarter of the staff members at the
central laboratory in Seoul join the local laboratory in the Kumi TV plant. In general,
they stay at the local laboratory for 3 to over 6 months until completing the test of a new
product and set-up of the production line. During this time, a lot of interactions and
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communications between the two are needed. Additionally, some of the local
laboratory engineers are sent to the central laboratory in the course of developing a new
product. Such a mutual exchange of people between the central laboratory and the
local laboratory tends to be further encouraged at the final stage of commercialisation.
In terms of technological learning, these interactions are intensified in a way that
technological interdependence can be increased. That is to say, staff of the local
laboratory may acquire knowledge on basic technologies that the central laboratory has
developed and accumulated and, at the same time, staff in central laboratory may
understand overall processes, ranging from the development of products through
engineering works to manufacturing, and learn product-based technologies that the local
laboratory specialising in applied technology possesses. The local laboratory in Kumi
has long accumulated a variety of competences in the form of both tacit knowledge,
such as know-how and skills, and codified knowledge, such as research files. R&D
engineers interviewed argue that technologies associated with digital display products
are not completely separate from analogue based technologies. Rather, it may be more
effective when both technologies are incorporated complementarily.
This technological non-discontinuity between both technologies is of critical importance
when we consider the ways in which firms adapt and learn in technological
discontinuities. That is because the strategic move to digital-based technology and
products may also, to a greater or lesser extent, be dependent upon an existing
technological base. This feature challenges some ideas on corporate adaptability and
technological discontinuity. There is an idea that large firms show strong performance
by seeking scale economies during the phase where technologies evolve at an
incremental pace, whilst they are likely to lose their advantageous positions in
technologically changing conditions due to their path-dependence in both technology
and organisation (McKelvey and Texier, 2000). However, such an idea ignores the
complex and continuous nature of changing technological attributes. It cannot be
viewed that knowledge and competence accumulated at the product-specific laboratory
are obsolete. Rather, the local laboratory can play a critical role in accessing new
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technological knowledge more swiftly by mediating between an emerging digital
technology and an existing analogue technology. Assets of organisational knowledge
and competences embedded through incremental learning over a long period of time can
be a valuable source necessary for sustaining innovation in products."
Let us move back to an explanation of the interactive tie in LGE between the central
laboratory and the product-specific local laboratory. This relationship implies frequent,
interactive communications and learning from one another. In doing so,
communication methods such as email and telephone are utilised conventionally. The
use of ICTs is likely to be increased with the help of the rapid progress of ICT
technology. According to head of the local laboratory, the company is also considering
interactive video-teleconferencing, in order to make communications between
decentralised R&D units more effective (26/07/00 interviewed). He recognises,
nevertheless, that these methods for distant communication may not be sufficient to
resolve technological problems and issues, as well as to share knowledge one another.
The sharing of know-how and the coordination of cognitive distance between distant
R&D teams are considered to be critical aspects in the process of the R&D project, and
these may only be effective through improving relational/organisational proximity on a
face-to-face basis.45
Thus, engineers of both laboratories in charge of a certain project often gather in a
suitable place to solve problems at a given point in time, or until completing joint-
projects. However, the problem becomes more complex when a task must be carried
out at a local laboratory but needs co-working between local lab members and central
lab members. If it is a short project (less than two weeks), the central lab staff may not
go back home during the project. If the project is, however, a long-term project (over a
month), they may go back home once every week or two weeks. Throughout this time,
staff members of the central lab and the local lab establish common values, mutual
44 Helfat and Raubitschek (2000), on the basis of the case of some Japanese electronics companies, also
illustrate that the success of radical learning can be dependent upon ideas and assets accumulated through
incremental learning.
45 See Rallet and Torre (2000) for an example of the empirical research supporting this view.
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understanding and common sense. These elements of relational/organisational
proximity constructed as a result of the process of making connections between
engineers can be a basic condition for working together effectively as well as to sustain
interactive learning. It implies that building organisational proximity seems to be, to
greater or lesser extent, influenced by spatial proximity. Conversely, once different
parties at a distance gain organisational proximity through continuous co-working
activities, difficulties in interaction and communication between them can be mitigated.
There is some problem that the nature of organisational ties between workers within the
company is not as strong as the frequency of contact and interaction between workers.
However, it is hard to say that this characteristic is one that is found only in this
company. It may reflect Korean organisational culture, steeped as it is in hierarchical
order and obedience to one's seniors (Fukuyama, 1995). However, this kind of
cultural characteristic may be used to regulate and control individuals, teams and sub-
organisational units who may have different interests. A senior engineer of a local
laboratory states:
The spatial separation of R&D units should make it difficult for us to interact and
communicate with the staff of the central laboratory as well as to coordinate tasks
between local and central labs. Quite often, members of the staff at both labs must
undertake business travel to meet their counterparts. Workers who have been
working for a long time, like me, may have thought that this is part of the work routine
given to us from the start of joining the company. But, recently joined young
engineers tend to increasingly complain about that problem. More seriously, young
graduates are increasingly unwilling to work at local labs located in non-capital regions
(L-9, 06/08/00).
The corollary of this is that the focus of corporate R&D investment has increasingly
been moving into Seoul. This may be viewed as going against the latest academic
fashion on innovation. According to the literature on geographies of innovation, the
post-Fordist mode of innovation requires the interactive flow of knowledge and
innovation. In this context, the spatial integration between manufacturing and R&D
becomes critical (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Hayter, 1996; Kenney and Florida, 1993).
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LGE's managers interviewed, in principle, agreed with a logic advocating spatial
integration of manufacturing and R&D. Nevertheless, they argue that LGE's
movement towards a spatial separation of manufacturing and R&D does not necessarily
mean the one-way circulation of knowledge, or a disadvantage to the innovation
capabilities. As argued by a senior engineer in a product-specific laboratory in Kumi:
In the course of basic research and the development of a new product, the interaction
between R&D and manufacturing would be less critical. Rather, for the development
of an existing technology and the improvement of established technology, more
frequent interactions and communications may be required at corporate-wide level (L-
14, 11/08/00).
A head of the central D-TV laboratory demonstrates a crucial rationale of this view:
A key element of Digital TV is a digital chip-set [based on ICT and semiconductor
technology] and the competitiveness of D-TV is not dependent on its manufacturing
capability, but exclusively on its design capability (Korea Electronics Times, 18
January 1999).
A former engineer who had worked until recently in the Digital TV laboratory says:
For digital electronics goods such as Digital TVs and digital media, the importance of
manufacturing seems to be no longer significant. Only R&D capability will remain
crucial for determining corporate competitiveness. That is because the size of
commodities becomes smaller as well as those commodities being composed of fewer
and smaller parts. These commodities seem to require a less complex process of
manufacturing than analogue ones (L-17, 06/07/00).
Jointly, they think that R&D activities can be sufficiently pursued without co-location
with manufacturing and more crucial is to intensify interactions among R&D staff. In
their view, interactions between R&D and manufacturing would be needed when
attempting to commercialise new products as it is critical for the firm to realise rapid
time-to-market and the optimisation of a new product and production line. The flow of
knowledge and learning may be constructed through more complex organisational
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processes than might be generally assumed. Thus, the functional units of organisation
such as R&D, manufacturing, design and marketing may not have a precise boundary
between them.
It is therefore difficult to argue that the changing patterns in the form of R&D
organisation imply a return to the Fordist linear R&D model, which is characterised as a
top-down, one way flow of innovation and learning and the precise division of labour
between R&D groups. Basically, R&D units have all their own R&D areas.
However, this does not necessarily mean that their tasks and roles are clearly
departmentalised or their knowledge flows are unidirectional. As illustrated
throughout this section, in many ways interactive relationships are sustained through
boundary-spanning, co-working activities. The processes of interactive learning based
on frequent, in-depth interactions and communications between the central lab's staff
members and people in local plants, not least the local lab, play a crucial role in
avoiding a one-way direction for innovation.
What is clear is that central laboratories play a key role as a mediator linking business
divisional R&D laboratories to LGEIT, whilst local laboratories (including engineering
departments) act as a bridge for combining the rest of the teams/departments involved in
production activities. On the other hand, an obvious trend in the R&D domain, which
has recently occurred in LGE, is that the priority of corporate R&D performance have
been placed increasingly upon central R&D units, away from the geographical
integration between R&D and manufacturing. These characteristics appear
conceptually paradoxical, but it should be understood that such a spatial form of R&D
reflects a corporate-specific mode of regulating organisational competences.
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5.7. Globalisation of R&D activities
In general, the globalisation of R&D activities by large Korean electronics firms took
place in the early 1980s. In the early years of overseas R&D, R&D activities focused
on narrow fields, concentrated on following up Japanese technologies, and were limited
to a few countries (Kim, 1997). That is to say, Korean firms, in that period, operated
overseas R&D in order to catch up and imitate an existing knowledge already developed
in advanced countries and leading firms. However, since the early 1990s they have
been increasingly operating overseas R&D activities in order to exceed competing firms
in terms of both technology and market competition. Korean electronics firms such as
LGE and SEC (Samsung Electronics Company) have similar purposes for operating
overseas R&D centres. Some main purposes are:
to analyse the market trends of host countries.
to develop market-specific products to meet local customer demands.
to collect information on the trends of technological development and progress in
competing firms and research institutions in technology-leading countries in general
and North America, Western Europe and Japan in particular.
— to have access to and learn advanced technologies and knowledge developed in host
countries.
to recruit both qualified graduates with higher degrees from top engineering and
business schools in the US, Europe and Japan and highly-qualified scientists,
engineers and managers working in leading and competing firms globally.
Let us examine the LGE experience of globalisation of R&D. As illustrated in Table
5.4, in January 2000 the company operated 11 overseas R&D centres. The first was
the Tokyo R&D centre in Japan in 1981 learning Japanese technologies. Then, most of
the overseas R&D centres have been built since 1990. Apart from R&D on product
technology, the company has continued to found since 1991, a global design network
encompassing four design centres in Dublin (1991), Tokyo (1993), New Jersey (1994)
and Beijing (1999). The Beijing design laboratory was added to cope with a rapidly
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emerging Chinese market. This tendency that product design R&D laboratories are
increased will continue, because LGE has decided to improve product design
capabilities as one of its core competences.
Of particular interest is that the company has opened five overseas R&D centres since
1998. Of these, the Zenith R&D centre in Chicago was created through a complete
merger with the Zenith, a former US TV maker. In addition, the geographical scale of
R&D operations has been increasingly globalised. LGE has the intention to secure
geographical advantages in host countries or regions with technology-leading firms,
R&D institutions and a pool of qualified human resources. The places include
Princeton in New Jersey, Chicago in Illinois, Dublin in Ireland, Aachen in Germany,
Tokyo in Japan, Moscow in Russia, Herzelia in Israel, Bangalore in India and Beijing in
China. Many of them have been founded in order to research local market-specific
product design. All places where the company forms global R&D networks are said to
retain national or local-specific advantages in certain areas of technology.
Let us take some examples from overseas R&D laboratories that have been established
since 1998. 46 In April 1998, the company established a 'Software Development
Centre' in Bangalore of India, a well-known ICT cluster (Fromhold-Eisebith, 1999).
The aim was to access IT-related knowledge and information as well as to utilise a low-
cost but high-quality brain pool. Subsequently, the company founded a European
R&D centre, called the LG Technology Centre of Europe, in Aachen of Germany. The
aim is three-fold: access to regional-specific technological knowledge and expertise;
collecting information on European technological trends; and recruiting highly qualified
European experts, particularly German engineers. The company recognises excellent
R&D infrastructures as the regional advantage of Aachen.
As illustrated above, there is a clear tendency for LGE to attempt to actively exploit
local-specific advantages in taking the global R&D strategy. What is noticeable is that
46 LG Electronics Company corporate release (14 July 1998).
133
five of the overseas R&D centres were founded immediately after the outbreak of the
Asian crisis. The question raised is why the company has set out to aggressively
expand overseas R&D operations, in spite of the economic crisis. The rationale is
two-fold. 47 On the one hand, there has been increasing global competition among
leading electronics firms to secure an emerging digital electronics market, notably the
Digital TV market. On the other hand, a greater necessity for access to advanced new
technologies and knowledge of digital products has been emerging, as LGE has
strategically decided to venture its fate on emerging new business domains such as
digital TVs and digital multimedia.
47 Based on interviews with a manager of the management team, DDD (L-1, 23/07/00) and a manager of
the development support team, DDD (L-10, 19/08/00).
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1996
1994
1991
Table 5.4 Overseas R&D laboratories (LGE)
Name
	
Location	 Research areas	 Esta b.
Zenith R&D
Centre
Trevini
Corp.
New jersey
Design Lab
Dublin
Design Lab
Aachen
Tech. Centre
Bangalore
Research
Lab
Beijing
Design Lab
Tokyo
Research
Lab
Tokyo
Design Lab
Moscow
Tech. Centre
Herzelia
Tech. Centre
Chicago, U.S.
New Jersey,
U.S.
New Jersey,
U.S.
Dublin,
Ireland
Aachen,
Germany
Bangalore,
India
Beijing,
China
Tokyo, Japan
Tokyo, Japan.
Moscow,
Russia
Herzelia,
Israel
Development of VSB and digital transmission 	 1999
technologies
Development of Digital TV technology
Design of product models for the North
American market
Design of product models for the European
market
Collection and analysis of European technologies 	 1998
Software development
	
1998
Support of the development of product design for
	 1998
the Chinese market
Localised R&D and the technology analysis of 	 1981
Japanese electronics industry
Analysis on the product design trend of Japanese 	 1993
electronics makers
Collection and analysis of technological trend in 	 1995
Russia and CIS, and software development
Collection and analysis of technological trend in	 1999
Israel
Source: LG Electronics Company.
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The company emphasises that:
We have a plan to intensify corporate-wide activities in technological learning and
innovation to cope with the rapidly emerging digital electronics competition and in
turn to secure the position of a global leader.48
The evidence can be found in the fact that the central purpose of establishing overseas
R&D centres recently has been to develop technologies in digital TVs and multimedia
(e.g. the R&D centres in Chicago, Bangalore, Herzelia and Aachen). For example, the
function of the hub R&D centres in New Jersey, USA, and Tokyo, Japan, have been
focusing more on developing new technologies such as digital TV, digital home network
and digital media.
Accordingly, it has become more crucial for the company to develop and secure rapidly
emerging digital electronics technologies than ever before. As the company has
centred most of its core tasks in R&D on those technologies, it is not surprising that in
recent years the company has aggressively invested in the operations of global R&D
centres.
One interesting story illustrates an attempt by LGE to change the geography of its US
R&D centres. After taking over Zenith in 1999, the company initially planned to close
down the Zenith Chicago R&D centre and move its function and employees to the LG
New Jersey R&D centre in order to save operating costs. Some employees would have
been laid off in the course of the location shift. However, the company came to find
this was a dangerous plan and promptly cancelled it. As indicated by a manager of the
TV lab:
On the one hand, local staff in Zenith R&D were reluctant to move their workplace to
New Jersey for various reasons. We were worried about the possibility that they
would leave their workplace for that reason. As they possess a great deal of expertise
necessary for developing Digital TVs, LGE would be likely to get incur damage if they
48 LG Electronics Company corporate release (7 January 1999).
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stopped their research. On the other hand, there is plenty of knowledge in the form of
formal knowledge in general, and tacit knowledge in particular (L-10, 19/08/00).
The company's attempt for geographical reform of R&D operations was undermined by
the spatial fixity of knowledge assets. This case indicates that the value of assets such
as R&D seems less dependent on the value of physical assets than that of knowledge
and intellectual assets, particularly in the tacit form embodied in humans. Currently,
Zenith R&D centre is recognised as one of the most important repositories of
knowledge and technology in the company.° A key factor for LGE to get confident of
leading the global Digital TV market and its technology is the technological
competence of the Zenith R&D centre. In fact, Zenith retains various core
technologies, including a US patent for VSB (Vestigial Side Band), an industry standard
technology for digital broadcasting transmission systems. The company has thus
actively attempted to mobilise internal R&D competences to take advantage of the
technology and knowledge that the Zenith R&D centre has accumulated. As indicated
by a senior engineer:
We are proud that we have constructed strong foundations in applied technologies so
far. But, in reality we are not so strong in substantial core technologies. Therefore,
we are trying to do our best to secure core technologies. In this sense, we believe that
the Zenith R&D centre plays an important role in a way in which we learn and develop
the core technologies of Digital TV (L-13, 01/08/00).
In addition, they are confident of securing their own competences to lead digital TV
technologies in the near future. The reason is two-fold. First, they have strength in
applied technology, which implies that they have previous ability to acquire advanced
technology rapidly. Second, they make intensive effort through harder working
(Janelli, 1993). Both are assumed to be crucial factors consisting of absorptive
capacity for learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; L. Kim, 1998). These aspects of
absorptive capacity reflect by and large the evolutionary paths and routines of the
company. As one means of sustaining this, the company regularly sends staff at
49 Interview with a manager of the development support team, DDD (L-10, 03/09/00).
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domestic R&D laboratories to the Zenith R&D centre.
This case shows that 'grafting', which is identified as a way of learning external
knowledge by acquiring knowledge intensive organisations or hiring new knowledge
retainers, can be a critical means to improve organisational knowledge and competences.
In particular, this means could be more effective if attempting to quickly acquire
complex forms of information and knowledge (Huber, 1996). However, the
effectiveness may depend on absorptive capacity or a prior base of knowledge and
competence.
An important activity that overseas R&D centres perform, most particularly US-based
R&D centres, is to recruit highly qualified engineering and management experts from
host countries. The company is suffering from a lack of qualified engineers and
graduates, like many other large Korean firms. However, it is generally considered
that LGE has been a bit inferior to SEC in terms of both the quantitative and qualitative
composition of R&D staff. In part, this may result from the fact that qualified
graduates tend to prefer working in SEC to LGE. They conventionally believe that
Samsung gives them better incentives and chances to promote their career. 50 LGE thus
has recently made great efforts to secure qualified experts and graduates from advanced
countries in general, and the USA in particular.5I
In the past, the company operated overseas R&D centres to sustain relatively simple and
limited goals, such as the collection of information and the imitation of technology.
However, the company has recently attempted to further the localisation of R&D
activities. For example, there is an increasing tendency that each overseas R&D
laboratory undertakes its own projects, and often carries out a joint project with local
companies or research institutes. The transition towards localisation is coherent in part
50 Based on interviews with workers of both companies and the author's indirect experiences.
51 Most of those who the companies attempt to headhunt are Korean overseas students with Masters and
PhD degrees or Koreans with high technological or managerial ability in leading global firms. This is
because they speak the same language, which means there is no problem with communication, and they
understand Korean culture and the Korean firm's organisational culture.
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with the increase of inter-firm cooperative alliances, such as joint product development.
Despite the tendency for the company to increasingly globalise its R&D base, it is
expected that domestic R&D function will remain the global hub of corporate R&D
network and technological competences 52 . This strategic orientation of the company is
largely similar to other TNCs (Pavitt and Patel, 1999).
5.8. Inter-firm alliances
Since LGE has secured technologies for the world's leading display devices and digital
products, the company will form strategic alliances with foreign partners to establish
its brand power as a global player (President of LGE's Digital Display Business
Division, The Korea Times, 31 January 2000).
What one of the top executives says above illustrates clearly the company's business
strategy. He goes on to argue that the company is now competing with global leaders
in the digital display sector on an equal footing and is speeding up its development for
the next-generation products such as Digital TV (ibid.).
Along with this strategic move, the company has sought to form strategic alliances with
major global players in a given market and technology. There are various reasons that
firms form alliances and there are various definitions of strategic alliances. In brief, I
use the term as a form of reciprocal agreement between more than two partners seeking
to continue to survive, or to be more competitive, by sharing competitive resources such
as knowledge and assets with counterparts. Recent theories on the firm have tended to
stress the existence of complementary assets between partners as a key factor of
strategic alliances. In particular, the competence-based perspective focuses on the
formation of inter-firm alliances in the context of the complementary combination of
distinct competences between firms (Nooteboom, 1999). Here, I do not want to deal
with detailed processes and mechanisms of strategic alliances taken by Korean firms.
52 LG Electronics Company corporate release (30 January 2000).
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Instead, I pay particular attention to understanding recent patterns and characteristics of
strategic alliances that Korean electronics firms such as LGE have taken in response to
environmental pressures, or to solidify a corporate-specific strategic direction.
As illustrated in Table 5.5, LGE has been constructing partnerships with leading firms
in a wide-range of electronics & ICT industries. The significance is that most of the
alliances have been made since 1998. This implies that the company is no longer a
technology or market-follower, as it has come to accumulate unique competences in
certain product markets or technologies. The forms of inter-firm alliances entered by
the company are divided into joint venture and technological partnerships.
The company looked for companies interested in investing in some of its core
businesses after the economic crisis. It was important for the company to attract a
large amount of investment. This is in part because the government urged the
company to lower radically its excessive debt-equity-ratio, but also because the
company wanted to secure a source of revenue needed for investing in new strategic
businesses such as Digital TV and digital home networks. In the end, LGE reached an
agreement with Philips, a Dutch-based electronics firm, to set up joint ventures for TFT-
LCD in 1999 and for CRT in 2000 respectively. 53 Both the CRT and LCD businesses
that were agreed as a joint venture are said to show a saturated or fluctuating global
market structure. Thus, LGE needed to form strategic alliances.
It is reported that both companies are planning to form strategic alliances in other
businesses, such as PDP and mobile phones, on the basis of successful partnership in
LCD joint venture (Hankyung Daily Business, 28 November 2000). Trust and mutual
understanding between alliance partners, obtained via the experience of LCD joint
venture, may have given an additional opportunity to collaborate. This is indicated by
previous research findings that a history of successful ties between alliance partners
generates trust (Inkpen, 1996).
53 In consequence, the joint venture businesses of both firms have come to be the top players in the global
market share.
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Area
PC production
and sales in
Korea
Digital data
broadcasting
Tessera	 Strategic
(US)	 alliance
Oak
	 Strategic
(US)	 alliance
Microsoft Strategic
(US)	 alliance
Erickson	 Strategic
(Sweden)	 alliance
Hyundai	 Strategic
(Korea)
	 alliance
PCB (Print
circuit board)
Chip
components of
optical storage
devices
Home network
Mobile
communication
equipments
Semiconductor
chip
	Intel
	
Strategic
	
(US)	 alliance
	
Lucent	 Strategic
	
(US)	 alliance
Table 5.5 Major interfirm alliances (1996-2001.1)
Partner	 Form
IBM	 Joint venture
(US)
PBS	 Strategic
(US)	 alliance
Goals	 Estab.
Combining IBM's technologies and	 1996
brand power and marketing advantage of
LG in the Korean market
Succeeding competition for the 	 1998
standardisation of digital data
broadcasting system
4 Success in developing unique
standard
Philips	 Joint venture
	 TFT-LCD
	 LG attracting foreign capital 	 1999
(Holland) (50:50)	 Philips expanding production bases
4 Expected to be expanded to other
areas of display products
LG developing advanced technology and 1999
commercialise earlier than competitors
Tessera securing production facilities
Combining LG's strength in optical	 2000
storage device system technology with
partner's chip component technology
4 Agreement on technology sharing and
joint development of core components
Coping with jointly competition for the 	 2000
standardisation of home network system
Exchanging complementary	 2000
technological competences between both
companies
Securing supplier for DRAM chip in the 2000
long-term
Utilising distinct technological
advantages one another
Semiconductor
chip for digital
electronics
Mobile
communication
devices
Technological cooperation, sharing of	 2000
intellectual property, long-term
transaction in semiconductor chip
Advancing the competition for	 2000
developing the next generation mobile
communication devices
Continued
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2000
2000
Hitachi	 Joint venture	 Optical storage
devices (CD-
ROM, CD-RW,
& DVD)
Sustaining market leadership through	 2000
combining LG's global marketing
capability and partner's technological
leadership
(Japan)
Intel
	
Strategic
(US)	 alliance
D-TV data
broadcasting,
home network
& Internet-
based
appliances
Developing jointly new products in
ahead of competitors
Coping with jointly the competition for
the standardisation of digital technology
system
Philips	 Joint venture	 CPT and CRT
(Holland)	 (50:50)
Matsushita Joint venture	 Air conditioner
(Japan)
Pursuing complementarities in
technological competences,
marketing and production areas, to keep
their competitiveness in saturated market
Sharing sales network and technology 	 2001
(For more details, see Table 5.6)
Sources: based on LGE Annual Report (1999, 2000); Korea Electronics Times;
Korea Daily Business (1 January 1998 — 30 April 2001).
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Most recently, the company has formed a joint venture with Matsushita. It aims to
sustain a leading position in the global air conditioning market. Both companies have
the first and the second largest market share respectively. 54 A strategic alliance
between the two involves wide-range cooperation, including production, marketing,
R&D, production technologies and sourcing. Basically, the rationale of this joint
venture is mutual complementarity in core competences between both companies.
LGE is very competitive in applied technology and production technology, whereas
Matsushita is a leading firm in core product technology (Hankyung Daily business, 17
January 2001). As summarised in Table 5.6, it is expected that both companies will
continue to manage a leading position in market and technology of air conditioner as
they have agreed to combine each one's distinct core competence (ibid.).
Table 5.6 Details of LG-Matsushita strategic alliance
Sector	 Details of collaboration	 Goals
R&D	 - Joint research on core technologies
Sourcing - Joint purchase of key parts
- Interchange of information on
materials and parts
Marketing - Joint marketing using global
production networks specialised
one another
- Leading technologies
- Creating technological
synergy
- Cost saving
- Increasing market
positioning
- Interchange of marketing
know-how
Source: based on Korea Daily Business (17 January 2001)
In short, common features can be found from the recent joint ventures of LGE. Firstly,
products agreed for joint venture are in a domain which is characterised by growing
technological standardisation and market saturation (display devices such as LCD and
CRT, and air conditioners). Secondly, allied companies are leading global players
within the top five of their global market share. The firms involved have chosen this
54 LGE has 14% of global air conditioner market share and Matsushita has 12% of it.
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strategy to secure their monopolistic positions in a given market.
Apart from partnerships through joint venture with a focus on production, recently the
company has also aggressively formed strategic partnerships with major technological
leaders. Once again, most of the alliances have been made since 1998 and focus on
digital technologies such as Digital TV, home networks and multimedia (see Table 5.4),
indicating clearly the company's strategy:
In particular, with focus on digital management moving towards becoming first mover
in the market and leading the industry standard, LGE is concentrating on strengthening
strategic alliances in the digital TV industry.55
Most major alliance partners are US-based firms and specialise in the fields of digital
TV and ICTs. All of the alliances have been made to win the competition to secure
leadership in an industry standard for digital TV and home networks. It is known that
alliance partners choose LGE because the company retains production capability,
applied technology, and digital TV technology. It is expected that this tendency will be
accelerated in line with the movement of global strategic alliances to take the leadership
in the competition for the swiftly approaching digital electronics market. Therefore,
the prospects of the firm is likely to depend on whether it is capable of securing leading-
edge technologies earlier than competitors by both mobilising and combining internal
competences and external competences.
5.9. Building a learning-oriented organisation
The recent literature on learning argues that learning is likely to occur through
interactive and complex social processes encompassed within and outside of the firm.
However, it cannot be viewed that such processes are constructed either solely by
informal interactions and communications communities of practice, or just by formal
55 LGE corporate release (30 January 2000).
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organisational units. Learning in organisations takes place in complex ways across
both formal and informal boundaries. The first part of this section reveals the limits to
informal learning and suggests the importance of social learning. The second part
deals with ways of learning on the basis of ad hoc organisations, task-force teams. A
task-force team is considered to be important in the context of learning and problem-
solving.
5.9.1. Limits to everyday learning and facilitating epistemic communities
Some writers as we saw in Chapter 2 propose that learning in doing occurs through
daily practice and it is seen as a vital source of both routine and strategic learning
through interaction, and everyday actions bring together tacit and formal knowledge
(Amin, 2000; Wenger, 1998, 2000). For them, communities of practice are central to
such everyday learning.
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to highlight learning centred upon R&D teams,
emphasising learning occurring in the context of particular formalised organisational
processes. In this section, I point out some difficulties that hinder learning via
everyday practice in the workplace. In turn, it tries to show the ways in which the
company attempts to activate epistemic communities in order to improve organisational
milieu and competence as well as to cover lack of learning through communities of
practice.
This account is based on a series of interviews with managers in R&D and
manufacturing teams and the survey on R&D and organisational culture recently carried
out by the innovation team of the DDD. LGE workers generally recognise a lack of
corporate routines that encourage informal learning among peers or between workers
beyond formal units of organisation. There are some factors that constrain the
opportunity to make inter-personal interaction and communication possible. Basically,
workers complain that working conditions with tight daily routines and long working
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hours make it difficult for them to share experience and know-how at work. 56 In some
cases, workers are not even aware of what peers next to them do. Sometimes, workers
have difficulty understanding one another because the company too often changes
organisational structure by forming new teams or breaking up established teams.
Since workers, as a result, must adapt to an unfamiliar organisational environment and
tasks, it may not be easy for them to create communities of practice because it takes a
long time to create them. Moreover, LGE's hierarchical culture is one of the
underlying factors restricting the activation of communities of practice. According to
Lam (2000), a large bureaucratic organisation tends to reduce the possibility of
distributed tacit knowledge to emerge, by focusing on formalising and institutionalising
organisational routines and knowledge. In such circumstances, it is not likely that
social learning based on informal interaction and communication between workers is
active. However, this does not mean that workers in the company do not interact and
communicate with each other in an informal manner or create communities of practice.
In the course of carrying out an interview with a manager of the organisational
innovation team, I found an interesting example where informal social learning leads to
radical learning.57
One of the R&D teams came to face with an uncertain problem in the middle of
carrying out their project, which was part of a major project for developing a new
device. They first tried to resolve it by modifying the procedure and method of
experiment. Next, they reviewed scientific references and research files. However,
they failed to solve the problem by themselves. Thus they convened a series of
meetings in which all of the members involved in that project participated. A variety
of ideas came out from participants. They tried to solve the problem by adopting some
of these ideas that seemed to be valuable and feasible. But they failed to resolve the
problem. Members got frustrated and stopped the project. Some days later, one of
56 Through a longitudinal fieldwork on a Korean chaebol company, Janelli starkly shows working
conditions in Korean big companies to be long working hours and hard work (1993: 203-228). On the
other hand, Moon (2000) points out the way in which lack of time to spare in working hours prevents
generating innovative culture in R&D teams, on the basis of a longitudinal survey of LGE's R&D
department when he was a professor of a Techno-MBA course established in the DDD of the company.
57 Interview with a manager of DND Super A team, DDD (L-15, 22/08/00).
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the members had a chance to talk with some of his peers working in another project
team during lunch in the refectory. He told to them about the problem they faced.
This is not unusual, because workers have a chance to meet their peers and friends at
lunch break. 58 By listening carefully to what was said, one of his friends realised that
in a past project, he had faced a similar problem and came to master it through many
experiments and trial and error. He joined the team at once and thanks to his help and
knowledge sharing, the team solved a problem that was critical in the project. In the
end, the project led to radical innovation. This is the benefit of the organisational
embeddedness of knowledge embodied in individuals and communities of practice
(Lam, 2000). A collective form of knowledge and its organisational process of
embeddedness may emerge from the combination of sets of dispersed individual
knowledge based on context-specific, relational/organisational proximity. The case
described above is not just an unusual anecdote. A variety of cases similar to this have
taken place in the everyday work life at LGE.
In recent years, the company has recognised a need to activate communities of practice
as a means of making organisational culture learning-oriented and innovative. This is
in part because the company has observed successful cases like the one described above.
But especially, management consulting institutions such as consultancy firms and the
LG Economic Research Institute have also suggested the importance and role of
communities of practice and social learning in competitiveness. In its survey report on
organisational culture and learning, the management innovation team reports that there
is the necessity to take strategic action to promote communities of practice in order to
change organisational culture in an incremental way, as well as to make organisation
learning-oriented. What they point out is absolutely right and timely. But, it is a
problem that the company forces workers to organise communities of practice via a top-
down process rather than trying to create institutional bases critical to making those
communities activate. Even though there have so far been a lot of strategic actions
58 All workers have lunch at the company refectory between 12:00 and 13:00. After lunch, some of
them may enjoy a club activity such as martial arts, oriental chess or learning English. Others may take
a rest, talk with peers, smoke or listen to music.
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similar to a strategy for facilitating communities of practice, these have not been as
successful or satisfactory as they expected. This is not surprising, since most of these
attempts have tended to focus on harvesting visible performances in the short-term
rather than seeking them in the long-term. On the basis of a survey carried out by the
innovation management team, the company, therefore, plans to create institutional
foundations such as regular consensus meetings, interactive conferences, the promotion
of boundary-spanning activities and the creation of communication space.
5.9.2. The task-force activities and learning
The company has attempted to make use of task-force organisations in order to not only
sustain radical learning but also solve specific problems. 59 The company operates task
force teams to solve certain problems or perform emergent tasks in a given point of time
(see Table 5.7). A task-force team is divided into three types according to the
complexity and nature of the problem-solving process for a task-force activity. Task-
force projects for seeking radical (or strategic) learning are likely to be raised by
corporate decision-making groups.
In general, the period of a task-force activity varies from a few weeks to over six
months. Each task force team is composed of members who have expertise and
knowledge in a given project. These members are mobilised through various kinds of
formal team units. It is believed that this sort of task-force team, which is cross-
functional and boundary-spanning, is a form of organisation capable of effectively
mobilising distributed knowledge across different areas of expertise in the face of an
emerging problem or task.
59 This section is based on interviews with managers of the R&D team and the organisational innovation
team (L-10, 03/09/00 and L-15, 22/08/00).
148
Table 5.7 Types of the task force team
Class	 Type of problem-	 Level of
	
Term &
	
Organisational
solving	 question	 organisation	 units involved
A-class Solving the gulf
	
Top down
between an ideal state
and a real state
B-class Making the current	 Top down plus
state better	 bottom up
C-class Solving the existing	 Bottom up
problems
- Over 6 months
- Led by staff
beyond team leader
level
- 3 to 6 months
- Led by staff equal
to team leader level
- Less than 3
months
- Led by staff under
team leader level
- Consulting team
- Organisational
innovation team
- Process
innovation team
- Team-level task
- Sub-team level
task
Source: the Digital Display Division.
The performance of a task-force team seems to depend on two regulatory frames. To
avoid uncooperative actions, among other things, the company institutionalises a strict
rule that managers in charge of formal organisational units, such as teams and
departments, have a duty to select the most appropriate and competent members when a
task-force team is newly organised. This may be an important pre-condition for the
company sustaining an effective outcome of task force activities. There is a possibility
that some managers will be reluctant to select members of their teams and send them to
a task-force team. Secondly, there is a specified rule that a task-force team, unlike a
formal organisational unit, may have a relatively horizontal form of organisation such as
a democratic procedure of decision-making or a liberal working environment. Usually,
these teams are led by someone considered to have the best knowledge of what to do,
irrespective of their occupational status in a formal organisational unit. This also
seems important for firms whose managerial practices are to a large extent hierarchical
and top-down, like LGE.
Let us look at the process of how task force teams operate. Before commencing a
specific task force activity, all members of the team may stay together in a certain place,
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such as a resort facility or the corporate training centre, for about a week or so. The
aim is to get to know one another as well as to understand what they have to do and how
in the course of the task-force activity. This is a team building process that may be
required to achieve a successful outcome. What is important is that this process may
contribute to helping members with diverse backgrounds and interests share relational
and cognitive proximities. In more detail, a team building process enables members to
construct relational and cognitive proximities, requiring linguistic and semantic
equivalence, shared tacit knowledge, rapid processing of information, trust, or other
conventions of communication (Nooteboom, 1999b; Amin, 2000). Distinctiveness of
cognitive frames and a variety of expertise among individual members may help a task-
force team to increase the potential for sustaining new learning. Meanwhile, team
building helps them to increase relational proximity that is conceived as an important
way to do a project together rapidly, as well as to learn about one another in an
interactive manner. While both dimensions of proximity seem to be opposite sides of a
coin, they do not necessarily erode each other's advantages. Rather, they are
complementary and, therefore, can make synergistic power by blending novelty based
on cognitive distance and communicability based on relational proximity (Nooteboom,
1999a). In this sense, a team building process is targeted to regulate and combine both
proximities and can be influential for the whole process of a project and its outcome.
The company provides a task-force team with a small project room within an existing
working space and they usually work together in the space until the task is completed.
Often, members of the team may even sleep in the working room. In the process of a
problem-solving activity, members exchange distinctive tacit knowledge that they
possess and, by combining tacit knowledge and codified knowledge, try to make a set of
knowledge embodied in individual members effective and available. The nature of
this kind of ad hoc project team may be organised so as to draw on valuable tacit
knowledge embodied in individual members. Members of a task-force team may be
those who are considered to have knowledge of specific organisational context and
routines as well as valuable tacit knowledge related to the given project. In this sense,
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the process of a task-force project should be given to combining them. After
completing the task, the team gives a presentation to test the practicality and feasibility
of the outcome as well as to diffuse new knowledge. One step further, every year the
company holds a company-wide conference called the 'Skill Olympics', which is
designed to represent the best practices from performances produced as a result of task
force activities. Participants include domestic and overseas subsidiaries and first-tier
suppliers whose relationships with the company are on a long-term basis. The purpose
of the conference is to promote the best practice and a learning environment among
workers at a corporate-wide level.
The company has increasingly attempted to take advantage of task force teams in the
pursuit of both discontinuous learning and incremental learning. As shown in Table
5.7, short-term projects which are normally taken less than 3 months are organised to
not only make the current state better but also solve the existing problems, while long-
term projects which are required more than 6 months aim at sustaining radical
innovations. The company has come to conceive the task force team as a form of
organisation relevant for coping with shortened product cycles, intensified market
competition and environmental turbulence. On the other hand, organising a task-force
team may combine the advantages of a large organisation, with an ability to effectively
mobilise geographically and organisationally distributed resources, and the advantages
of an informal or small organisation, which has flexibility and rapidity.
Annually, a number of task-force teams are organised for new product development and
problem-solving. Their number has been increasing for the last few years. For
instance, in 1999 the DDD operated more than 100 task-force teams, double the number
of four years before. This may reflect the ways in which the company has made a
great effort to sustain innovation in organisation and product and to change
organisational routines in better ways by organising task force teams. It should be
noted that the company has tended to try to activate this kind of organisational form to
cover a lack of informal learning among organisational members.
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In sum, evidence shows that the task force teams as learning communities play an
important role in sustaining incremental and radical learning and that the process of
learning involved in task force activities can be sustained by bring together tacit
knowledge and codified knowledge. It should be noted that the performance of task
force activities would be dependent on the extent of relational/organisational proximity
between project members, but it is not to say that this relational proximity could only be
sustained through geographical proximity. What I want to argue is that geographical
proximity alone cannot secure the efficiency of task force activities and the potential of
learning. Instead, geographical proximity, in managing task force teams, can be used
as a useful means to more facilitate relational/organisational proximity.
5.10. Conclusions
This chapter has presented the various dimensions of restructuring and learning sought
by LGE to adapt since the economic crisis. The restructuring and learning experience
of LGE have offered some critical implications for understanding learning and
adaptation.
First, corporate adaptation in radical change may be possible through a combination of
restructuring and learning. A radical external shock has not only allowed the company
to recognise a sense of crisis in organisation, but also to undertake routine-breaking
corporate restructuring away from organisational lock-in. Corporate restructuring has
been focused mainly on the reform of business structure moving towards core
competences through downsizing and the reorganisation of production; redundancies
and the pursuit of flexibility in labour and production; and the reform of organisational
structure. Some of these restructuring tools are apparently intended to save costs. It
should be noted, however, that these restructuring practices have also made it possible
for the company to further learning-based adaptation. They have contributed to
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unlearning old practices and routines and opening up a chance to sustain new learning
such as innovations in products and processes.
Second, corporate learning is not reducible to a matter of localised learning and
geographical proximity. Based on this, the company, despite the crisis, has made great
efforts to promote technological learning through the intensification and globalisation of
R&D activities and cooperative strategic alliances as the company has considered as a
crucial precondition for continuous adaptation and long-term success. Such learning
practices do not tell us about a matter of whether the source of learning is localised or
trans-localised, but indicate that corporate learning takes place across boundaries of
organisational space beyond limited space/place.
Third, the effectiveness of learning seems influenced by different proximity effects.
Collective learning is dependent on the degree of relational/organisational proximity
between actors. However, it also needs to note that geographical proximity contributes
to the formation and development of relational/organisational proximity. LGE
experience shows that the geographical decentralisation of organisational units
challenges the circulation and mobilisation of knowledge and competence within the
organisation in many ways. It is clear that, to a degree, spatial proximity influences
organisational learning, although it is not a sufficient condition. Rather, spatial
proximity can be a necessary condition for creating and sustaining
relational/organisational proximity. For the purpose of the promotion of technological
and organisational capabilities, the company maintains a functional linkage between
R&D and manufacturing, whilst attempts to mobilise the focus of technological
competences within the capital region offer a greater potential for using localised
sources of knowledge and competence.
Fourth, the company has increasingly tried to use a temporary form of organisation,
called the task-force team, to sustain learning, not least radical learning. The task-
force team combines the advantages of a large organisation, with the ability to
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effectively mobilise geographically and organisationally distributed resources, and the
advantages of an informal, or small, organisation which has flexibility and rapidity. In
addition, LGE is trying to activate epistemic communities to cover a lack of informal
learning and instil learning-oriented organisational culture. In addition, the operation
of task-force teams has been increasing to improve problem-solving capabilities and
sustain radical innovations. These can be important parts of intra-firm modes of
learning that enable to mobilise various sets of knowledge in and out of the firm and
embed new knowledge and routines in the organisation. In the following chapter, we
will discuss the Samsung case with the same theme as LG.
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Chapter 6
Learning and adaptation in the Samsung Electronics
6.1. Introduction
This chapter explores dynamic ways of corporate restructuring and learning in the face
of a radical environmental change within SEC. It is widely recognised that SEC is the
flagship company of the Samsung group, one of the largest Korean chaebol. SEC has
been celebrated as a case that has achieved path-breaking adaptation in response to a
series of difficulties such as the economic crisis and organisational lock-in. This
chapter starts by summarising a series of attempts to destroy path-dependence and
sustain organisational innovation and illustrating the general process of restructuring in
the face of the crisis. In this section, it illustrates that traditional restructuring tools
have been critical for SEC to sustain learning-based adaptation. This claim is explored
in more detail in the following sections which tackle SEC's restructuring processes on
the basis of downsizing, employment adjustment, change in business structure and
change in organisational structure.
In the second half of the chapter, I explore learning-based adaptation tools such as R&D
activities and inter-firm alliances. SEC has focused more on technological learning
since the crisis and tried to make better use of internal and external sources of
knowledge and competences. Especially, this chapter deals with spaces of learning
and the issue of proximity with the reference to spatial reorganising processes of
production and R&D units. Compared to LGE, while SEC has a multi-divisional and
decentred structure of organisation, its geographical configuration is extremely
concentrated. SEC's recent changes in production and R&D units show spatial
strategies that represent the clustering of specific organisational functions and the use of
the advantages of space and place. These strategic actions provide us with important
implications for learning and adaptation.
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Unfortunately, this chapter cannot illustrate the complexities of tacit ways of learning.
This is due to the great difficulty of gaining access to the company for a longitudinal
survey as I argued in Chapter 4. To partly cover this methodological limitation, a
variety of secondary source data and the results of interviews with industry specialists
and workers are used.
6.2. Breaking path-dependence and innovating organisation
Companies that have an experience of great success in the past and have sustained
growth in more or less stable situations over a long time might have trouble
changing... Usually the demise is the result of the top management's inability to read
changes in the environment and to respond adequately... (CEO of SEC).
It seems that what the CEO of SEC is talking about is the nature of organisational
change and how it corresponds with what the company has been doing so far. It is
interesting that his tone shares some key ideas from an evolutionary perspective, such as
path-dependence and lock-in, in stressing how difficult large companies find it to move
beyond path-dependence or organisational lock-in. At the same time, it emphasises the
crucial role played by the top decision-maker in sustaining a firm's continuous survival
and evolution. Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) argued that managers who try to adapt to
discontinuities through incremental adaptation are unlikely to succeed. In this regard,
it is useful to recall as Schoenberger (1997) notes:
firms change all the time. They buy new equipment, hire new people and move the
old ones around, enter new markets, reorganize departments and functions, change
supplies, develop new products, and so on, and they are constantly engaged in these
activities. So the question is not so much why firms don't change, as why they
embrace particular kinds of change while resisting others... The firm's strategy
entailed change on a large scale, but the wrong kind of change (pp. 113-4; my
emphasis).
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For the last few years, SEC has been celebrated as an exemplary case that has sustained
path-breaking adaptation (see Fortune, 24 January 2000; Financial Times, 27 March
2000; Business Week, 20 December 1999). The company has disposed of radically old
routines and practices predominant in most of large Korean firms. Before entering a
discussion on the various dimensions of corporate adaptation and learning, this section
tries to explain the recent efforts of the company to sustain radical adaptation and
organisational innovation, by drawing upon various secondary sources and interviews
with middle managers and industry specialists.
Samsung started its business in consumer electronics about 30 years ago. However,
the company emerged as an international player in the electronics industry by virtue of
the surprising success of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) chips since the
early 1990s (see Table 6.1). SEC's DRAMs business has been ranking top in the
world market share since 1992. In 1995, memory chips accounted for 90% of
corporate profits and half of all sales, due to a surge of memory chip demands.
However, this success induced complacency in top managers and workers. More
seriously, such a long run of success in the semiconductor business has tended to give
rise to the predominance of semiconductor executives in senior management, who
represented the 'glamour' side of the business when global demand for memory chips
was strong (Financial Times, 27 March 2000).
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Table 6.1 Market share in memory chips (1998)
.1•" 2"d 3rd 41b
DRAM Samsung (Korea) Micron (US) Hyundai (Korea) NEC (Japan)
2,854' (18.6%)b 1,791 (11.7%) 1,752 (11.4%) 1,694 (11.0%)
SRAM Samsung (Korea) NEC (Japan) IBM (US) Toshiba (Japan)
749 (20.5%) 368(10.1%) 365 (10.0%) 294 (8.1%)
NVO Intel (US) AMD (US) Atmel (US) Fujitsu (Japan)
760(15.1%) 561 (11.1%) 551 (10.9%) 487 (9.7%)
Total Samsung (Korea) NEC (Japan) Micron (US) Hyundai (Korea)
3,790 (15.4%)	 2,243 (9.1%)	 1,857(7.5%)	 1,792 (7.3%)
Source: Dataquest (May 1999).
° US $ million.
b Market share
' NVM: Non-Volatile Memory
As a result, the company's fate had become too dependent upon the risky memory chip
business which has volatile cyclical fluctuations in demand. Nevertheless, the
corporate executives did not pay much attention to other business lines, particularly
consumer electronics which had been suffering profit losses. As a manager of the
management team indicates:
Executives did not give priority to business areas other than semiconductors until they
experienced the 1996 crisis brought about by a great downturn of demand on DRAMs.
Not only did they have less regard for non-semiconductor business areas, but also they
expected that such a crisis could be simply overcome if demand on DRAM resurged
soon (S-2, 07/10/00).
At the end of 1996, when the company situation was getting worse, the chairman of the
Samsung group replaced the leader of the company in an attempt to fundamentally
transform the company in order to survive. The chairman appointed Jong-Yong Yun as
the CEO of the company, who had spent most of his career in consumer electronics and
was in charge of SEC's Japanese subsidiaries for some years before being named CEO.
It is known that the group's chairman had two main objectives in appointing Yun.
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Figure 6.1 Changes in sales and net profit (1995-2000)
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First, Yun was expected to be able to redress the imbalance in business lines by
instigating path-breaking new perspectives, because he was a non-semiconductor
executive who had a long career in consumer electronics. Second, he was expected to
possess a wide-range of knowledge on the restructuring processes of Japanese
companies through years of direct observations in Japan. Yun explains the corporate
situation at that time:
After taking over as CEO at the end of 1996, I stressed that our company must face a
real crisis if I did not fundamentally undertake restructuring right away. Nonetheless,
no one had had a sense of crisis, because they had been too familiar with the cycle of
demand fluctuation on DRAM. They persisted in a received wisdom that such a
crisis tends to occur periodically every 3 to 4 years and in turn a resurgence of demand
would undoubtedly follow. However, I was very worried about that because I had
observed directly that not a few Japanese semiconductor companies had gone down,
owing to that kind of thinking (Nikkei Business, 6 November 2000).
This reflects an evolutionary perspective, seeing that firms are likely to fail to change in
the face of radical change. Inertial pressures, particularly cultural inertia known to
come from an experience of success in the past (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) reinforce
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the firm's routines and practices (Sharfman and Dean, 1997). From 1996 SEC
prospects turned gloomy after the glorious triumphs of 1995, as profits plummeted due
to both the great collapse of prices for memory chips and continued losses in consumer
electronics (see Fig. 6.1). To cope with the crisis, the CEO set out a revolutionary
project to transform the declining company. This project has implications for
understanding routine-breaking adaptation, illustrating a four-stage restructuring
strategy for radical change (Fortune, 24 January 2000):
Stage I. Using chaos to shake up the old structure and practices
Stage II. Deprecating past accomplishments
Stage III. Instilling new values
Stage IV. Stabilising the company
Like LGE, the company, first of all, had to drastically reduce its debts, sell or spin off
peripheral business sectors or those unrelated to its core businesses, cut subsidies to
other affiliates, and cut a third of its workforce. The strategic focus moved to
innovative high-end products and resolutely abandoning market-saturated, low-profit
peripheral businesses. SEC continued to invest over 8% of sales in research and
development, even during the financial crisis. It concentrated most R&D investment
on emerging new businesses, or on its core strengths, such as semiconductors covering
memory and non-memory chips, mobile communications, Digital TVs and TFT-LCDs.
Second, it has been trying to redress the imbalance between business lines with the
intention of reducing excessive dependence on semiconductors. The company
operates three business divisions — semiconductors; telecommunications; multimedia &
consumer electronics — and aims to reach for a third of sales in each (see Figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2 Changes in the proportion of sales by business sector
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Third, the CEO requested senior managers to relinquish obsession with expanding the
market share at the expense of profits. Such practices had remained prevalent as a rule
of competition in the Korean business tradition. To eliminate this, the CEO took a
radical action. As the value of Korean currency to US dollar fell by double after the
financial crisis, the company had a unique chance to export consumer electronic goods
such as TVs and home appliances with a better profit margin. However, the CEO
decided to shut down the plants for two months because so many unsold TVs and other
appliances had piled up in its warehouses. The cost of carrying that inventory was
devastating to the company's balance sheets.
The CEO announced that Samsung factories would not produce goods, if orders were
not in hand with profitability assured. "Shutting the TV plant sent a very strong signal
to the staff", said a director of supply chain management (Business Week, 20 December
1999). The CEO also put it:
The Asian financial crisis was very helpful for our managers to change their attitude
and the way of doing things. In more detail, the crisis made it easier for the
company to overcome initial resistance from managers who A ere used to putting size
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over profits (Fortune, 3 February 2000).
In general, strategic organisational change is likely to be impeded by organisational
resistance and management non-commitment (Eriksen and Amit, 1996). It is
recognised however that such a radical shock, to a degree, enables the company to drop
ill-established management practices. In addition, the destruction of the lifetime
employment convention was a critical discontinuity from the past. 6° Historically, the
Samsung group had strictly forbidden workers to organise labour unions. In turn, the
company tried to avoid potential conflict with employees by paying its people better
than other chaebol companies, as well as by giving them more favourable incentives
such as building a better workplace environment, providing employees with more
opportunities to continue individual learning, offering welfare benefits, and providing
job security. Based on the implicit convention of employment security, the company
had tried to avoid mass job cuts. However, during the crisis, the company faced the
necessity to use redundancies as a critical means of restructuring. Its employment
policy moved from employment stability towards internal labour market flexibility.
Top executives made a decision to abandon the lifetime employment convention.
These followed a chain of mass job cuts in the company (see Figure 6.3). This was
also a radical concept in big Korean firms in general, and Samsung in particular.
Based on these 'unlearning' processes, the CEO commenced to instil new values and
path-breaking ideas into the company. 'Grafting' is a significant way that a company
can use in order not only to learn external sources of knowledge but also to unlearn
obsolete routines. The concept of 'grafting' can be defined as a radical attempt to
imbue new values, new knowledge, and routine-breaking perspectives via recruiting
new people and replacing core personnel in a rational and relevant way. As Huber
(1996: 136) argues, organisations frequently increase their store of knowledge by
acquiring and grafting on new members who possess knowledge not previously
available within the organisation. Thus, grafting may become a more frequently used
60 Interviews with a manager of the management team, Consumer Electronics Division (S-1, 30 09 00)
and a manager of the manufacturing team, Telecommunication equipment plant (S-3, 22/09/00).
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approach for organisations to quickly acquire knowledge that is new to them.
SEC has shown examples of adaptation and learning through grafting. In particular,
the replacement of the CEO in the face of a crisis is of critical importance, because he
has played a central role in turning around a large bureaucratic company. In 1999, the
company changed its human resource management policy, replacing 'pure bloodism'
with 'mixed bloodism'. 'Pure bloodism', embedded over years as a corporate tradition
and practice, meant that corporate managers should be people who began their job in the
company, and not managers and leaders recruited from outside the company. The
company has recognised that such an isolationist practice can no longer be effective as it
tends to retard transformative thinking, creative ideas and dynamic organisational
learning, which may be regarded as an advantage of (cognitive) diversity. To resolve
this problem, the company strives to hire external experts and specialists in their own
fields. For example, the company hired the CEO of a US-based advertising company
as the new head of the Global Marketing Business Division. The company has
recruited highly qualified employees who mostly hold advanced degrees from US
universities. In 2000, the company hired 342 people with advanced degrees — mostly
ethnic Koreans studying in the US, to instil new values and new ways of thinking as
well as to encourage organisational learning and innovation competences. This way of
governing the firm has actively spread into other big companies, particularly its rival
LG. Searching for qualified human resources has become a critical task of overseas
subsidiaries, particularly of US R&D centres.
Bringing together insiders and outsiders is not all that represents the company's efforts
at organisational innovation and the improvement of organisational capabilities. The
power of human resources that the company retains is considered to be formidable
amongst Korea's largest firms. It is well known that the company has made great
efforts to promote technological competences and organisational skills. Despite the
financial crisis, the company has tried to improve organisational competences and
knowledge as well as to mobilise more effectively organisational knowledge by
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reorganising employee training programmes. Since the early 1990s, employee-training
programmes have been run in corporate training centres such as the Advanced
Technology Training Centre (ATTC), the Global Marketing Research Centre (GMC)
and the Centre for Leadership Development (LDC), all of which were established
around the capital region. ATTC focuses on training engineers in the areas of service,
technology systems and software. In the past, the methods of training employees
were unilateral, firm-centred and technique-teaching oriented. As these methods
became no longer relevant, in 1998 the training centre was substantially reorganised
(Korea Economic News, 14 November 1999). Since then, employees receive problem-
solving oriented, on-the-job-training courses, while compulsory, regular training courses
that took place in the central training centre have become significantly reduced. In
doing so, ATTC tries to design trainee-centred, tailored training programmes in
collaboration with the sub-division's education & training teams. In contrast, LDC
and GMC are non-technology employee training centres designed to promote
managerial personnel and marketing specialists. In particular, GMC, which was
established in the early 1990s in order to keep pace with a rapidly increasing
globalisation of the corporate activities, has played a crucial role in promoting local
marketing specialists. GMC has recently focused more on teaching foreign languages
and offering knowledge on marketing strategies and national-specific cultures critical
for overseas marketing.
However, it is significant that the company established a semiconductor university
within the Kiheung semiconductor complex in early 2001. The company employs
more than 900 engineers and scientists with a doctoral degree. Of them, more than
500 Ph.D. engineers are specialised in semiconductor engineering. As one engineer
said:
In Korea, it is clear that Samsung is the strongest link as far as semiconductors are
concerned. However, it is disappointing that the universities' technological
capabilities and educational programmes on semiconductors are not so satisfactory (S-
5, 20/09/00).
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As a technological leader, the company wanted to utilise internal resources and
capabilities to increase technological competences. In pursuit, the company appointed
70 Ph.D. engineers as academic staff at the university and selected 61 young engineers
as the first students. 61 In addition, every year the company selects some engineers and
sends them to academic institutions, mostly US-based universities, in order to give them
an opportunity to gain their Masters or Ph.D. degrees. 62 By offering this incentive, the
company aims not only to give workers a chance to upgrade their individual knowledge
and competences, but also to instil new ideas and new ways of thinking in the whole
organisation.
In short, the company has taken various measures to unlearn obsolete practices and
routines which are regarded as factors hindering organisational renewal. They have
also made great efforts to innovate organisation. Nevertheless, it should be stressed
that the recent radical shocks, such as the crash in memory-chip prices and the financial
crisis, have played a role as an external driving force to make such changes possible.
Such a chain of organisational crises enabled both executives and workers not only to
think seriously about what went wrong but also to have a sense of crisis, with
recognition of the inevitability of drastic reform. In addition, many observers agree
that such radical changes could be realised because the CEO put radical measures into
practice. The remaining sections detail the processes of adaptation and learning sought
by the company in the latest face of radical change.
6.3. Downsizing
In the mid-1990s, as the company faced the continued downturn of semiconductor
profits and the deepened profit loss of the home appliance sector, the need for
61 The intra-firm university is formally authorised as a higher educational institution by the Ministry of
Education and plans to offer all kinds of degrees from first degrees to PhD degrees.
62 The company selected more than 70 staff in 1999 and plans to increase the number to 150 in 2001.
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restructuring was raised inside the company. However, strategic actions for
restructuring were not activated. Since the financial crisis, the government has
initiated, as we saw, a corporate restructuring programme guided by the IMF.
Government intervention became central to the radical moves by chaebol towards
improving management practices and governance structure.
The company took drastic action to cope with the uncertain crisis. As described in the
case of LG, the most critical issue for big firms was to lower their debt-equity ratio to
less than 200%. Downsizing in less competitive or marginal business sectors became a
key response (see Table 6.2). Firstly, the company sold off loss-making subsidiaries
and production facilities. The company sold off AST, a loss-making American
subsidiary that manufactures and sells personal computers for the American market.
In 1995 the company had acquired the American PC maker, once one of the top
American PC manufacturers, with a view to penetrating the US personal computer
market. But, the subsidiary continued to lose profitability for various reasons.
The company also sold off another US subsidiary, SMS, which produced chemical
materials used for manufacturing semiconductors, regarded as a non-core business. In
turn, the company agreed to sell off a domestic semiconductor plant to Fairchild, a US
semiconductor firm in December 1998. As Fairchild agreed to take over all physical
assets, including the factory, manufacturing facilities, business organisations and 1,500
employees, SEC could take advantage of the opportunity to adjust non-core business as
well as to make mass job cuts.
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Table 6.2 Major business downsizing cases (1998-2000)
Forms of downsizing	 Sectors
Sell-off	 SMS (a US subsidiary firm) (1998)
AST (a US subsidiary firm) (1998)
Production base for semiconductors used in electrical power
products (1998)
Spin-off (EBO)
	 Distribution (1998)
General affairs (1998)
Sales unit for computer network systems (1999)
Spin-off (Subsidiary)
	 Light household appliances (1998)
After-sales service (1998)
Refrigerator manufacturing sector (1999)
Word processor software business unit (2000)
Sources: based on Korea Electronics Times; Korea Daily Business
(1 January 1998 — 30 April 2001).
A spin-off strategy also enabled the firm to adjust its business structure and achieve
redundancies. As mentioned in Chapter 5, big Korean firms have made good use of
this strategy as a means of restructuring since the crisis. SEC has promoted spin-offs
of marginal and peripheral business sectors with the use of various incentives (Korea
Electronics Times, 28 December 1998). Thus, non-production units such as
distribution, general affairs and after-sales service have been spun off in the form of
either independent firms or subsidiaries. Although these companies have become
independent companies, they still have a strong connection with SEC, as they supply
services or parts to SEC.
In addition, many products considered to be low-profit, peripheral items, such as small
appliances, audios, VCRs and refrigerators, were transferred in full to either overseas or
domestic production subsidiaries. It is clear that streamlining business organisation is
part of a strategy, which seeks the internalisation of core activities and the
externalisation of peripheral activities. In this context, the company has tried to cut
many household appliance items because of the decrease in profitability due to market
saturation and management failure. As a result of these efforts, over 145 non-core
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business items have been cut in the last three years (Korea Electronics Times, 5 January
2001), reflected in SEC's domestic employment falling drastically from 58,000 in 1997
to 39,000 in 1998.
Some executives and the labour-management council had suggested avoiding turmoil in
the workplace by reducing wages and working hours rather than cutting a significant
number of employees. But, the CEO refused such a suggestion. He argued that there
was a danger of the company collapsing by rescuing 30 % of its workforce and
employment adjustment was an essential process for renewing a company. In July
1998, the company announced a radical plan to complete employment adjustment as
swiftly as possible. This was to minimise the possibility of conflict and workplace
instability. To do so, the company cut 20% of its employment in two months and an
additional 10 0 0 within six months (see Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3 Changes in domestic workforce and sales (1996-2000)
M=I Sales --Workforce
Source: Samsung Electronics Company.
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It is interesting that most workers over 48 left the company in the process of
employment adjustment. Only fifty workers aged over 48 remain, under the executive
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level (Nikkei Business, 6 November 2000). The company thus tended to make
redundant workers who were high-paid, but with obsolete skills. Either workers
retired from the company spontaneously or others were forced to retire with some
monetary incentive.63
Table 6.3 Changes in the number of domestic workforce"
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
R&D 11,900 12,600 11,500 11,000 12,800
(20.1) (22.0) (26.7) (27.9) (29.6)
Non-R&D' 47,200 44,700 31,600 28,400 30,500
(79.9) (78.0) (73.3) (72.1) (70.4)
Total 59,100 57,300 43,100 39,400 43,300
Source: Samsung Electronics Company.
a December 31of each year.
b Non-R&D employees = all workers including production, marketing and business support jobs,
except for R&D workers.
In contrast to the mass job cuts faced by factory workers, the percentage of R&D
workers has significantly increased to nearly 30% (Table 6.3). There has been an
increase of nearly 8°0 compared to 1997. This clearly reflects the corporate strategy,
as the CEO notes:
SEC has continuously invested in all sectors, even during the financial crisis. We
have been investing in digital technology for 10 years, with 2000 engineers. When
external conditions improved, we were able to seize the opportunity, because the
Japanese have been more passive in investments (Financial Times, 27 March 2000).
The company's business strategy is to concentrate on core businesses and newly
emerging business sectors. While taking advantage of its cash-box businesses, such as
semiconductors, TFT-LCDs, Digital TVs and telecommunications, the company will
further concentrate on the Internet and ICTs (Korea Herald, 21 December 1999).
63 Interviews with S-1 (30/09/00) and S-3 (22/09/00).
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6.4. Reform of organisational structure
Since the 1980s, the company has a multi-divisional organisational form, as the size of
the firm has grown and a range of business has diversified. Although the original idea
of the M-form was to reduce excessive burden on the CEO and the difficulties of
effective management in diversified business domains, the firm remained characterised
by top-down management by the chairman of the Samsung group and corporate
headquarters, and disconnection between organisational functions. This is typical of
Korean chaebol. However, this governance structure is considered inadequate by
shareholders and business experts. It has been argued that it not only hinders the
transparency of management but also makes the effective mobilisation of decentralised
competences difficult.
After the crisis, the government and civic groups urged the company to transform the
corporate governance system, dominated and controlled by the owner family. At the
same time, the rapidly changing competition environment required the company to have
a more competitive organisational structure. In this context, the company introduced a
new form of organisation, called the Global Product Manager (GPM) system, in 1998.
In the GPM system an appropriate division takes all responsibilities for product
marketing and operations. The GPM system emphasises the authority and
responsibility of each business unit and the functional integration of production and
marketing by an individual business unit. This decentralisation of decision-making
functions is in line with the 'companies within company' system, which LGE
introduced recently.
Thus, the new organisational structure allows the leader of a business division to take
charge of most managerial functions. The company recognises that since centralised
authority is inconsistent with speed management, devolution is essential for adapting to
constant changes in the business environment. To do this, each business division
established its own strategic marketing team responsible for strategic planning, product
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design and both domestic and foreign marketing.
Part of the company's intention, via transparency, is to abolish a business practice in
which profit-making sectors provide subsidies for loss-making sectors. The company
wants to improve the managerial performance by introducing the new system of
corporate governance. The company believes that this will imbue a sense of crisis in
individual business divisions and encourage them to manage on their own way.
Individual business divisions have to continue organisational restructuring on their own
way, with such methods as downsizing, production shifts and employment adjustment.
In addition, individual business divisions can mobilise and allocate resources and
competences.
SEC evaluates that the new structure of organisation will raise sales and profits by
building independent management practices and maintaining processes of restructuring
towards core competences. Observers see that the tendency towards decentralisadon
of management functions into sub-organisational units is likely to continue further
(Korea Electronics Times, 10 November 1999). Meanwhile, the corporate
headquarters seem to be evolving towards becoming a key control centre. This
involves movement of its role towards the establishment of medium and long-term
corporate strategies to maximise the whole corporate performance, the reconciliation
and coordination of interests and tasks among business divisions and the effective
allocation and mobilisation of resources among them. However, there are some
preconditions. The first is to establish transparency of corporate governance, which
implies the disconnection of ties between corporate management and members of the
founder's family. The second is to sustain the effective mobilisation of resources and
the coordination of tasks between sub-organisations. Thirdly, it is critical that the
corporate headquarters and the corporate leader have an ability to govern different sub-
organisations.
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6.5. Spatial reorganisation of production
When Samsung embarked upon its consumer electronics strategy in the late-1960s, a
former chairman of the group decided to build a large production complex in Suwon
city, near to Seoul. The objective was to save labour and distribution costs by
operating a manufacturing factory in the capital region with large purchasing power and
easy access to an abundant labour poo1. 64 To cope with the possibility of additional
production sites in the future, the company purchased a vast area of land. The
company continued to grow over time and the range of products that the firm produced
expanded. Instead of decentralising manufacturing, the company sought to continue
the clustering of production as well as R&D facilities in Suwon and its surrounding
areas. That is because the company recognised that the capital region was the most
suitable for access to a variety of formal and informal knowledge as well as for
employing qualified graduates and engineers.
Nevertheless, not everything is clustered in the capital region. A few products are
produced in elsewhere. Telecommunication equipment is produced in Kumi, one of
the major industrial clusters in the southeast of Korea, and some home appliances are
produced in the Kwangju plant in southwest Korea. In the late 1970s, the company
took over a government-funded public firm established in Kumi, which made
telecommunication equipment. Thus, the Kumi plant became a production site for
telecommunication equipment. The Kwangju plant was established, in the mid-1990s,
to make electrical appliances such as vending machines, vacuum cleaners and
refrigerators. Products that the factory produces were once made in the Suwon plant.
However, products produced in Kwangju factories are said to be low profit, peripheral
ones. Currently, the company does not pay much attention to home appliances, as this
sector has been losing profitability. The company believes that production lines for
consumer electronics products, in a mature stage in the product life cycle, will be
64 Based on Kang, J. (1996). This book is the autobiography of the former SEC president (Kang, J.,
1996) and includes a detailed description on the locational choice of factories and the firm's technology
catching-up.
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increasingly shifted to overseas plants in general and plants operating in Southeast
Asian countries and China in particular, in order to take advantage of cheap labour costs.
The production shift was initiated by political factors. In the 1996 general elections,
the government and the ruling party forced the company to promote its industrial
activities in non-metropolitan areas, notably less favoured and less industrialised areas,
such as the Cholla province which includes Kwangju city. Another similar case
happened in 1999:
The company is planning to move home appliance production lines in Suwon,
including air conditioners and microwave ovens, to Pusan as a means to cover the
downfall in the local economy resulting from the shutdown of the Samsung car plant in
Pusan. The political context is very similar to the one that motivated the relocation
[of the consumer electronics plant from Suwon to Kwangju] four years ago... The
current move also takes place with the general elections less than one year away
(Korea Herald, 8 July 1999).
Subsequently, the relocation plan was cancelled for various reasons. As one of the
managers indicated:
Local voices in Kwangju and Suwon were very unfavourable. Voices in Kwangju
required the rest of the production lines to relocate to Kwangju plants, while the voices
of Suwon were very reluctant to move them, as you would expect. Together, there
were additional but more critical concerns. First, many suppliers in the capital region
close to Suwon were opposed to the relocation plan. Second, employees who work in
the business units were strongly resistant to moving their workplace. Third,
additional increase in distribution costs resulting from the relocation could be a factor
threatening the recovery of its profitability (S-3, 22/09/00).
The company has tried to reconfigure the role of each production space. Strategically,
activities in high-tech manufacturing and corporate R&D will be concentrated in Suwon
and Kiheung. In fact, all R&D laboratories of SEC are clustered in Suwon (the
consumer electronics division and the telecommunications division) and Kiheung (the
semiconductors division and the Samsung Advanced Technology Centre, a group-wide
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electronics research centre). Meanwhile, there is no R&D function in local plants such
as Kumi and Kwangju. Literally, the company is rigorously pursuing a hierarchical
spatial division of labour. While most core functions, such as R&D, design, marketing
and strategic planning, are managed and operated in the Suwon headquarters, local
plants perform only a manufacturing function. Most recently, the company has
completed a transfer of the printer production line and its managerial function from
Kumi to Suwon. As a manager of the Telecommunication Business Division says:
Since the company decided to promote the printer business strategically as one of the
core businesses, its production line is also destined to move to Suwon from Kumi.
The company understands that this decision can improve efficiencies in terms of
sourcing, assets complementarity with related business units in Suwon and, maybe, co-
location between manufacturing and R&D. In addition, since some production lines
in Suwon plants have been transferred to Kwangju and overseas plants, the company
can make use of existing manufacturing space. My team [the strategic planning team]
has also recently completed the move to Suwon (S-2, 07/10/00).
Meanwhile, the remaining consumer electronics production lines in Suwon have moved
to overseas plants, particularly in China and Southeast Asia. For instance, in 1998, the
full line of VCR production was transferred to an Indonesian plant to lower production
costs, as the VCR business unit had suffered periodic profit losses (Korea Electronics
Times, 26 October 1998). An initial plan was to transfer the managerial function
together with the production line. However, the company decided that core functions,
such as engineering, R&D, planning and marketing, should remain in the Suwon
divisional headquarters. There are various reasons for this. 65 Geographical shift of
conception functions needs movement of a number of domestic employees, but the
majority of employees were reluctant to move to overseas branch and, as a result, there
was the possibility of exit of several staff. The loss of critical tacit knowledge
embodied in individual experiences and competences appears to hamper effective
organisational performance, as it would not be easy to recover managerial expertise
once lost. Second, the transfer of established organisational routines and competences
63 Based on interview with a manager of the management team, Consumer Electronics Division (S-1,
30/09/00).
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may be difficult and time-consuming. Competences and routines constitute a good
deal of tacit and collective knowledge embedded in a certain organisational
environment for a relatively long time (Sachwald, 1998). This means that the transfer
of routines and competences requires a collective learning process via frequent face-to-
face interactions and communications between the domestic staff and the overseas
subsidiary staff. However, such tacitness and collectiveness seem to make it difficult
to copy, or transfer the knowledge to different organisational settings. Considering
these problems, the company came to a conclusion. The leader of the VCR business
unit comments some important spatial issues:
We came to a conclusion that the physical integration of manufacturing and
conception functions is by no means a presequisite, because mus( works ace
computerised and the corporate computer network enables all departments to
connect on-line on a global basis. In addition, we do not think that a geographical
separation between both organisational units subsequently deteriorates organisational
performance, because we believe the members of the staff in charge of conception
functions have retained a high level of competence to solve problems rapidly, even at
a distance. To cover the gap created by geographical disconnectedness, I, as a
leader of a business unit, try to play a bridging role in mitigating the gap between
manufacturing units and managerial and R&D units via frequent toing and froing
between Korea and Indonesia. It is not easy for me to do that. But, I think this is
the best alternative form of organisation when we consider that the overseas
production subsidiary has not yet constructed sufficient competences to carry out
managerial functions (Korea Electronics Times, 26 October 1998).
The leader of the business unit usually works at the Indonesian subsidiary and drops in
at Suwon head office more than every two months to check and coordinate the business
process. According to him, after relocating the production line to Indonesia, the
business has escaped from a deficit in revenue by saving over 30% of production costs
by virtue of the lower labour cost effect and various efforts to improve productivity
(ibid.). Encouraged by this performance, the company plans to continue to shift
production lines for analogue consumer electronics products to overseas plants.
As defined by Dosi and his colleagues (Coriat and Dosi, 1998; Dosi and Marengo,
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1994), organisational routines are likely to play a key role in both coordinating
distributed units of organisations and tasks and solving problems. This implies that
routines established in the organisation constitute organisational competences and
knowledge that are difficult to transfer to elsewhere. The company views that such
competences and knowledge, which have been firmly embedded in the domestic staff
organisation, may not be easy to transplant to overseas branches, particularly the
Indonesian subsidiary, due to learning difficulties. In this sense, it is regarded that the
company has adopted a strategic means to coordinate tasks and solve problems at a
distance via established routines rather than taking a potential risk, which may occur by
radically transposing managerial functions to the overseas subsidiary.
In sum, recent tendencies in production activities are characterised by a deepened
hierarchical spatial division of production and an increase of production overseas. A
central idea in the reorganisation of production is based on the agglomeration of high-
tech knowledge-intensive industries at the industry level and the geographical
integration of core functions at the organisation level. This is focused in the capital
region centring upon Suwon and Kiheung. In other words, on the one hand, the
company intends to make full use of the regional advantage offered by the capital region
in terms of infrastructure and knowledge. On the other hand, the company wants to
maximise the availability of competences and knowledge by centralising geographies of
core competences in organisation. This context is directly linked to the ways in which
the company uses space and place in organising R&D activities.
This example illustrates that SEC strategy on production shift is characterised by a
selective relocation strategy. While high value-added electronics products and
semiconductors will continue to concentrate on production sites centred around Suwon
and Kiheung in the capital region, low value-added consumer electronics products will
be increasingly shifted to elsewhere in Korea and overseas. This is rather different
from LGE which has attempted to promote all domestic plants as core production sites.
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6.6. Domestic R&D activities, learning, and proximity
6.6.1. The co-location of R&D activities and learning
In spite of facing successive crises, the company has continued investing in R&D so as
not to fall behind in international competition. By doing this, the company wants to
master digital technology standards, as well as to lead the next generation of
semiconductor technologies and markets (see Table 6.4). In the context of a rapidly
changing technological paradigm, coping with time competition between firms seems to
be critical for continuous adaptation (Best, 1990). The concept of time competition
emphasises time-to-market speed and the effective use of market specificity. For the
company, like its many competitors, these aspects are important tasks of R&D activities.
Table 6.4 Some indicators of R&D investment
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Investment in R&D a n.a. 1.3 (7.0%)a 1.7(8.3%) 1.6 (6.1%) 1.9 (6.5%)
US Patents 486 (19 th )c 585 (16th ) 1,306 (6 91 ) 1,544 (4th ) n.a.
R&D/rota' 20.1% 22.0% 26.7% 27.9% 29.6%
Source: Samsung Electronics Company.
a Unit: billion won
b Ratio to sales
' World ranking
d	
ofRatio r R&D employees to total employees
Over the last few years, the company has attempted to reorganise R&D organisations or
establish new R&D organisations in order to cope with increasing technology
competition. These tendencies may reflect strategic responses to rapidly changing
markets and technologies. This section focuses on the dynamic change of domestic-
level R&D organisation in the face of the crisis and its implications for space and
learning.
Basically, the company uses a four-layered R&D system (see Table 6.5). SEC has a
similar form of R&D organisation to LGE. However, the distinction between both
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firms becomes clear in terms of its spatial form. All Samsung's domestic R&D units
are clustered in the capital region centred around the city of Suwon (see Figure 6.4).
Central R&D centres are operated by the business division and play a central role in
developing business-specific technology.
Table 6.5 The role and objective of corporate R&D units
R&D unit	 Role and Objective
Group-wide R&D	 Basic and applied research
Centre (SAIT)	 Developing technologies in areas beyond the boundary of
individual firms
—Long-term research projects
—Research on future-technology
Business Divisional	 Focusing on future-oriented products and technologies
Central Labs	 — Searching prospective businesses or products
Developing emerging new technologies
Developing new technologically converged products
—Developing software technologies
—Leading technology standards
Product-specific Labs — Developing new products and technologies
Developing new product models
Source: Samsung Electronics Company.
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Figure 6.4 Spatial distribution of sub-organisational units in SEC
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Apart from laboratories at the main semiconductor production complex in Kiheung, all
other divisional laboratories are located in the Suwon production complex.
Subsequently, each sub-business unit has a product-specific laboratory. The product-
specific laboratory is in charge of the development of brand-new models and quality
improvement related to a specific product. Thus the product-specific laboratory
necessitates frequent interaction and communication with manufacturing-related teams.
However, not all product-specific laboratories are close to the manufacturing plants. If
a factory making a specific product is in the capital region, associated laboratories tend
to be close to the production site. But, factories that are in non-capital regions have to
link with laboratories in the capital region, mostly within the Suwon production
complex. However, there are less numerous.
Interestingly, it is identified that there is a strong tendency of co-presence between R&D
units and between R&D and manufacturing units. As revealed by J. Kang (1996) and
interviews with SEC managers 66 , the company has regarded that clustering of R&D and
production facilities would provide it with some advantages. First, the co-location of
R&D laboratories specialising in specific products is likely to improve the potential of
interactive learning between people and teams involved in different areas of technology
and organisation. The importance of interaction between different R&D teams has
become crucial in the context of increasing convergence between varied domains of
product and technology. Second, the increasing complexity of labour process, ranging
from the development of product and design to manufacturing, may require more
frequent interactions and communications among people and teams engaged in different
fields of expertise. It is assumed that the greater the proximity between people or
teams, the easier the interaction and communication between them and the higher the
potential of interactive communication and learning. In particular, the co-presence of
central and product-specific laboratories, and of laboratories related to the development
and production of a specific product and manufacturing plants, may be more effective
66 Interviews with a manager of the management team, Consumer Electronics Division (S-1, 30/09/00), a
manager of the management team, Telecommunication Division (07/10/00), a manager of Semiconductor
lab (20/09/00) and an engineer of Digital TV lab (08/09/00).
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for coping with a shortened product life cycle. Perhaps the higher the complexity of
the technology and production process, the more involved are the teams and the more
frequent is the interaction and communication between them.
The exceptions are factories that produce telecommunication equipment and some less
value-added home appliances, as mentioned above, which are distant from the main
production and R&D complex in the capital region. Factories in these business units
do not retain R&D function, or even managerial functions like strategic planning and
marketing. They have only the manufacturing technology team. However, they also
need frequent face-to-face contacts with R&D teams when a brand new product reaches
the stage of both testing reliability and manufacturability and in the setting up of the
manufacturing line for mass production. In this case, R&D staff members may spend
many days in the plant to work with the manufacturing technology and manufacturing
teams. 67
There are some difficulties associated with the spatial separation of conception and
manufacturing. According to interview 68 , a concern is less the deterioration of the
potential for learning and innovation than difficulties in communication and
coordination. However, the company does not consider necessarily the transfer of
R&D to manufacturing plants distant from the capital region. From the viewpoint of
the company, the benefits that are offered by the operation of R&D units in the capital
region and the co-location of different sorts of R&D units are greater than the gains
from moving R&D units to distanciated manufacturing units.
As far as innovation is concerned, the company considers that the capital region offers
the better sources of innovation and learning than elsewhere in Korea. In addition, the
geographical clustering of in-house R&D laboratories is assumed to offer more positive
effects for technological learning and innovation, not least in a radical way. Tidd et al.
67 Interview with a manager of the manufacturing team, Telecommunication equipment plant in Kumi (S-
3, 22/09/00).
68 Interview with a manager of the manufacturing team, Telecommunication equipment plant in Kumi
(S-4, 23/09/00) and an engineer of the telecom equipment lab (S-8, 21/09/00).
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(1997) discuss some advantages of the geographic concentration of strategic R&D for
launching major new products and processes. For them, such clustering helps to deal
with unforeseen problems more effectively, since proximity may allow quick, adaptive
decisions as well as the integration of tacit knowledge through close personal contacts.
A senior engineer of TV lab in Suwon supports this view:
Perhaps, the co-presence of multi-tiered R&D laboratories as well as between R&D
and core manufacturing units tends not just to increase efficiency in communication
and coordination by making formal contact and interaction between people and
teams easy. It is also more likely to give workers who belong to different teams an
increased chance of informal personal contacts (S-9, 08/09/00).
Managers interviewed argue that such co-location may influence more or less the
mobilisation of resources and the creation and sharing of intangible assets. 69 The
company is seeking to further intensify the clustering of R&D laboratories. All of the
R&D laboratories which are dispersed around the capital region, including Seoul, will
be moved to the R&D complex within the Suwon production complex by the end of
2001. In addition, R&D laboratories which have recently been established are all
aggregated within each of the main production complexes in Suwon and Kiheung. For
instance, the company most recently founded the TFT-LCD R&D centre within the
Kiheung semiconductor complex. The aim is to bring together in a specific place
people and teams involved in the research and development of TFT-LCD. This is not
only to promote efficiency in the process of R&D but also to mobilise decentralised
technological capabilities. The company understands that such clustering may not
only contribute to mobilising sets of spatially decentralised knowledge among
individual R&D teams but also improve the speed of new product development.
Furthermore, it is expected that clustering will promote the ability for R&D teams to
interact and communicate in different but complementary areas of technology in terms
of technological convergence. In the electronics industry, product development based
69 Interviews with a manager of Semiconductor lab (S-5, 20/09/00) and an engineer of Telecom
equipment lab (S-8, 14/10/00).
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on technological convergence is increasing. For example, the cutting-edge mobile
telecom equipment industry may need to bring together varied technologies such as
telecommunications, semiconductors and LCD, although in the past it was considered
that such technologies had little to do with one another.
However, despite the recognition of the company on co-location, this is not necessarily
to assert that geographical proximity and co-presence between organisational units,
especially between R&D units and between R&D and manufacturing, induce
automatically the increase of 'learning by interacting' and a positive outcome in a direct
way. It should be noted that the co-location strategy is part of strategic attempts that
the company makes to not only promote organisational knowledge and competences but
also to accelerate the efficiency of organisational learning.
6.6.2. Task-force activities, learning and proximity
In 1998, the company established a new R&D centre, called the Value Innovation
Programme Centre (VIP Centre), to manage ad hoc short-term R&D projects. Of
course, it was located within the Suwon complex. The VIP Centre provides an
exclusive space for the sorts of task force teams performing projects which require
boundary-spanning co-working activities on a short-term basis. Those project teams
are largely in charge of tasks associated with new product development, remodelling of
established products and problem-solving.
Thus, many projects undertaken for developing new products and remodelling existing
products are carried out in this centre. In particular, the VIP Centre is seen to be an
appropriative space to develop digitally converged products which bring together varied
technologies, including consumer electronics, semiconductors and telecommunications
(e.g. MP3 and video mobile phones). The reason is that product development projects
like these may call for experts beyond the boundary of an individual R&D team. An
engineer of the telecommunication lab in Suwon:
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An urgent need has emerged to develop products jointly by gathering staff members
involved in a project in an independent space. It is very important to cope with time
competition in the context of the shortened product life cycle, continuous depreciation
in price, and fragmented and rapidly changing customer demand (S-8, 21/09/00).
In this space, members of a task force team carry out all the tasks associated with the
project. Until finalising the project, members of the team work in the project room
within the centre, instead of being based in workplace in the organisation they formally
belong to. Each project team usually has freedom and autonomy in its activity. It
invites internal or external experts for discussion to resolve a certain problem if needed.
All the members of the project usually work together all the time and spend most of
their time in the same place. Quite often, they even sleep in the centre. They can
have a drink, exercise and enjoy entertainment. Everything can be done in this centre.
Their work routines are similar to those of project teams in LGE. However, an
establishment of purpose-specific space is a unique feature of SEC.
For the company, the VIP Centre plays an important role as a specific organisational
place where a one-stop service to promote the efficiency of a research project is
provided. The company reports that the VIP Centre, since being founded in 1998, has
made a critical contribution to innovations in products and processes and the reduction
of development time span (Korea Electronics Times, 25 July 1999). For example, the
company allowed a task force team in charge of the development of an innovative PC
monitor to carry out the project. The team was composed of 25 experts, many of
whom belonged to different teams and departments. The development of the new
product was completed one and a half months earlier than the estimated period of time
for the existing way of doing projects. In addition, since the team lowered over 20%
of the number of parts used for assembly, a 30% cost saving effect on sourcing parts
followed.
What is significant is that the purpose-specific physical space, the VIP Centre, plays a
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crucial role in promoting relational/organisational proximity with the support of
geographical proximity. 7° A project team is composed of members who have different
expertise and belong to different teams, with the advantage of cognitive distance or
variety, possibly clashing with relational/organisational distance. However, in the
course of working together in an independent space, members of the team tend to show
attributes that are common in informal groups, like communities of practice. These are
things established in a group through intensive processes of joint practices, open ways
of communication and mutual efforts to understand each other. In addition, the VIP
Centre is designed as an exclusive place for only the performance of task force activities
and is likely to give many chances to share common interests and knowledge between
members of various task force teams. In this respect, the operation of a purpose-
specific organisational space can be regarded as a critical way to sustain and promote
organisational learning and innovation. In particular, in the case of firms that show
inflexible and hierarchical corporate culture such as SEC, such a space becomes more
an effective means to derive learning and innovation, not least in a radical way.
In sum, it has been identified that the company has been trying to build physical and
organisational milieu relevant to cope with radical transformations in markets and
technologies. In particular, a strategy using the advantages of proximities can be
considered to be one of the significant ways to sustain efficiencies and synergies in
R&D activities as well as in organisational processes centred around R&D.
Although both SEC and LGE have attempted to increase technological competences and
innovations through R&D activities and attempted to make active use of task-force
teams as a means to sustain technological learning and innovation, both are different in
terms of the use of space. SEC has focused more on a co-location of R&D units. In
addition, the operation of physical space designed to increase efficiency of project
activities and the potential of learning between project teams is what SEC is
distinguished from LGE.
70 Interview with an engineer of Telecom equipment lab (S-8, 21/09/00; 14/10/00).
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6.7. Globalisation of R&D activities
As explained in the previous section, the company has continued to strive to construct
technological competences, not only to keep its leading position in businesses such as
memory chips, TFT-LCD and wireless telecommunications, but also to secure its
competitive position in businesses such as the emerging digital electronics technology
and non-memory chips. Much of this has come from centralised locations within
Korea, but it is also involving R&D activities beyond the home base boundary.
Some organisational changes in overseas R&D units have occurred since the financial
crisis (see Table 6.6). 71 There is, however, a tendency for these changes to fluctuate
according to the economic situation. After the crisis, the company immediately closed
down two overseas design laboratories, a US semiconductors laboratory and an Osaka
laboratory in Japan, as a means of streamlining overseas subsidiaries. The company
integrated the function of the Osaka laboratory into the Tokyo laboratory. Originally,
the company had three overseas design centres. Of the design laboratories closed, one
was a European design laboratory in London, UK and another was a US design
laboratory in San Francisco, USA. Thus, the Japanese design laboratory came to be
the sole overseas design laboratory. The Japanese design laboratory had played a key
role in monitoring the product design trends of Japanese makers as well as in learning
and utilising continuously national-specific competences and know-how related to
product design. The company's major export commodities are not just market-specific
household appliances, such as washing machines, air conditioners and refrigerators, but
also non-market-specific electronic parts such as semiconductors and TFT-LCD. In
other words, high-tech products and electronic parts do not require much local
adaptation to respond to local demand and tastes, as claimed by Tidd et al. (1997), and
therefore the company decided to rationalise overseas R&D operations.
Since then, market conditions have been getting better and the company has made a
71 This is based on SEC annual reports (1999, 2000) and corporate release materials (1999-2000).
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strategic decision to strengthen overseas market share in consumer electronics and
telecommunications, such as digital media, mobile handsets and household appliances,
in order to diversify the product portfolio for export. In line with this, in December of
2000, the company reopened overseas design centres that were closed down in 1998.
The aim was both to monitor changing local-market trends and to develop new product
items and design concepts. In more detail, the San Francisco design centre aimed at
researching new product concepts as well as developing market-specific product
designs, notably associated with mobile hand-sets and home multimedia. London's
European design centre sought to monitor European product design trends and perform
basic research needed for developing market-specific product designs.
The company has been trying also to diversify R&D area and geographical scale. In
particular, overseas R&D laboratories have either been founded or reorganised in order
to focus on local adaptation in response to local-specific markets and local-specific
sources of knowledge and technology. The company established a software
development centre in Bangalore of India, in 1996, with the aim of performing research
on the development of software used in telecommunications, home networks and printer
systems. The company has a plan to significantly expand its size and function,
increasing laboratory staff from 120 to 800 by 2002. The reasons are not complex. It
is accepted that India has a great number of highly qualified but relatively cheap
engineers and scientists. In addition, it is known that Bangalore is rapidly emerging as
an Asian version of Silicon Valley. In operating the Bangalore R&D centre, the
company hopes to capitalise on this regional advantage in the form of plenty of human
resources and the circulation of local and extra-local knowledge by virtue of Indian
social networks. Together, the company plans to utilise the centre as a technological
node to penetrate the large Indian market, which is expected to grow explosively in the
near future.
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Table 6.6 Overseas R&D laboratories (SEC)
Name	 Location
San Jose	 California,
Media Lab USA
Dallas	 Texas,
Telecom	 USA
Lab
US Product New Jersey,
Innovation	 USA
Lab
Yokohama	 Yokohama,
Lab	 Japan
Sendai Lab
	 Sendai,
Japan
Research areas	 Estab.
Previously Semiconductor lab (1998 closed) 	 1983
Developing Media technology, notably
digital TV (2000 reopened)
Developing telecommunications technology 	 1997
—Developing North American market-specific
products
Developing new technology on digital
	
1998
consumer electronics and telecom
Analysing on local technological trends
Originally consumer electronics lab
	
1983
—Developing key parts of digital consumer
electronics (1997 reorganised)
Developing core technology of optical disk 	 1995
drive
China Lab	 Beijing,	 Developing CDMA mobile telecom 	 2000
China	 technology for Chinese market
Europe Lab London,
UK
Russia Lab	 Moscow,
Russia
India Lab
	
Bangalore,
India
Israel Lab
	
Tel Aviv,
Israel
—Developing European market-specific mobile 1994
phone
—Developing software used in display
products
—Developing software related to 	 1993
telecommunications
—Technology outsourcing
Developing software related to 	 1996
telecommunication system, home network and
printer
Monitoring technological trends	 1997
—Developing telecommunications equipments
and related software
Continued
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US Design San Francisco, — Searching new product concept	 2000
Lab	 USA	 — Developing product design associated with reopened
mobile phone and home multimedia
Europe	 London,	 — Monitoring European product design trends 	 2000
Design Lab UK	 — Doing basic research needed for developing
market-specific product design
Japan	 Yokohama,	 — Tracking product design trends of Japanese	 -
Design Lab Japan	 makers
— Developing market-specific product design
Source: Samsung Electronics Company.
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Secondly, in 2000 the company reopened the Silicon Valley-based R&D laboratory,
which was closed down in 1998. The R&D laboratory was originally established in
1983 to develop semiconductors technology in San Jose, California. The company
learnt semiconductors-related technology from this laboratory at the start of entering the
semiconductor market. To operate the San Jose-based semiconductors laboratory, the
company hired over 30 scientists and engineers with the help of personal networks
among US-based Korean scientists. 72 Most of them were ethnic Koreans who had
expertise through experiences in the leading US semiconductor companies after gaining
PhD degrees in the US. From the beginning, the company did not want to simply learn
to imitate semiconductor technology. Rather, the company made great efforts to
accumulate and secure an absorptive capacity to develop semiconductor technology by
itself.
One of the major reasons is that Samsung's leaders were afraid that some core staff
would leave to jobs giving better pay and rewards (Kang, J., 1996). To cope with such
a possibility, the company sent 32 young and enthusiastic engineers selected in domestic
laboratory to the San Jose semiconductors laboratory to learn beyond simply learning to
imitate basic principles and applied technology related to semiconductors. 73 Their
training was based on learning by direct investigation, face-to-face instruction and
discussions with local staff in the laboratory, and recursive feedback sessions among
domestic staff every night for a year. Throughout this course of training, trainees were
able to gain a great deal of tacit knowledge embodied in individuals and codified
knowledge, such as research notes. These sets of knowledge became the base of
absorptive capacity and a source of technological competences. After they returned to
the domestic workplace, the company formally established a domestic semiconductor
laboratory centred upon engineers trained in the US laboratory. On the basis of
technological competences built via these efforts, in 1998 the company became the first
72 That is because American scientists and engineers with enough knowledge to develop semiconductors
were mostly unwilling to work in a Korean company that was unknown and had no brand power (Kang, J.
1996).
73 The reason for the company sending 32 engineers was to make 1:1, face-to-face-based learning and
investigating possible (ibid).
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to succeed in mass production of 16Mb DRAM and is now the largest manufacturer of
DRAMs and the fourth-largest maker of all kinds of semiconductors. This story gives
some important clues for understanding how the company has learned technological
knowledge.
According to interviews74, although the company still gives priority to the accumulation
of core technological competences on a domestic basis, it has been also trying to utilise
corporate-wide international technological competences. 75 In this sense, the company
has introduced programmes for knowledge exchange and interactive learning between
domestic lab-based engineers and foreign lab-based ones. Recently, domestic
laboratories have attempted joint activities for knowledge exchange and mutual learning
with overseas laboratories, not least US and Japan-based laboratories, which possess
technological competences in ICTs, semiconductors and digital technology. Based on
this corporate-historical context, the company closed down the San Jose-based
semiconductor laboratory after the financial crisis. The company recognised that
technological competences of the domestic laboratories were competitive enough to
lead the technology. Instead, in 2000 the company established the San Francisco R&D
laboratory which is in charge of the development of Digital TV-related technology and
US market-specific products. To secure a competitive advantage in the Digital TV
technology market, the company strategically formed a multilateral global R&D
network, covering central places in technology and markets, including Korea, Japan
(Yokohama), Europe (London, UK) and North America (San Francisco) (Korea Daily
Business, 9 September 1999).
Third, the company opened another US-based laboratory, called the US Product
Innovation Lab, in New Jersey in 1998. This laboratory is dedicated to the
development of new technologies in digital consumer electronics and
74 Interviews with a manager of Telecommunication Division (S-2, 07/10/00), managers of
Semiconductor lab (S-5, 20 09/00; S-6, 20/09/00) and an engineer of Telecom Equipment lab (S-8,
21 09 00).
75 Pavitt and Patel (1999) show that, in general, TNCs tend to domesticate their key R&D activities and
competences.
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telecommunications and an analysis of local technological trends. Additionally, the
laboratory plays an important role in both searching for US high-tech firms to
collaborate with and in hiring qualified graduates with Masters or PhD degrees in
management and engineering from top-ranked US universities.
Finally, the company opened a Beijing laboratory in late 2000, aiming to develop
market-specific mobile phone and telecommunication equipment for capturing an
explosively growing Chinese mobile telecommunication market. The current project
of the laboratory is to develop mobile telecommunication technology, which is expected
to be the Chinese standard. Though the laboratory started with 60 engineers, the
company plans to make it a large mobile communication laboratory with more than 300
engineers by 2003.
In short, these responses illustrate that the company, like LGE, has made huge efforts to
learn from external sources of technology and knowledge, not only for local adaptation
to local-specific markets but also for access to local-specific sources of knowledge and
technology. It has been identified that the forms of R&D organisation in the company
have been constructed or reconstructed by combining a corporate context and an extra-
corporate context. The contexts and factors can be understood in terms of dynamic
local and global market situations, technological changes, corporate strategies and
competences, and geographical sources of knowledge and competences.
6.8. Inter-firm alliances
This section attempts to understand the recent move of SEC, like LGE, to make
connections with other companies in response to radical change. Before the early
1990s, SEC lacked independent technological capabilities. Major technologies had
largely been imported through vertical inter-firm contracts, such as technology licensing,
joint ventures and OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing). Technology licensing
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and joint ventures had been an important means for the company to learn and gain
advanced technologies and knowledge from leading companies, particularly Japanese
counterparts. In addition, OEM contracts with major players had played a crucial role
in expanding economies of scale as an indirect way of exporting their products as well
as learning know-how and knowledge in a wide range of production and technology.
It is not surprising that, in this period of time, it had been difficult for the company to
have horizontal cooperative agreements with leading firms, since the company had less
competitive resources and competences in technology and markets, with the exception
of the advantage of labour costs.
As the company has continued to grow and strengthen its competitiveness since the
1990s, relatively horizontal and cooperative inter-firm agreements have steadily
increased in some business sectors, such as semiconductors. Furthermore, increasing
competition for market and technology and a global shift towards strategic alliances
between major players (Dicken, 1998) made the company seek to take part in such a
new business environment. In addition, the company has been gaining international
competitiveness since the early 1990s with the help of the success of its semiconductor
business. This means that the company was ready to form equal horizontal
cooperative relationships with leading players by constructing competitive competences
(Kim, 1997).
Table 6.7 shows the major inter-firm alliances between SEC and counterparts since
1998. First, the company has constructed long-term supplier-buyer partnerships with
leading companies in the computer industry, such as Dell (1999, 2001), Intel (1999) and
Compaq (1999). As mentioned, SEC is one of the top players in semiconductors —
notably memory chips — and TFT-LCD. Counterparts want a partner capable of
supplying key parts necessary for making their products on a long-term, stable basis.
Samsung wants to ensure long-term-based buyers to cope with market turbulence and
uncertainty. In addition, Samsung wants buyers to be able to contribute to its facility
investment, because capital goods such as semiconductors and TFT-LCD require
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continuous and large-scale investment to cope with a shortened product life cycle and a
rapidly growing market competition. The most recent agreement between SEC and
Dell illustrates this. The president of the semiconductor business division notes:
Dell is very attractive to us because of the proven ability of its model to quickly
introduce relevant new technology to the marketplace. First-to-market advantage is
critical to our success and Dell knows how to accomplish this by working directly with
its customers (SEC's corporate release, 24 March 2001).
In response to this, Dell's co-president notes:
Samsung has consistently provided us with leading-edge technology for the array of
products we customise and offer directly to our customers... As we broaden our
strategic relationship to also induce R&D activities, we believe we are positioning
ourselves to further extend our ability to meet the evolving needs of those customers
(ibid.).
In fact, since the mid 1990s both companies have maintained a cooperative buyer-
supplier relationship. However, the recent agreement shows that both companies are
developing reciprocal trust in each other, involving further potential for traded and un-
traded interdependencies. Similarly, the company has continued a cooperative
relationship with Intel. Both firms have sought interactive learning and exchange of
complementary assets, particularly technology.
Forms of alliance such as a long-term partnership may require stronger ties and
reciprocal trust between partners than other forms of alliance, such as technological
partnerships, because the former immediately affects corporate profitability. However,
this is not to argue that market-based forms of inter-firm alliance are better for inter-
firm learning than un-traded alliances or that inter-firm networks based on un-traded
interdependencies are more sustainable. Although inter-firm alliances are initially
based on a market contract, if they build social capital such as reciprocity and trust over
time, they are likely to develop collaborative relationships, such as dynamic learning.
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Second, there is an increasing tendency for SEC to take part in multi-company
collaborative alliance groups, encompassing competitors and non-competing firms, in
order to cope with an accelerated trend towards digital convergence. This includes
domains of technology such as ICTs, computer, multimedia and semiconductors. The
boundary between industries has been blurred, and individual firms do not have all the
competences and assets needed for coping with the emerging technologies and markets.
It is thus very important for SEC to enter multi-firm alliance 'champion' groups,
because one of SEC's core business strategies is to secure its competitiveness via
'digital convergence'.
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Partner	 Form	 Area
Intel (US)	 Strategic Digital Still
alliance	 Camera
Microsoft
(US)
Toshiba
(Japan)
Brooks (US)
Strategic PC parts
alliance
Strategic VCR
alliance
Joint	 Semiconducto
venture	 r equipments
Compaq (US) Strategic Alpha chip
alliance
Dell (US)	 Strategic TFT-LCD
alliance
Table 6.7 Major inter-firm alliances (1998,-2000)
Goals	 Date
Joint development of new product 	 1998
Technological cooperation on and	 1998
joint development of PC parts
Mutual supply of VCR parts	 1998
Joint development of key parts
Operating a joint venture firm that	 1999
produces equipments for
semiconductor manufacturing
process automation
[established in Kiheung, Korea]
Long-term supply contract	 1999
Technological cooperation
Samsung -) long-term supply of
	
1999
TFT-LCD to DEL
DEL 4 capital investment in SEC
Micron, Intel Strategic Next
(US); NEC	 alliance	 generation
(Japan),	 DRAM
Infinion
(Germany),
Hyundai
(Korea)
Thompson Joint
	 Defence
	
CSF (France) venture
	 equipments
(50:50)
Microsoft
	 Strategic Mobile
(US)	 alliance	 phones
Joint development of next
generation DRAM
Sharing and mutual exchange of
technological knowledge
Combining Samsung's defence
equipment production operation
and Thompson's technological and
marketing capabilities
Headquartered in Kumi, Korea
Developing Internet mobile
phones
Combining SEC's hardware
technology and MS's software
technology
2000
2000
2000
Continued
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Toshiba,	 Strategic LCD chips for Joint development and marketing	 2000
Optrex	 alliance	 electronics	 of LCD chips
(Japan)	 appliances	 Samsung developing chips with a
built-in memory
Toshiba developing LCD driver IC
Optrex producing modules
integrating the LCD chips
Intel (US)	 Strategic Rambus	 Samsung 4 long-term supply of	 2001
alliance DRAM	 Rambus DRAM to Intel
Intel 4 capital investment in SEC
Source: based on SEC Annual Report (1999, 2000); Korea Electronics Times; Korea Daily
Business (1 January 1998 — 30 April 2001).
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Another critical reason for the formation of strategic alliances between market and
technology leader companies is to dominate global competition for industry standards in
the emerging technology, such as digital broadcasting and home network. This 'co-
win' strategy between alliance group companies is becoming a vital element for
surviving and adapting to a new competition environment. In this sense, the company
has continued to seek cooperative relationships with major ICT companies such as Sun
Microsystems, Microsoft and Intel. Samsung wants to learn and acquire 'software'
technology, while ICT firms want to secure 'hardware' technology.
Third, in a similar context, in June 2000 the company agreed to develop jointly core
technologies for the next generation DRAM in association with market-leading
competitors, including Hyundai (Korea), Intel, Micron (US), NEC (Japan) and Infinion
(Germany). In fact, this type of alliance among technology and market leader firms
has often been found in the semiconductor industry. For example, as the required scale
of R&D investment in semiconductor production rose, Japanese and US-based firms
increasingly formed joint ventures in the 1990s to spread the costs and risks of
developing new generations of integrated circuits (Hudson, 2001: 207). They wanted
to reduce the uncertainties and risks of R&D. More fundamentally, such an exclusive
association between leading memory-chip makers aims at more and more solidifying a
monopolistic power of upper-class firms. They want market followers to drop in the
market by developing new products in advance.
Fourth, the company has sought to forge cooperative alliances in order to secure the
leadership in market and technology by sharing firm-specific technological
competences. For example, a strategic partnership with Intel for the development of a
digital still camera aims to share Samsung's strength in consumer electronics and
semiconductors and Intel's strength in micro-processor chips. Similarly, a strategic
alliance with Microsoft to jointly develop PC parts and Internet mobile phones
combines Samsung's hardware technology and Microsoft's software technology. In
contrast, the partnership between Samsung and Toshiba in the VCR business represents
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a coupling between the two strongest links, intending to strengthen their monopolistic
positions as top leaders in the saturated market. A strategic alliance with Toshiba and
Optrex for the joint development and marketing of LCD chips used in mobile phones
may demonstrate inter-firm division of labour using firm-specific competences between
partners. Toshiba is in charge of developing LCD driver IC, while Samsung is
developing LCD chips with a built-in memory. Optrex produces modules integrating
the chips to supply to mobile handset manufacturers. They expect the partnership to
help reduce the cost and period of product development as well as to contribute to the
mutual sourcing of core parts between partners on a stable basis (Korea Daily Business,
7 April 2000).
In sum, since the crisis, strategic alliances by Korean firms such as SEC and LGE have
been significantly increased. The 1997 financial crisis had a precipitous impact.
Corporate financial difficulties, and the government push to restructure the corporate
sector, resulting from the financial crisis, have forced Korean firms to find a more
radical breakthrough (Yoo, 2000). Strategic alliances are one of the most favourable
ways for them to sustain competitiveness under such pressures. Compared with SEC,
LGE has more attempted to forge joint ventures as a means to sell off assets and
maintain its competitive position in saturating markets. However, it is expected that
Korean firms will focus more and more on horizontal inter-firm agreements with
competitors in order to cope with an increasing global competition in technology and
markets.
6.9. Conclusions
This chapter has explored the dynamics and processes of how SEC has adapted to
radical environmental change. As with LGE, the focus of analysis was on
restructuring and learning. There are some implications for adaptation and learning.
First, since the crisis the company has tried not only to unlearn obsolete practices and
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routines which seemed to constrain organisational renewal, but also to make great
efforts for organisational innovation. It should be stressed also that a series of recent
radical shocks, such as the crash in memory-chip prices and the financial crisis, have
played a role as an external driving force making such changes possible. Such a chain
of organisational crises enabled both executives and workers not only to think seriously
about what went wrong, but also to have a sense of crisis, which entails recognition of
the inevitability of drastic reform. Many agree that such radical changes could be
realised because the CEO put radical measures into practice. Together, a 'grafting'
strategy has been adopted as a way of sustaining radical adaptation and learning, instead
of unlearning old routines. It should be noted that traditional methods of restructuring,
such as downsizing, employment adjustment and change in business structure and
change in organisational structure, have made it possible for the company not only to
unlearn obsolete routines but also sustain discontinuous learning. This is to confirm
that, in the face of radical change, corporate adaptation can be realised by a balance
between restructuring and learning.
Second, in the process of adaptation, territorial sources of learning have influenced the
way in which SEC uses space. The company tends to differentiate competences
between corporate spaces. In particular, it has tended to seek a clustering strategy of
R&D in the core organisational spaces. This has shown that the reorganisation of
production and R&D has critical implications for the context of learning and proximity.
The recent tendencies in production activities are characterised by deepened spatial
divisions of production and the increase of production shifts to overseas. A central
idea in the reorganisation of production is based on the agglomeration into the capital
region of high-tech knowledge-intensive industries at the industry level and the
geographical integration of core functions at the organisation level. In other words, the
company intends to make full use of the territorial advantage of the capital region in
terms of infrastructure and knowledge.
Together with this, the company wants to maximise the availability of competences and
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knowledge by centralising geographies of core competences in organisation. The
company has been trying to build physical and organisational milieu relevant for coping
with radical transformations in markets and technologies. In a similar vein, the
company has sought to take advantage of proximity in the process of adaptation. The
absolute clustering process of R&D illustrates clearly the ways in which the company
makes use of proximity. However, it is important to note that this process means the
company seeks relational/organisational proximity based on spatial proximity. The
company wants to intensify organisational learning capabilities by improving
relational/organisational proximity between heterogeneous R&D groups. As a means
to do this, the company sought spatial proximity based on a co-location of R&D and
production units. The company's concern does not lie in the integration of R&D and
manufacturing, but in the geographical integration of R&D units.
In addition to the internal mobilisation of knowledge and modes of intra-firm learning,
it is evident that access to external sources of knowledge has been made through the
dynamic use of overseas R&D tentacles and inter-firm alliances. This is particularly
crucial in the face of increasing environmental turbulence and industry competition.
These methods were explained in the context of the firm's knowledge base and
competence and the direction of corporate strategy. This implies that firms are not
concerned on specialising specific local knowledge, but on promoting organisational
knowledge and competences by integrating a variety of knowledge distributed within
and without the boundaries of the firm.
Finally, an example of task-force teams has shown that learning communities centred on
task-force teams play an important role in sustaining both incremental and radical
learning. These communities attempt to sustain learning and innovations by
combining tacit knowledge embedded in individuals and teams and codified knowledge.
It is difficult to see incremental learning as the acquisition of tacit knowledge and
radical learning as the acquisition of formal knowledge. Continuous learning and
innovation may need both kinds of knowledge. At the same time, discontinuous
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learning and innovation may require to combine tacit knowledge and formal knowledge.
Whatever the nature of learning, processes of learning represent the process of bringing
together tacit knowledge and codified knowledge.
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Chapter 7
LGE and SEC compared
7.1. Introduction
The two previous chapters have examined in detail the complex and multifaceted
processes of restructuring and learning and their implications for adaptation (see Table
7.1 for a summary). In this chapter, I compare the two firms studied. The
comparison between the two Korean firms is elaborated based on the theoretical
framework explored in chapters 2 & 3. Throughout the whole chapter, an emphasis is
placed on recognising the context specificity of corporate learning and adaptation.
In the following section, I focus on the effect of traditional methods of restructuring on
learning and adaptation. It emphasises that, in the face of radical change, these
dimensions of restructuring can be used as a critical device to sustain learning and
adaptation. In addition, I argue that both restructuring and learning need to be
recognised as on-going corporate responses to radical change in environment. Section
7.3 shows that the processes of organisational change found in case study companies
have involved spatialities and such spatialities of organisational change have
implications for learning. The firm-specific context leads to different processes and
ways of adaptation, particularly in terms of learning, as well as usages of space. This
case shows that distinctive spatial forms of organisation result in variations in
restructuring and learning strategies.
In the next section, I deal with the way in which both firms have attempted to sustain
learning via formal learning channels such as strategic alliances, company training
programmes, in-house R&D and grafting. In the final section, I tackle intra-firm social
learning through knowledge-brokering communities and its implications for learning
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Goals &
Adaptation
Issues
Restructuring
and Learning
Practices
Contexts of
VariationFirm Variations
Abandoning low
profitable &
peripheral
businesses
4 Downsizing by
means of sell-off,
spin-off
Instead, focusing
more on strategic
business areas
Transforming paths
LGE:
Diversification
4 downsizing —>
seeking
diversification
(merger of LGIC)
SEC: diversification
but excessive
specialisation 4
downsizing 4
seeking diversified
specialisation
Difference in
business structure
Learning from
trends in the
industry
Learning from the
past experience
(SEC)
Unlearning thanks
to flexibilised
labour market and
the crisis
Business
structure
To save labour
costs
To capitalise on
increased labour
market flexibility
To facilitate
unlearning
To improving
organisational
knowledge base
Increasing R&D
employees
Decreasing
production
employees
Strengthening
employees training
Promoting
multifunctional
workers
Increasing
temporary workers
LGE:
A bit more reluctant
to make its
employees
redundant than SEC
SEC:
More drastic
employment
adjustment than
LGE
Leading the radical
increase of
investment and
employment in R&D
Corporate culture
Learning from the
past experience
(LGE)
Securing
independence of
individual business
divisions
Increasing
transparency of
management
practices and the
flexibility and speed
in decision-making
LGE:
Production and
marketing controlled
by individual
business division,
while strategic
planning and R&D
by headquarters
SEC:
Most functions
controlled by
individual business
division
Organisational
structure
To adapt to
technology and
market
competition
To strengthen
core
competencies
To improve
profitability
Employment
adjustment
To adapt to a
political pressure
To respond
quickly to radical
changes in its
environment
Corporate
routines and
culture
Contrasting
geographies of
organisational
setting
and adaptation. Especially, it centres on the role of task-force teams on radical
learning and adaptation.
Table 7-1. Summary of the restructuring and learning by LGE and SEC
Continued
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Production
process
To adapt to
global market
change
To decrease
production
costs
To penetrate
foreign markets
Intensifying
spatial divisions
of labour
Intensifying
globalisation of
production base
(Domestic plants
for
technologically
complex products
and high-value
products
Overseas plants
for standardised
products and
local market-
specific products)
Plant-specific
knowledge base
and competencies
in manufacturing
Firm-specific
production and
marketing strategy
Product specificity
(e.g.
semiconductors)
Goals &
Adaptation
Issues
To adapt to
changes in
customer
demands
To increase
manufacturing
productivity
Restructuring
and Learning
Practices 
Introducing new
production
methods
(A cell production
method;
A modular
production
method)
Firm Variations
LGE:
Process innovations led by
the DAD 4 other Divisions
4 overseas plants
Best practices in process
innovation for consumer
electronics
Contexts of
Variation
The DAD's historical
context
(To adapt to
standardized
product technology,
market fluctuation &
increasing labour
costs)
Realising the
standardisation of
parts/components
More active in the
standardisation of
parts/components
Continuous learning
and innovation
activities in its own
way
SEC:
Not examined in detail.
But, best practices in
process innovation for
semiconductors
Unlearning obsolete
practices by leadership
and the crisis construction
Production
sites
LGE:
Decentralised
concentration strategy
Reinforcing in-situ
restructuring in domestic
plants
(Making knowledge-
intensive plants)
While, shifting low-end
product production lines to
overseas plants
SEC:
Selective relocation
strategy
Consumer electronics —
incremental shift to
overseas plants
Semiconductors —
reinforcing domestic
production base
(geographical clustering)
Continued
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Contexts of
Variation
Restructuring and
Learning Practices	 Firm Variations
Goals &
Adaptation
Issues
R&D &
Product
innovation
Little difference in
modes of learning
More aggressive R&D
investments despite the
crisis phase
To adapt to
changes in
technology and
market Each firm is investing
and concentrating
more on its own
strengths
They tend to
emulate each
other (learning
from rivalry)
To create new
product markets
Focusing more on
developing new
technologies for radical
innovation Specificity of
technological
competencies
To strengthen
market position
for existing
products
Continuing incremental
innovations in
established technology
(diversifying product
range & improving
product design)
Each firm tries to
make better use of its
specific technological
advantage
(e.g. LGE: digital
appliances and digital
TVs; SEC: multimedia
and semiconductors)
Difference in
corporate
strategy and
business
structure
Learning by employees
training
Learning by grafting
Learning foreign
knowledge from global
R&D activities and
strategic alliances
R&D sites Intensifying co-location
of R&D labs
To improve
technological
capabilities
To penetrate
local markets
More concentrating
domestic R&D sites in
Seoul metropolitan area
Domestic R&D sites
LGE:
Towards spatial
division of R&D
activities (Seeking
dual R&D system)
Difference in
geographical
setting of sub-
organisations
To learn
territory-specific
knowledge
SEC:
Seeking extreme co-
location of R&D
activities
More concentrating core
competencies in home
base
(as hub of in-house R&D
activities)
Simultaneously, more
intensifying globalisation
of R&D activities (as
complementary sites of
in-house R&D activities)
Overseas R&D sites
LGE:
Continuing
globalisation of R&D
activities despite the
crisis phase
SEC:
Scale down of some
overseas operations
after the crisis 4
Reintensifying
overseas R&D
activities
Specificity of
strategic
business areas
(e.g. Home
appliances
sensitive to
specificity of local
markets)
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7.2. Organisational change as a learning tool
In this section, based on empirical evidence of two case studies, I speculate on the
importance of traditional ways of restructuring as a critical means for firms to learn and
adapt to radical change. Prior to exploring this issue, it needs to mention the role of
the government in making Korean firms put restructuring in practice as this has played a
key role in resulting in similar paths of adaptation between Korean firms since the
financial crisis. From the beginnings of national industrialisation, the Korean
government, as a 'developmental state', has regulated big business firms as a way of
sustaining continuous economic growth (see Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Kang, M.,
1996; Kim, 1996; Whitley, 1992). In the midst of the financial crisis, the Korean
government, like many other Asian developmental states, attempted to regulate
managerial practices and the governance structure of chaebol firms as their survival or
competitiveness was strongly linked to the resurgence of the overall national economy
(Yeung, 2000b).	 This involvement is of critical importance in understanding
dynamically the process and mechanism of recent adaptation in Korean big firms.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the main point the Korean government made to the
largest Korean firms was that they should restructure their operations. As far as the
adaptation issue is concerned, the real signal did not come from change in market
conditions, but from the political pressure from the government and international
organisations. The corporate restructuring programme guidelined by the government
and the IMF required firms to implement the following five tasks: improvement of the
corporate governance framework, enhancement of management transparency,
elimination of cross-debt guarantees, improvement of the capital structure of firms, and
greater concentration in core businesses.
Being the flagship company of each chaebol, both LGE and SEC have been at the heart
of the chaebol reform programme. To adapt to extremely uncertain economic
conditions, the core issue became that of streamlining operations and making decision-
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making more transparent. However, these were not just necessary to meet the
government requirements in a short-term. The transformation of both business
structure and organisational structure was also critical for both to effectively adapt to
increasing market and technology competition in a longer-term. The restructuring of
business structure was expected to strengthen core competencies and improve
profitability and the restructuring of organisational structure to enable them to respond
more quickly to radical changes in its business environment.
In carrying out downsizing, the enactment of new labour laws legitimating labour
market flexibility was of crucial importance because this made it possible for both to cut
large numbers of jobs. As Beck (1998) argues, the labour market reforms were a vital
step to facilitate restructuring which was, prior to 1998, virtually impossible for the
chaebol to lay off workers. The majority of jobs cut affected employees in production
lines and administrative offices, while the number of R&D employees in both
companies has been significantly increased. The link with learning is clear. Both
companies believe that employment adjustment has assisted them with unlearning
obsolete practices, preconditions necessary for effectively accomplishing new learning
practices. But, interestingly, although the pattern and result of employment adjustment
are similar, both companies have shown slightly contrasting features in job-cut
processes. While SEC drastically pursued job cuts, LGE has shown rather a slower
pace. In SEC, the CEO constructed a strong sense of crisis in the organisation and
massive job cuts were driven through organisational consensus created by the crisis
building, helped by SEC's reputation of not permitting unionisation within the company.
Meanwhile, LGE was a bit more careful in implementing job-cut. LGE did not want
to repeat the painful experiences of labour disputes in the late 1980s.
In line with massive job cuts, SEC and LGE streamlined business lines, using
downsizing to not only transform business portfolio into more lucrative business lines
but also to cut many jobs at a time with minimised troubles. However, each company
has shown rather different paths in the transformation of its business structure. Until
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1996, SEC's profit structure had been excessively dependent on its semiconductors
business. However, instability based on cyclical fluctuations in demand of DRAM
seriously impacted the company. The company had to redress the imbalance in
business lines. SEC tried to use the external shock to redress this imbalance.
Downsizing was part of the project to not only lower its debt-equity ratios transform but
also transform a mono-centric business portfolio into multi-centric one.
Meanwhile, LGE formed joint ventures with Philips in the display devices — LCDs and
CRTs — business which was one of the core business lines, to cope with a saturating and
fluctuating global market. As a result, this company has faced a particular dilemma of
adaptation. Its business structure resulted in depending too much on saturated business
lines — white goods — and on still risky emerging business lines — digital TVs and digital
home networks. Thus, this company found it necessary to diversify business lines
again in order to cope with unexpected threats in market and technology.
Consequently, LGE consolidated LGIC (LG Information & Communication Co.), one
of its brother companies in 2000 in spite of criticisms that are concerned about a return
to the obsession with economies of scale and the expansion of size.
Finally, both companies have attempted to restructure organisational structure rightly
after the crisis. It was critical for both companies to not only adapt to a political
pressure to require them to be more transparent and more efficient in the decision-
making process but also to be able to respond quickly to radical changes in the business
environment. Both companies felt the need to restructure organisational structure after
the mid 1990s and tried to transfer partially decision-making authority to sub-
organisational units. However, the financial crisis and the government-led corporate
restructuring programme played a key role in advancing the decentralisation of
decision-making authority. The most significant is that individual business lines begin
to take charge of its business lines, while headquarters play a central role to establish
company-wide long-term strategies, coordinate sub-organisational units and monitor
their performances. Both companies called it 'companies within a company'.
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However, there is a contrasting feature between both companies. For LGE,
organisational decentralisation is centred on productive activities and the control of
some strategic planning function and R&D function remains in corporate headquarters.
Meanwhile, SEC decentralised its most functions, ranging from R&D and strategic
planning to productive activities. It seems that these consequences reflect differences
in existing corporate routines and culture as well as the geographical setting of
organisational units.
These restructuring paths illustrate that ways of restructuring could play a critical role as
a learning and adaptation device. Facing the need for discontinuous learning in
response to radical change, such restructuring practices could become a precondition for
firms to sustain continuous adaptation, as discontinuous learning requires to unlearn
obsolete routines.
7.3. Spatialities of organisational change and learning
One of my findings drawn from evidence of empirical study is that the processes of
organisational change found in both companies have involved spatialities and such
spatialities of organisational change have implications for learning. As multi-
divisional firms as well as multinationals, both companies appear to have decentralised
forms of organisation on both a national and a global scale. This means that these
firms may face a need of effectively managing decentralised competences within and
without boundaries of the firm.
Both companies have displayed some interesting geographical implications in the
restructuring of production activities. They have not shown dramatic features such as
a factory closure in the process of production restructuring. Instead, they have focused
more on in-situ restructuring through the partial shifts of production lines. They have
been more and more intensifying international divisions of labour in productive
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activities. Since the crisis, both companies, basically, have tended to promote
domestic plants as a focal site of global production networks. Thus, domestic plants
have been focused more and more on producing more technologically complex and high
value products, while existing production lines centred on standardised consumer
electronics products have increasingly been being shifted to overseas subsidiary plants.
There have also been found some distinctive features in geographies of the restructuring
of production activities between the two. LGE has taken a decentralised concentration
strategy. On the one hand, this means that production activities have been increasingly
globalised, while production activities of strategic core products such as digital
electronics products have remained in domestic focal plants. On the other hand, this
strategy can be expressed as the selective globalisation of production activities.
However, the company plans to shift even such high-tech products to overseas if
overseas plants based in China and South East Asian countries establish knowledge
base enough to produce high-tech products.
Meanwhile, SEC has taken a selective relocation strategy. This company has been
incrementally shifting some of consumer electronics business lines — for example VCRs
— to overseas subsidiaries in South East Asian countries. However, this company has
been more reinforcing an expansion of semiconductors production facilities in domestic
production sites around Kiheung, the world's largest semiconductors production
complex, with the exception of foreign investments to penetrate trade barriers. The
reason for this is that the company sees the domestic semiconductors plants as best
performance plants that possess a great deal of tacit knowledge which may be difficult
to be transferred to outside of the home base.
Moving on, both companies have also used geography for learning in R&D. The most
significant is that both companies have sought the globalisation of their in-house R&D
activities. It is important for them to improve overall technological capabilities and
harness and learn territory-specific information and knowledge. But this also has
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become increasingly important to penetrate foreign markets. However, in spite of the
increasing globalisation of R&D activities, R&D sites at home base have remain as a
hub of global R&D networks. Both companies have concentrated core competencies
in the home base. Thus, many of foreign R&D centres function as a complementary
site rather than replacing home base R&D functions. However, both companies have
shown more or less distinctive responses to globalisation of R&D activities. LGE
decided to continue investments to maintain and expand its global R&D networks
despite the crisis phase. LGE needed to continue and expand foreign R&D activities
because its main profit sources come from consumer electronics products which are
more sensitive to specificities of foreign local markets. Meanwhile, SEC decided to
close some overseas operations immediately after occurring the crisis. This company,
however, has begun to re-intensify investments in foreign R&D activities after the
financial turmoil situation became calm down. The partial reason is that SEC believed
that remaining R&D functions are capable of replacing or complementing R&D
functions carried out by foreign R&D laboratories closed down.
As opposed to LGE, SEC has concentrated more on a co-location of R&D functions in
Suwon and its surrounding areas, belonging to Seoul metropolitan region. As most of
its plants have been clustered in Suwon and its surrounding areas from the beginning,
R&D has been easy to interact with manufacturing. This company has again
attempted to move remaining R&D laboratories, which are scattered around Seoul
owing to insufficiency of spaces in its Suwon industrial complex, into Suwon as some
production lines have shifted into overseas subsidiaries. It can be said that this
company seek an extreme co-location strategy.
Considering the above, the reason why both companies have revealed differences in
spatial processes of organisational change in production and R&D is related to the fact
that both companies have different spatial forms of organisation. The corporate use of
place-bound resources is associated with capabilities to have access to and learn both
informal and formal sources of knowledge. Firms characterised by decentralised
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forms of organisation may try to use space and place in the course of adaptation and
learning, because individual spaces and places represent distinctive potential for
learning and innovation. In this sense, it appears that each company has tried to
improve the potential for learning through reorganising and reconfiguring a given form
of organisation. The feature of both companies as spatially decentralised
manufacturing firms in both domestic and global scale gives a critical implication for
organisational and technological learning in the domain of R&D as well as between
R&D and manufacturing.
Although both companies display decentralised spaces of organisation in the domestic
level, the actual characteristics of the space of governance are distinct. Samsung
shows an absolute concentration of core functions and units, whilst LG presents spatial
separation among organisational units and business divisions. In the course of seeking
radical adaptation, Samsung has tended to deepen clustering of almost all core activities
such as R&D and managerial functions and core manufacturing plants. It has tried to
maximise efficiency of coordination between different units of organisation and the
potential for interactive organisational learning between different R&D teams and
between R&D, manufacturing and other managerial functions via close physical
proximity and an increased potential of organisational proximity.
Meanwhile, in LG, the spatially dispersed multi-divisional form of organisation
challenges the mobilisation of distributed knowledge and competence. Core in-house
R&D laboratories are distant from sites of focal manufacturing plants, which each site
belongs to an independent business unit. In line with this, in-house R&D laboratories
are dispersed by business unit and between central laboratories and product-specific
local laboratories. The challenges are to improve the potential of localised learning as
well as simultaneously to continue to manage an effectiveness of interaction,
communication and learning between R&D and manufacturing. To do this, core R&D
activities continue to move to the corporate R&D complex in Seoul, whilst R&D
activities necessary for close linkage to manufacturing activities remain in focal
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manufacturing plants. The former is not only to have access to sources of knowledge
and competence embedded in the capital region but also to promote effectiveness of
interactive learning between different R&D teams and units, based on the increased
potential of organisational proximity through the spatial clustering of core R&D
activities. In contrast, the latter is to maintain or improve an ability to mobilise and
learn distributed sources of knowledge within the whole organisation via organisational
proximity based on the spatial and functional integration between R&D and
manufacturing.
It is common that both companies continue to concentrate more and more their (core)
R&D competences in the capital region around Seoul. Upper-tier cities, notably
globalised metropolitan areas, have advantage of knowledge because they contain rich
sources of knowledge that constitute constellations of a variety of codified and tacit
forms of knowledge, on the basis of diversity and intensity of networks (Amin and
Thrift, 2001). Without doubt, in Korea the capital region offers a superior potential for
allowing firms in need of multiple sources of knowledge to have access to formal
sources of learning such as producer service firms, top-class universities and public &
private research institutions as well as informal sources of learning such as a superior
chance of easy and frequent-contact to scientific communities and intelligent brain
pools. 76 In addition to this, both companies are concerned about the ways in which the
spatial decentralisation of R&D activities gives rise to the difficulty in maintaining and
mobilising the sources of intellectual knowledge in R&D. This concern is evident in
Blanc and Sierra (1999) arguing that the decentralisation of R&D activities entails a risk
of capability fragmentation.
76 See for example Park and Nahm (1998) on the increasing concentration of managerial and control
functions and producer service firms into the capital region.
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7.4. Formal learning in adaptation
As explored in case study chapters, both companies have attempted to innovate
processes and products as a means to cope with increasing global competition in
technology and markets. For manufacturing firms, the centrality of technological
learning may lie in effectively sustaining both incremental and radical innovation in
process and product: an incremental innovation as the refinement and improvement of
existing processes and a radical innovation as the development of new processes or
products which requires different routines from the old ones.
Before and after the financial crisis, LGE has attempted to set up new production
methods to build up a flexible mass production system. However, it was to
complement mass production rather than replacing it. Although I could not explore
process innovations in SEC in detail, I have found some clear evidence from secondary
data and interviews that SEC has also made great efforts to sustain innovations in
process (e.g. inventory cost-saving). The economic crisis has resulted in a radical
decrease in demand in both domestic and global markets. Therefore, both companies
have had to make more effort to sustain process innovations in order to save costs and
improve productivity.
These process innovations have been possible because both companies have been
prepared to innovate production processes and draw on codified and tacit forms of
knowledge to sustain such process innovations. Especially, this was evident in an
example of LGE. The company have accumulated knowledge, necessary for process
innovation, in the form of skills, know-how as well as codified knowledge as the result
of experiences, experiments and trial and errors for a long time. Such knowledge has
become a basis for absorptive capacity which makes process innovations possible.
This case indicates that innovation cannot occur without knowledge bases accumulated
within the firm and learning processes are context-specific as well as firm-specific.
This argument would become much clear by considering the following case.
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LGE has paid more attention to the standardisation of parts/components than other
domestic rivals, in order to lead process innovations in production lines for consumer
electronics. Among other things, the DAD (the Digital Appliance Business Division)
has played a leading role as a source of knowledge and innovation, as far as production
activities are concerned. The reason is that this business division has been dedicated to
the production of technologically standardised white goods, which represent relatively a
low entry barrier in its industry. To adapt to such pressures as market fluctuation,
increasing competition and an increase in labour costs, this business division thus must
have focused more on both improving productivity and saving production costs than
other business lines. In addition, according to interviews, this business division,
compared to other business divisions, has traditionally been known as distinctive
organisational culture with strong organisational identity and consensus. It is said that
such an organisational proximity has made much contribution to leading process
innovations.
An example of process innovations by LGE gives some critical implications for the
theory of learning. First, process innovation is characterised by complex learning
processes in which a variety of people and organisational units are involved. Second,
such learning involves the processes of bringing together tacit knowledge and codified
knowledge. Finally, assets of knowledge established as a result of evolutionary
learning can be a critical source of knowledge for radical learning and innovation.
Together with process innovation, product innovation is also an important element of
technological learning. Both firms have made great effort to both continue product
innovations and strengthen technological competences in order to cope with an
increasing market competition. They tended to slightly reduce investments in R&D
during 1998 after the financial crisis. Thereafter, however, both companies, in spite of
facing a severe economic downturn, increased investments in R&D. There are some
reasons for this. Firstly, Korean firms expected that the Asian crisis would not last
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long. Secondly, and more importantly, they thought that the only way to overcome
economic depress was to create new market niches through continuous technological
development and product innovation. Thirdly, they were anxious not to lose their
competitive positions in a cutthroat competition for emerging digital electronics markets
between global leading electronics firms.
Therefore, they have been focusing on developing new technologies and products for
radical innovation. At the same time, they have been striving to continue incremental
innovations in established technology through diversifying product range and improving
product design. To sustain this goal, both companies have tried to raise organisational
and technological competencies by using a formal means of learning. First, a radical
increase of inter-firm alliances has been the most significant feature. Both firms have
aimed to not only learn technological knowledge existing in diverse forms from alliance
partners and share it with them, but also cope with instability and unpredictability in
market and technology by cooperating with industry leaders. Second, both companies
have focused more on employees training. For this, they have attempted to not only
activate off-the-job-training such as the operation of a corporate university and MBA
courses and the support of employees studying inside and outside of the country but
also to promote on-the-job-training. Third, both companies have attempted to improve
competencies, instil new insights and ideas and unlearn obsolete practices and routines
by recruiting well-educated doctoral graduates studying overseas and industry veterans
who have worked in leading foreign firms.
Although there is little difference in formal learning practices between the two, some
differences can be noted. In fact, SEC has been known as a Korean company taking
best advantage of 'learning by grafting' and employee training. The domestic rival
firms, including LGE, have tended to learn and emulate from SEC. However, this is
not to say that LGE always follows SEC. In recent years, each has attempted to make
better use of its specific technological advantage and strengthen core competencies.
For example, LGE has focused more on digital appliances and digital TVs, while SEC
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has focused more on multimedia and semiconductors. Each company's technological
learning practices reflect such a tendency.
In sum, these formal learning methods include strategic alliances, in-house R&D
activities, employee training and grafting. Methods of learning such as strategic
alliances, the search of foreign knowledge through foreign R&D activities and grafting
provide firms with a good opportunity to access and learn valuable information and
knowledge, while those such as in-house R&D and a variety of employee training
programmes can play a role in improving organisational knowledge and competences
further, generating new knowledge and disseminating such knowledge within the firm.
Finally, and most importantly, these means of learning can be crucial to sustain radical
learning and innovation such as the development of new processes or new products as
radical learning, in many ways, necessitates new knowledge or knowledge outside the
firm as well as different way of doing things.
7.5. Social learning in adaptation
There is no doubt that formal learning channels, like those described in the above
section, are important for firms to learn and adapt in a radically changing environment.
It is hard to see, however, that they are a sufficient condition to sustain learning and
adaptation. In this sense, an understanding of social learning taking place informally
within and beyond the firm gives critical insights into unveiling actual learning
processes as well as the sources of learning.
In my case studies I could not fully clarify the detailed processes of social learning. In
addition, it would not be possible to statistically measure the extent to which
communities of practice contribute to creating knowledge and sustaining learning.
Nevertheless, case study firms have shown clear evidence to represent the importance
and role of social learning in sustaining learning and adaptation. Especially, the study
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of LGE shows that some radical innovations have been achieved as a result of in-depth
communications and frequent interactions between workers. Both companies are
characterised by hierarchical organisational cultures and a lack of slack and these
cultural and institutional characteristics appear to restrict the possibilities that
communities of practice are activated.
To overcome such limitations to learning, in recent years, both companies have tried to
facilitate non-formal social learning as a means to encourage learning-oriented
organisational cultures between peers, and between boundaries of sub-organisations as
well as to sustain both incremental and radical learning and innovation. It is a good
example that LGE has made efforts to create and facilitate knowledge-brokering
epistemic communities not only to encourage the creation and sharing of knowledge but
also to solve in informal way the emerging problems facing the firm in the long-term.
More than anything else, it is most significant that both companies have attempted to
take full advantage of task-force teams, aiming to sustain both incremental and radical
learning as well as to solve a certain problem.
In LGE, task-force teams are either spontaneous or strategic. While self-organising
spontaneous task-force teams tend to contribute to incremental innovations, strategic
task-force activities are expected to sustain radical innovations. Recently, the
company has strived to support task-force activities that communities of practice
organise spontaneously. Compared to LGE, it is noteworthy that SEC operates a
purpose-specific physical space, called the VIP Centre, designed to promote an
efficiency of task-force activities as well as communications and interactions between
task-force teams. In sum, these examples represent that learning communities play a
critical role in sustaining both incremental and radical learning and adaptation. In this
sense, to understand firm learning and adaptation, we need to consider the processes and
mechanisms of social learning occurring within and beyond the firm.
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7.6. Conclusions
This chapter has presented the comparative accounts of the main findings on the
pathways to Korean firms' learning and adaptation in the face of radical change. In
recent years, the centrality of an interpretation of corporate adaptation and success has
radically moved from the restructuring-based approach towards the learning-based one.
There is no doubt that competence and learning-based approaches offer critical new
insights into an understanding of the processes and variations of adaptation and
evolution. However, the evidence drawn from an empirical study on Korean firms
represents that an interpretation of corporate adaptation needs to speculate more on the
processes of corporate restructuring. To adapt to radically changing environment,
firms are necessary to focus not only on sustaining radical learning but also on seeking
on-going restructuring.	 It should not regard ways of restructuring based on
organisational change as merely a reactive means of adaptation. 	 Instead,
organisational change can be important as a learning tool. This interpretation
illustrates that continuous adaptation and evolution is likely to depend on a firm's
capability to effectively sustain restructuring and learning by monitoring changes in
internal and external environment.
Second, for empirical research, firms create and reorganise their own organisational
spaces. Multilocational and multinational firms that have the decentralised
geographical forms of organisation need to strive to mobilise distributed knowledge and
competences within and beyond boundaries of the firm. The shifts of production and
the globalisation of R&D activities reflect the local-specific sources of knowledge and
competences. Korean firms have chosen a strategy of co-locating R&D units in a
certain geographical area as a means to promote relational/organisational proximity
which is seen to influence a learning capability. In the context of learning, another
important aim is to access to places that are replete with valuable information and
knowledge and thereby to make good use of a place-specific advantage.
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Finally, corporate learning channels are diverse. Formal learning channels include
inter-firm alliances, company training programmes and 'grafting'. These are of critical
importance in not only learning knowledge outside the firm but also in improving
knowledge and competences within the firm. On the other hand, as explained earlier,
learning based on knowledge-brokering communities can be a driving force of both
incremental and radical innovations. Korean firms are expected to focus more on
sustaining both incremental and radical learning in order to adapt to rapidly changing
environment by taking advantage of formal as well as informal methods of learning.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1. Introduction
In the wake of the Korean crisis, most Koreans and foreign observers raised a question.
Will Korean chaebol, or big firms, survive? The question I have raised, following
institutional and evolutionary perspectives, is how they have responded to radical
environmental changes since the financial crisis? It would be difficult to say that
evidence from two Korean firms represents a general perspective on radical learning.
However, my research on two of Korea's flagship companies provides some valuable
insights into theoretical questions concerning learning and adaptation.
First, corporate adaptation involves firm-specific and complex organisational processes.
This implies that deterministic and totalising explanatory frameworks cannot specify
how adaptation might be realised within firm-specific and wider socio-institutional
contexts. The paths of corporate responses to a certain environment cannot be
explained as logically elaborated in textbooks or a certain theoretical position. The
case study has shown that the paths and mechanisms of corporate responses to adapt to
the crisis have been influenced by context-specific factors.
Processes of corporate adaptation have been realised through restructuring and learning
practices of various forms. These include not only non-learning-based restructuring
methods such as changes in business structure, organisational structure and employment
but also various non-technological and technological learning practices. A theoretical
implication is that the evolutionary and competence-based approach to the firm has
tended to focus too much on learning as a factor that influences corporate evolution and
adaptation. The empirical research has shown that traditional restructuring methods
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have been of paramount importance for both short-term and longer-term adaptation —
even more critical for longer-term adaptation. Traditional restructuring performances
have influenced effectiveness of other forms of learning practices. Downsizing and
change of business structure offered Korean firms a basis for sustaining new learning
and innovations in product and process. Thus, an understanding of corporate
adaptation needs to incorporate heterodox positions such as a learning perspective, a
restructuring perspective, innovation system studies, business system research and a
political economy perspective.
In the following section, I argue that the paths and outcomes of corporate adaptation
may vary according to specificity of organisational contexts. In section 8.3, I
challenge fashionable perspectives on theories of the firm and geographies of learning,
which tend to fetishise learning in explaining continuous adaptation and long-term
evolution. Instead, I suggest that restructuring is also an indispensable process for
continuous adaptation in the radical context and argue that both learning and
restructuring should be integrated in a common perspective. In section 8.4, I claim
that a learning perspective needs to consider all forms of knowledge and learning in
understanding complex dimensions of learning. The last section deals with the role of
proximity in sustaining learning and stresses that learning in the firm occurs on the basis
of the dialectic relation between spatial and relational/organisational proximity.
8.2. Specificity of organisational context and adaptation
Organisational processes for adaptation and paths to adaptation are likely to present
firm-specific characteristics. Thus, firm-specific contexts lead to distinctiveness in
adaptation and evolution between firms with similar industry and institutional contexts.
There are a variety of factors that make corporate adaptation context-specific. Those
include the firm's evolutionary trajectory and path-dependence, leadership, business
strategy, characteristics of organisational knowledge and competences and the (spatial)
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forms of organisation.
Each firm has shown distinctive aspects of adaptation. Although LGE and SEC, as
part of Korean chaebol firms, share common attributes of the national business system,
both have different evolutionary trajectories. In more detail, they illustrate difference
in organisational routines, leadership, business structure, (core) competences,
organisational structure, and its spatial form.77
The example of Samsung shows the importance of leadership in breaking path-
dependence and seeking new ways of adaptation. The difference in the characteristics
of business structure between firms leads to different ways of adaptation strategies.
This aspect is critical to understand firm-specific pathways to adaptation through
different strategies and ways of restructuring and (technological) learning.
Organisational structure and its spatial form influence the effectiveness of decision-
making and learning as well as the firm-specific ways of mobilising sets of knowledge
distributed in organisation. However, it is clear that the nature and characteristics of
knowledge and (core) competences embedded in individual firms become a key factor
that leads to distinctive processes and ways of adaptation and learning. Consequently,
these dimensions imply that processes and mechanisms of adaptation should be
understood by considering multiple organisational variables that exist in an individual
firm.
8.3. Indivisibility of restructuring and learning
Much of the recent literature on organisational change, innovation and competitiveness
tends to claim that organisational learning and knowledge accumulation is the single
77 Some scholars, such as Kotter and Heskett (1992), Hodgson (1999), Schein (1992), and Schoenberger
(1997), attempt to understand such differences from the context of corporate culture. As an approach to
corporate culture, however, may need un-packing of the firm based on longitudinal and in-depth survey, it
frequently find it difficult to know that.
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pathway to long-term corporate success and competitiveness. This thinking should be
reconsidered. First, organisational changes and processes of adaptation are not
discontinuous or simple processes, but on-going. Second, corporate responses to
environmental change are influenced by both internal inertia and resistances and
external challenges. In a relatively stable environment, the evolution of the firm might
be sustained by existing ways of doing things and routine learning. But, to survive and
evolve in a radical context, firms are required to draw on more complex responses.
In Korea's largest electronics firms, corporate restructuring has been an essential part of
the response to adapt in the face of the crisis. The traditional ways of corporate
restructuring involving downsizing and streamlining seem to be crucial for short-term
recovery as well as long-term evolution. Restructuring is not only a precondition to
recover a reliable corporate financial structure, but it becomes a foundational element
that makes 'learning to adapt' possible. In spite of the long-felt need for restructuring,
both companies had not tried to do so until the economic crisis. In part, this was due
to organisational lock-in and inertia. However, external pressures such as the financial
crisis and the government push to lead corporate restructuring ignited restructuring.
This implies that ways of restructuring that are generally assumed as a corporate
strategy centred upon saving costs should not be simply read as pathways to weak
competition. Processes of restructuring centred on business downsizing and
redundancies have provided firms with a chance to learn radically to adapt as well as to
improve core competences. In other words, the Korean evidence shows that routine-
breaking learning can be more effective when corporate restructuring is pursued
coherently on the basis of the strategic orientation of the firm.
Therefore, I argue that both restructuring and learning should be treated as indivisible
requirements for continuous adaptation and the long-term survival of the firm. In this
sense, the recent literature that accentuates simply learning as a key process for
successful organisational evolution is partial. The evolutionary dynamics of firms
226
involve complex organisational processes and mechanisms that bring together learning
and restructuring. In this sense, firms need to continue restructuring and learning
practices in a continual basis in order to adapt to instability and unpredictability in
market and technology. The balanced combination of restructuring and learning
practices enables the firm to improve its adaptability on both short-term and longer-term
bases. If a firm focuses on simply the improvement of learning capability without
carrying out restructuring in a relevant way, it could be caught in a competence trap.
Conversely, if a firm focuses on simply implementing restructuring programmes with a
lack of learning practices, it could be also difficult to gain competitiveness. These
both aspects are important for corporate adaptation and continuous evolution, because,
as argued by Amin and Cohendet (1999), more crucial is to learn to adapt rather than
learning to learn.
8.4. Indivisibility of incremental and radical learning
The result of the empirical studies shows that large firms seek to sustain adaptation
through complex ways of learning using multiple forms of knowledge and across
multiple organisational spaces. It challenges the existing view stressing powers of
(local) tacit knowledge and incremental learning in sustaining competitive advantage
under environmental uncertainty (e.g. Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a, 1999b).
The issue here is about the relationship between knowledge and learning. In reality,
the nature of learning that takes place in a firm is closely associated with the nature of
competition in the industry and the characteristics of the business environment. In a
relatively stable environment, firms may secure competitive survival through
incremental improvements in product and process. This implies the promotion of tacit
knowledge such as skills and know-how based mostly on learning-by-doing. However,
in a complex and unpredictable business environment, dependence on only incremental
learning would make a firm's survival difficult to assure. Thus, in the context of
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radical change, firms need to develop more strategic and dynamic learning.
In my study, both companies seek to adapt to radical environmental shifts via strategic
ways of learning such as in-house R&D activities and inter-firm alliances as well as the
facilitation of informal and formal learning within the organisation. Rapid
technological changes and accelerated technological competition have forced the
company to mobilise internal sources of knowledge and competence as well as to link to
external sources of knowledge, to improve technological knowledge and capabilities.
In the course of pursuing learning, it is clear that some knowledge and routines hindered
continuous adaptation. However, this is not to imply that strategic learning must
replace the existing base of knowledge and routines with a new knowledge base.
Established knowledge and routines have played a critical role in sustaining strategic
learning. In this sense, an argument that assumes a strict dichotomy between codified
and tacit knowledge as well as between the established base of knowledge and new one
does not help to understand complex ways of learning undertaken by the firm in the face
of radical change. 78 As argued by Allen (2002), innovation and learning are not just
about the formalisation of previously unstated ways of doing things, but also involve an
interplay between tacit and codified knowledge as well as a combination between
established knowledge and new knowledge.
In addition, corporate learning can occur through not only strategically designed
learning communities such as epistemic communities and task-force teams but also
through unconscious learning between workers and between people across the boundary
of the firm. These sorts of learning in the firm can play a vital role in sustaining both
incremental and radical learning. In the case of Korean firms, the task force (or
project) teams which can be viewed as a strategically designed, purpose-specific,
learning group make a critical contribution to leading organisational and technological
innovations. The task force teams tend to be organised for taking advantage of the
benefits of spatial and organisational proximities. Learning in the task force team can
78 See for example Allen (2000), Amin and Cohendet (1999b), Asheim (1999) and Howells (2000) for
arguing the inseparability between codified and tacit knowledge.
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be effective as creating `ba', a context in which knowledge is shared, created and
utilised via intensive interactions between project team members (Nonaka and Konno,
1998; Nonaka, Toyama and Konno, 2001). These team members who possess
distinctive expertise and skills are assembled from within and without the firm. They
also undertake their projects through co-location as well as across places (Grabher,
2002; Bengtsson and Soderholm, 2002). The nature of their activities presents
networks of relations through relational/organisational proximity beyond bounded
places. As a result, this kind of organisational form may to a greater or lesser extent
function as a boundary spanning learning object.
Finally, it should be noted that, in both firms, 'grafting' has been adopted as a critical
way to learn new knowledge, mostly tacit knowledge embodied in individuals as well as
to sustain radical adaptation through discontinuous learning. Although both firms
have strived to make good use of 'grafting' so far, Samsung tends to utilise it more
dynamically and widely, in order to access external sources of knowledge as well as to
unlearn obsolete routines required for discontinuous learning. The fact that the
corporate leader and some of top executives were replaced by managers who have new
perspectives has become an effective means to seek routine-breaking adaptation. In
addition, the recruitment of highly qualified scientists, engineers and graduates from
advanced countries, particularly the US, has played a positive role in absorbing valuable
tacit knowledge which may be not easy to acquire just through weak ties of networks
between firms. Such recruitment has also helped new ideas and knowledge over the
whole organisation.
The arguments above confirm that it is not easy to identify the boundary between
incremental and radical learning. Radical learning requires access to formal
knowledge. However, radical learning also needs tacit knowledge, by combining
formal knowledge with the tacit knowledge that certain individuals and organisation
possess (Howells, 2000; 2002). In addition, the conventional view that the radical
learning requires losing assets of incremental learning needs to recognise that radical
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learning can be sustained more effectively by utilising assets of incremental learning.
In sum, firms need to make efforts to sustain not only incremental learning and
innovation but also radical learning and innovation. Incremental learning and
innovation could be important for firms to maintain a competitive position for a given
market on a short-term basis. However, adaptation requires firms to do more than this.
In this sense, radical learning and innovation could be crucial for firms to gain its
competitive position for an emerging industry competition on a longer-term basis. In
doing this, firms need to strive to learn competitive knowledge through various learning
practices in order to build up organisational and technological competences.
8.5. The role of proximity in firm learning
This section deals with how proximity influences adaptation in a broad sense and
learning in a narrow sense. The concept of proximity is defined here as closeness
between agents within the web of complex human relationships. Proximity thus
implies multi-dimensional aspects that define the nature of the relationship between
agents. Particularly, dimensions of proximity, spatial and relational/organisational, are
all important to explain the role of proximity in learning. As discussed in Chapter 3,
proximity is crucial not only to understand adaptation strategies in response to radical
changes of the business environment, but also how processes and mechanisms of
learning occur in the firm.
Many economic geographers have argued as we saw in Chapter 3 that the effectiveness
of learning in the firm is based on advantage of geographical proximity between agents.
Most recently, some commentators, such as Amin (2000) and Rallet and Torre (1999),
have suggested that geographical proximity may not be the fundamental aspect and that
the issues of proximity should be understood in terms of relational/organisational
proximity between agents involved in learning processes. My evidence suggests that
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both geographical proximity and organisational proximity need to be grasped to
understand the role of proximity in sustaining adaptation and learning, rather than
arguing the superiority of any single side.
Firms try to promote innovativeness and the capability to learn by building
relational/organisational proximity. Spatial proximity would be viewed as a means of
sustaining this. The basic condition to increase relational/organisational proximity
between organisational members is to make an organisational environment that supports
frequent, intensive interaction and communication on a face-to-face basis. Leonard
and Swap (1999) who illustrate best the rationale put it:
All the technology in the world does not — at least yet, and maybe never — replace face-
to-face contact when it comes to brainstorming, inspiring passion, or enabling many
kinds of serendipitous discovery. A study of geographically dispersed product
development has found that team members conducting complex tasks always would
have preferred to have a "richer" medium (that is, on supporting more channels and
more interaction) than they actually had to use. Fax is fine for one-way
communication; e-mail for two-way, asynchronous and relatively emotionless
communication; telephone for communications that require no visual aids; and video
conferencing if no subtlety in body language is necessary. But face-to-face
communication is the richest multi-channel medium because it enables use of all the
senses, is interactive and immediate (p. 160; cited in Thrift, 2000, my emphasis).
Samsung, which pursues the extreme co-location of core functions centred around R&D
and operates an exclusive organisational space to undertake task force projects, shows
how firms try to use spatio-organisational proximity to facilitate learning as a kind of
adaptation strategy. In addition, examples that show processes of organisational
learning centred on R&D teams in LG and learning through task force activities in both
companies prove that frequent, intensive face-to-face communication is fundamentally
crucial to sustain learning, notably radical one.
Geographical proximity can be a useful means for gaining "rich" organisational
proximity which means it could be a better way of understanding, making a sense,
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learning one another in both mutual and recursive ways. This in turn implies, however,
that organisational proximity increased through the repetition of these processes can be
to a degree sustained at a distance with the help of ICT communication methods such as
e-mail, telephone and teleconferencing. Consequently, simply 'being there' is half-
sided.
In addition to this, examples of distanciated learning, such as the increasing
globalisation of R&D activities, business travels and the cooperative relationships
between distanciated firms, tell us that learning does not necessarily need geographical
proximity and need not necessarily be dependent upon localised learning. Corporate
learning takes place through networks of relationships across organisational spaces on a
global basis. All this is to emphasise the centrality of relational dimensions in the way
in which learning takes place and is realised.
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Appendix I Key Informants Interviewed
1. Corporate Managers
L-1, Manager, Management Team, DDD, LGE (23/07/00).
L-2, Manager, Management Team, DAD, LGE (14/07/00).
L-3, Manager, Management Team, DAD, LGE (20/07/00).
L-4, Team leader, Super A Team, DDD, LGE (22/07/00; 12/08/00)
L-5, Manager, Production Engineering Team, LGE (30/08/00).
L-6, Manager, Manufacturing Team, TV plant, LGE (31/08/00).
L-7, Supervisor, Manufacturing Team, DDD, LGE (29/08/00).
L-8, Senior Manager, Manufacturing Team, TV plant, LGE (29/08/00).
L-9, General Manager, New Display Product Lab., DDD, LGE (06/08/00).
L-10, Manager, Development Support Team (R&D), LGE (19/08/00; 03/09/00).
L-11, Chief engineer, DND Engineering Dept., LGE (26/07/00).
L-12, Manager, Digital Network Division, LGE (25/08/00).
L-13, Senior engineer, New Display Product Lab., LGE (01/08/00).
L-14, Senior engineer, Digital TV Lab., LGE (11/08/00).
L-15, Manager, DND Super A Team, LGE (26/07/00; 22/08/00).
L-16, Senior engineer, DND Engineering Dept., LGE (11/08/00).
L-17, Engineer, Digital TV Lab., LGE (06/07/00; 10/09/00).
L-18, Engineer, DND Engineering Dept., LGE (01/09/00).
5-1, Manager, Management Team, Consumer Electronics Division, SEC (30/09/00)
S-2, Manager, Management Team, Telecommunication Division, SEC (07/10/00).
S-3, Manager, Manufacturing Team, Telecom equipment plant, SEC (22/09/00).
S-4, Manager, Manufacturing Team, TV plant, SEC (23/09/00).
S-5, Manager, Semiconductor Lab., SEC (20/09/00).
S-6, Manager, Semiconductor Lab., SEC (20/09/00).
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S-7, Manager, Semiconductor Lab., SEC (21/09/00).
S-8, Engineer, Telecommunication Euipement Lab., SEC (21/09/00; 14/10/00).
S-9, Engineer, Digital TV Lab., SEC (08/09/00).
2. Industry Experts
K. Moon, Professor, Management, Kyungpook National University (07/09/00).
Y. Huh, Professor, Electronics, Kyungpook National University (29/06/00).
J. Lee, Director, Taegu Techno Park (28/06/00).
C. Lee, Professor, Economic Geography, Kyungpook National University (27/06/00).
G. Kwak, Director, Kumi Chamber of Commerce (05/07/00).
T. Kim, Civil servant, Changwon City council (20/07/00).
